Universality and programmability of quantum computers

Manin, Feynman, and Deutsch have viewed quantum computing as a kind of universal physical simulation procedure. Much of the writing about quantum logic circuits and quantum Turing machines has shown how these machines can simulate an arbitrary unitary transformation on a finite number of qubits. The problem of universality has been addressed most famously in a paper by Deutsch, and later by Bernstein and Vazirani as well as Kitaev and Solovay. The quantum logic circuit model, developed by Feynman and Deutsch, has been more prominent in the research literature than Deutsch's quantum Turing machines. Quantum Turing machines form a class closely related to deterministic and probabilistic Turing machines and one might hope to find a universal machine in this class. A universal machine is the basis of a notion of programmability. The extent to which universality has in fact been established by the pioneers in the field is examined and this key notion in theoretical computer science is scrutinised in quantum computing by distinguishing various connotations and concomitant results and problems.Comment: 17 pages, expands on arXiv:0705.3077v1 [quant-ph

Formal Arithmetic Before Grundgesetze

A speculative investigation of how Frege's logical views change between Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze and how this might have affected the formal development of logicism

Inferentialism and the reception of testimony

Peer reviewe

Dummett and Frege on Sense and Selbständigkeit

As part of his attack on Frege’s ‘myth’ that senses reside in the third realm, Dummett alleges that Frege’s view that all objects are selbständig (‘selfsubsistent’, ‘independent’) is an underlying mistake, since some objects depend upon others. Whatever the merits of Dummett’s other arguments against Frege’s conception of sense, this objection fails. First, Frege’s view that senses are third-realm entities is not traceable to his view that all objects are selbständig. Second, while Frege recognizes that there are objects that are dependent upon other objects, he does not take this to compromise the Selbständigkeit of any objects. Thus, Frege’s doctrine that objects are selbständig does not make the claim of absolute independence that Dummett appears to have taken it to make. Nevertheless, in order to make a good case against Frege based on the dependency of senses, Dummett need only establish his claim that senses depend upon expressions: appeal to an absolute conception of independence is unnecessary. However, Dummett’s arguments for the dependency of senses upon expressions are unsuccessful and they show that Dummett’s conception of what it is to be an expression also differs significantly from Frege’s

The Basic Laws of Cardinal Number

An overview of what Frege accomplishes in Part II of Grundgesetze, which contains proofs of axioms for arithmetic and several additional results concerning the finite, the infinite, and the relationship between these notions. One might think of this paper as an extremely compressed form of Part II of my book Reading Frege's Grundgesetze

Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws

Frege claims that the laws of logic are characterized by their “generality,” but it is hard to see how this could identify a special feature of those laws. I argue that we must understand this talk of generality in normative terms, but that what Frege says provides a normative demarcation of the logical laws only once we connect it with his thinking about truth and science. He means to be identifying the laws of logic as those that appear in every one of the scientific systems whose construction is the ultimate aim of science, and in which all truths have a place. Though an account of logic in terms of scientific systems might seem hopelessly antiquated, I argue that it is not: a basically Fregean account of the nature of logic still looks quite promising

A blind spot in undergraduate mathematics: The circular definition of the length of the circle, and how it can be turned into an enlightening example

We highlight the fact that in undergraduate calculus, the number pi is defined via the length of the circle, the length of the circle is defined as a certain value of an inverse trigonometric function, and this value is defined via pi, thus forming a circular definition. We present a way in which this error can be rectified. We explain that this error is instructive and can be used as an enlightening topic for discussing different approaches to mathematics with undergraduate students