The Road Not Taken: Horace Mann Charter Schools in Massachusetts

Drawing on research with legislators, leaders at the Massachusetts Department of Education, heads of the major education associations, and charter school experts, this policy analysis seeks to identify reasons for the lack of interest in Horace Mann charter schools. Once touted as a potentially revolutionary new school alternative, Horace Mann charter schools now are an almost totally abandoned education reform option. In stark contrast to the popularity of Commonwealth charter schools, not a single application for a Horace Mann charter has been filed in the past two years. The report finds that some of the challenges to the creation of Horace Mann charters include: political challenges, financial disincentives, and a general lack of information.Commonwealth charter schools, which operate as independent of mainstream school districts, are highly popular among educators, parents and the students who attend them. Yet, they have consistently generated remarkable acrimony and controversy within the education community. By contrast, Horace Mann charter schools, which operate as part of mainstream districts, hold political promise for diminishing the damaging controversies surrounding Commonwealth charter schools. This political promise has not, however, increased the appeal of Horace Mann charter schools. Even with more than twice as many Horace Mann charters available and a higher approval rate than Commonwealth charters, Horace Mann charter schools have remained grossly underutilized.Recommendations:This analysis recommends that legislators and policy makers create a sense of urgency about resurrecting the Horace Mann charter school option. Policy recommendations include: Clarifying roles and responsibilities for the leadership constituencies of Horace Mann charters;Extending the outreach efforts to promote Horace Mann charters as a model for addressing specific educational challenges, such as converting low performing schools; andEstablishing support mechanisms for prospective Horace Mann leaders.In order to adequately address these recommendations, the Rennie Center report calls for policy makers to take a more active interest in cultivating the Horace Mann model

Re-thinking Whitbread v. Walley: Liberal Justice and the Judicial Review of Damages Caps Under Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms

This paper advances a theoretically-driven reconstruction of s.7 Charter doctrine, which currently precludes protection for personal injury damages. Proceeding from a standpoint built on deontological strains of tort theory, the author dissects the reasoning in Whitbread v. Walley, the governing authority on the applicability of s. 7 to legislated damages caps. In three stages, the author argues that in the contemporary context, theoretical and doctrinal support for Whitbread is weak. First, when tort rights are theorized non-instrumentally, rights to personal injury damages fall squarely within the irreducible sphere of personal autonomy now protected by s. 7. Second, recent developments, both in civil recourse theory and in Charter doctrine, suggest thatrights topersonal injury damages can no longer be treated as beyond the realm of constitutionaljurisprudence. Third, and most importantly, the specter of Lochner v. New York can no longer be invoked tojustify the wholesale exclusion of tort rights from s. 7protection. Discrete heads of damage can be separated into two categories: those based entirely on rights to bodily integrity (bodily claims), and those based at leastpartly on distributive entitlements (distributive claims). The author argues that constitutional doctrine can protect morally legitimate bodily claims by protecting some heads of damage (nonpecuniary damage and cost of care), and by leaving heads of damage based on morally imperfect distributive claims (past income loss and loss of earning capacity) to the policy discretion of the state. The article concludes with a short discussion of s. 1 issues, and of some possible broader applications of the bodily - distributive claim framework

Are you willing to be made nothing? Is Commonwealth reform possible?

A new round of Commonwealth reform proposals commenced at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting of 2009. An ensuing report, titled A Commonwealth of the people: time for urgent reform, contained a long list of proposals that eventually resulted in 2013 in the adoption of the Commonwealth Charter. Many classic international organizations are in need of reform, but this is, of course, challenging. This new Commonwealth reform process will not lead to satisfying changes and will not make it a more relevant actor in global governance. The year 2015 marks the Commonwealth Secretariat’s first half-century. We take this symbolic marker to push for a forward-looking exercise, arguing that because the true nature of the Commonwealth is often misunderstood, a better understanding of the organization is essential before embarking on any successful change-management project. In the article we identify four different kinds of Commonwealth: three of a ‘formal’ nature (the official, bureaucratic and the people’s Commonwealth) and a fourth ‘informal’ one (Commonwealth Plus). By describing the potential of these four different kinds of Commonwealth, we can anticipate better the challenges with which the Commonwealth network is faced, both internal (including its mandate, its British imperial past and dominance, the organization’s leadership and its membership) and external (other international organizations, other Commonwealths, rivalry with regional organizations and the rise of global policy networks). Consequently, this should lead to a better and more sustainable debate about the Commonwealth’s future role in global governance

Buffalo City Comptroller

Under the Buffalo Charter and Code, the Comptroller is the head of the Department of Audit and Control. The Department of Audit and Control is broken down into three divisions: Division of Audit, Division of Accounting, and Division of Investment and Debt Management. The Division of Audit is headed by the City Auditor; the Division of Accounting is headed by the City Accountant, and the Division of Investment and Debt Management is headed by the Investment and Debt Management Officer. All heads are Deputies of the Comptroller who can be appointed and removed at the pleasure of the Comptroller. The City Auditor exercises all powers and duties with respect to audits and approves all checks signed by the Comptroller or the Comptroller’s Deputies. The City Accountant exercises all powers and duties with respect to accounts and accounting and prepares all checks. The Investment and Debt Management Officer exercises all the powers and duties with respect to depositories, security, and investment of general fund moneys

‘To be or not to be?’ The African Union and its Member States Parties' Participation as High Contracting States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)

This article examines, under the light of international law, African States’ fascination and fall-out with the ICC. It examines the challenge to international institutions and to international justice for high crimes posed by the quasi-supranational African Union’s (AU) emergent practice of ordering its Member States Parties not to co-operate with ICC Arrest Warrants against African Heads of States/Governments. The legal substance of AU claims and the AU’s own interpretations of the standards of sovereign immunity and universal jurisdiction are also examined. The article shows that emergent AU recalcitrance to ICC orders is difficult to dismiss even though it may be contrary to current international law on the Law of Treaties which nullifies resort to domestic local law as a justification for breach of the strictures of international law. In particular, AU claims that universal jurisdiction and sovereign immunity should be redefined to suit their concerns contradict recent international efforts to combat impunity for international crimes

United Humanity: from "UN 2.0" to "UN 3.0" The conceptual model of the United Nations for the XXI century

The conceptual model of United Nations reform - "UN 3.0" includes the General Program of Action on UN Reform, consisting of two stages. The first stage for 2020-2025 envisages the transformation of the main organs of the UN - the General Assembly and the Security Council with measures to improve the effectiveness of the management system, address the "veto problem", problem of financing, improve staff work and administrative and financial control, strengthen UN media, improvement of work with the global civil society. The General Assembly is converted into the General All-Parliamentary Assembly of the UN. In the structure of the Assembly, the Council for Law is being established, which coordinates the activities of UN structures in the field of law. To coordinate the activities of the UN in the field of human rights and civil society, ethical issues, the General all-parliamentary Assembly creates the Council on ethics, human rights and civil society and transforms the Committee on information into the Council on public information and communication with civil society. The structure of the Council includes all UN media. The reform of the UN Security Council is carried out in three sub-stages. At the 1st sub-stage (2020-2021) the Security Council is transformed into the Council of Existential Security (CES). The membership of the CES is increased to 25 member countries, of which five countries have the right of the unconditional (absolute, eternal) veto: Great Britain, France, China, Russian Federation, USA. The General All-Parliamentary Assembly elects 15 new permanent members of the Council of Existential Security with the right of the conditional (limited) veto: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, South Africa, Nigeria, Pakistan , Turkey, Japan (if they fulfill the mandatory restrictive conditions). At this sub-stage, the CES elects also five non-permanent members with the right of a conditional (limited) veto when they meet the mandatory restrictive conditions, with a rotation period of 2 years from geographical regions (or regional unions): Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific Ocean (2 places), Eastern Europe. On the second sub-stage (2022-2023), subject to the effective activity of the CES of the enlarged composition and compliance with mandatory restrictive conditions, new permanent members of the "Existential Security Council" are elected with the right of a conditional (limited) veto: Iran, Spain, Poland, Saudi Arabia. Members of the CES may be regional unions, whose member countries are not represented in the CES, but still have one vote with the right of a conditional (limited) veto. Two essential levels of the veto: 1. Unconditional (absolute, eternal) veto is the historical right of veto of the five permanent members of the Council of Existential Security - Great Britain, China, Russia, USA, France; 2. Сonditional (limited) veto is the veto of other permanent and non-permanent members of the Council of Existential Security. The right of veto is a unique international school for the achievement of consensus, a school of high democracy for Humanity, a reliable guarantee of the viability of the UN structure. The Council for Existential Security centralises the management of the UN subsidiary bodies with the expansion of their security functions: the Military Staff Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Committee for the Prevention of the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons, the Sanctions Committees and other committees. On the basis of the decision of the Council of Existential Security, the General All-Parliamentary Assembly creates permanent contingents of UN peacekeeping and counter-terrorism forces. In addition, two Centers are being created in the structure of the Council for Existential Security: the World Center for the Elimination of the Effects of Technogenic and Natural Disasters with branches on all continents and the World Center for the Analysis of Existential Risks and the Overall Security Strategy. The Center is developing the Programs of research and monitoring of global existential threats and risks. In order to increase the level of legitimacy and authority of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Rules of procedure for elections to this post are changing. Each member country of the Council for Existential Security represents one of the most authoritative candidates for election to the post of Secretary General at the session of the General All-Parliamentary Assembly, with the possibility of nominating candidates from other countries, including those not members of the Council for Existential Security. Elections are held in two rounds during one day of the session of the Assembly. The Legal Committee of the UN General Assembly is developing a Program for the Reform of the Judicial System of the United Nations, which takes into account the proposals of the previous international discussion and determines the scope and terms of the reform of the courts. In accordance with the Program of Action on UN Reform for 2020-2025, reforms are under way in the structure of the Economic and Social Council. The central task of the reform is to strengthen the coordinating role of ECOSOC in the entire system of UN-related specialized agencies, funds and programs related to the Council. The key task of the UN reform is the solution of the financing problem. A unified "UN Open Budget "Solidarity XXI" is being created, including the financing of peacekeeping operations and other expenses. Each country, a member of the United Nations, lists in an established period, once a year, an Existential contribution - the Earth Tax. The Earth Tax for each UN member state is established on the basis of four scales of calculation: Scale I - for 5 permanent members of the Council of Existential Security, who have the right of absolute (absolute) veto; Scale II - for the permanent members of the SEB, who have the right to a conditional (limited) veto; Scale III - for non-permanent members of the SEB, who have the right to a conditional (limited) veto; Scale IV - for all other UN member countries. The program of action on UN reform includes a set of measures to ensure transparent work of the International Civil Service Commission with the involvement of the UN media. To strengthen control functions in the sphere of personnel policy, administrative and financial management, the General All-Parliamentary Assembly of the United Nations establishes the Permanent Commission on Ethics and Administrative and Financial Control. All members of the Commission, members of the Committees and auditors are independent in their activities from the leadership of the United Nations, its funds and programs. The General All-Parliamentary Assembly completes the first stage of the Program of Action on UN Reform in 2025 and, following an open discussion, introduces a single language of international communication - Esperanto and approves it as the official language of the United Nations. With a view to more effective work of the central UN governing bodies in the face of increasing existential threats and risks, reducing the current expenses for the maintenance of the central bodies of the UN, the Council for Existential Security and the General All-Parliamentary Assembly decide on the relocation of the UN headquarters to Iceland. The UN building complex in New York is transferred to preferential use of non-governmental organizations, which contribute to the implementation of the goals of the United Nations. At the second stage of the UN reform in the period 2026-2028, additional necessary transformations are being made in the UN system. At the end of the first stage of the reform, taking into account the reforms carried out by the main organs of the United Nations and the internal improvement of the work of all its structures, the United Nations Program of Action for the years 2026-2028 is being developed

The International Criminal Court\u27s Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms: The Indictment of President Omar Al Bashir

Part I introduces the Rome Statute and highlights the portions of the Rome Statute that leave the ICC vulnerable to member states that violate the Rome Statute without any clear punishment for the violation. In particular, Part I focuses on the expansive jurisdiction and the limited enforcement mechanisms that the Rome Statute bestows upon the ICC. Part II illustrates the ICC\u27s vulnerability under the Rome Statute by using the example of the ICC\u27s indictment of President Al Bashir and examining the existing tension between the ICC and the African Union ( AU ). Part III argues that the ICC must strengthen or expand its enforcement mechanisms in order to become a legitimate force in the international forum. It suggests three possible ways to reach this goal: suspension, expulsion, and implementation of United Nations ( UN ) Security Council sanctions