Government mandated blocking of foreign Web content

Blocking of foreign Web content by Internet access providers has been a hot topic for the last 18 months in Germany. Since fall 2001 the state of North-Rhine-Westphalia very actively tries to mandate such blocking. This paper will take a technical view on the problems imposed by the blocking orders and blocking content at access or network provider level in general. It will also give some empirical data on the effects of the blocking orders to help in the legal assessment of the orders.Comment: Preprint, revised 30.6.200

Revisiting network neutrality

The paper discusses the topical subject of network neutrality, from a US and European legal perspective. The article will begin by first defining network neutrality before addressing the underpinning technology and will then compare the legal approaches adopted by Europe and the US. In Europe, there is an existing electronic communications regulatory framework which can be used to address the network neutrality problem rendering any further legislation unnecessary and perhaps, detrimental to the current framework. In the US, however, the main concern arising is a potential for a 'fragmented' internet, which leads to our conclusion that network neutrality legislation is necessary on multiple levels. The article will conclude that the US' stance on network neutrality legislation will cause a seismic shift in the way we view technology and the way that networks are accessed and utilised

Internet Censorship: An Integrative Review of Technologies Employed to Limit Access to the Internet, Monitor User Actions, and their Effects on Culture

The following conducts an integrative review of the current state of Internet Censorship in China, Iran, and Russia, highlights common circumvention technologies (CTs), and analyzes the effects Internet Censorship has on cultures. The author spends a large majority of the paper delineating China’s Internet infrastructure and prevalent Internet Censorship Technologies/Techniques (ICTs), paying particular attention to how the ICTs function at a technical level. The author further analyzes the state of Internet Censorship in both Iran and Russia from a broader perspective to give a better understanding of Internet Censorship around the globe. The author also highlights specific CTs, explaining how they function at a technical level. Findings indicate that among all three nation-states, state control of Internet Service Providers is the backbone of Internet Censorship. Specifically, within China, it is discovered that the infrastructure functions as an Intranet, thereby creating a closed system. Further, BGP Hijacking, DNS Poisoning, and TCP RST attacks are analyzed to understand their use-case within China. It is found that Iran functions much like a weaker version of China in regards to ICTs, with the state seemingly using the ICT of Bandwidth Throttling rather consistently. Russia’s approach to Internet censorship, in stark contrast to Iran and China, is found to rely mostly on the legislative system and fear to implement censorship, though their technical level of ICT implementation grows daily. TOR, VPNs, and Proxy Servers are all analyzed and found to be robust CTs. Drawing primarily from the examples given throughout the paper, the author highlights the various effects of Internet Censorship on culture – noting that at its core, Internet Censorship destroys democracy

Internet Filters: A Public Policy Report (Second edition; fully revised and updated)

No sooner was the Internet upon us than anxiety arose over the ease of accessing pornography and other controversial content. In response, entrepreneurs soon developed filtering products. By the end of the decade, a new industry had emerged to create and market Internet filters....Yet filters were highly imprecise from the beginning. The sheer size of the Internet meant that identifying potentially offensive content had to be done mechanically, by matching "key" words and phrases; hence, the blocking of Web sites for "Middlesex County," or words such as "magna cum laude". Internet filters are crude and error-prone because they categorize expression without regard to its context, meaning, and value. Yet these sweeping censorship tools are now widely used in companies, homes, schools, and libraries. Internet filters remain a pressing public policy issue to all those concerned about free expression, education, culture, and democracy. This fully revised and updated report surveys tests and studies of Internet filtering products from the mid-1990s through 2006. It provides an essential resource for the ongoing debate

Systemization of Pluggable Transports for Censorship Resistance

An increasing number of countries implement Internet censorship at different scales and for a variety of reasons. In particular, the link between the censored client and entry point to the uncensored network is a frequent target of censorship due to the ease with which a nation-state censor can control it. A number of censorship resistance systems have been developed thus far to help circumvent blocking on this link, which we refer to as link circumvention systems (LCs). The variety and profusion of attack vectors available to a censor has led to an arms race, leading to a dramatic speed of evolution of LCs. Despite their inherent complexity and the breadth of work in this area, there is no systematic way to evaluate link circumvention systems and compare them against each other. In this paper, we (i) sketch an attack model to comprehensively explore a censor's capabilities, (ii) present an abstract model of a LC, a system that helps a censored client communicate with a server over the Internet while resisting censorship, (iii) describe an evaluation stack that underscores a layered approach to evaluate LCs, and (iv) systemize and evaluate existing censorship resistance systems that provide link circumvention. We highlight open challenges in the evaluation and development of LCs and discuss possible mitigations.Comment: Content from this paper was published in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETS), Volume 2016, Issue 4 (July 2016) as "SoK: Making Sense of Censorship Resistance Systems" by Sheharbano Khattak, Tariq Elahi, Laurent Simon, Colleen M. Swanson, Steven J. Murdoch and Ian Goldberg (DOI 10.1515/popets-2016-0028

Framing the Policy Debate: Competing Portrayals of Technology in Online Content Regulation and Lessons from Science and Technology Studies

In an effort to control access to certain online content, the U.S. Congress has repeatedly mandated the use of powerful regulatory technologies such as Domain Name System blocking, Internet Service Provider filtering, age verification systems, and commercial filtering software. The application of these enforcement mechanisms may have serious implications for constitutional rights, individual freedom, and autonomy. This research will show that policies including the Communications Decency Act, the Child Online Protection Act, the Children\u27s Internet Protection Act, the Stop Online Piracy Act, and the PROTECT Intellectual Property Act all have the potential to negatively impact these rights. Although the motivations for these policies differ, each requires the use of technologies that legislators have often portrayed as instrumentally useful tools. The primary question at the core of this project is to ask how Congress may have misunderstood these mechanisms and may have failed to recognize the political and constitutional impact they can have. By understanding how lawmakers have portrayed technology, it will be possible to offer recommendations for injecting a more critical understanding of these regulatory technologies within the policy process. This understanding relies on core concepts from Science and Technology Studies

Caught in the Seamless Web: Does the Internet's Global Reach Justify Less Freedom of Speech?

A federal appellate court will decide this year whether French anti-discrimination law can restrict freedom of speech on U.S.-based websites that are accessible in France. A Paris court ruled in 2000 that the Yahoo! website violated French law because its users offered for sale certain Nazi artifacts. However, to force compliance with the order, French plaintiffs must seek enforcement from a U.S. court. In response, Yahoo! sought a declaratory ruling and a federal district court held that enforcing the French order would violate the First Amendment. The matter is now on appeal. The Yahoo! case presents the question of whether the Internet should be governed by myriad local censorship laws from around the world. U.S. courts have held uniformly that the Internet should receive the highest degree of First Amendment protection. They have been influenced profoundly by the medium's global reach and have invalidated most restrictions so as not to interrupt the "never-ending worldwide conversation" that the Internet makes possible. A contrary result in the Yahoo! case would embrace a very different philosophy -- that Internet speakers must "show their papers" at each nation's borders to ensure that their speech is acceptable to local authorities. Other nations may treat their citizens as fragile children if they wish, or worse, as enemies of the state. But U.S. courts should not permit the seeds of foreign censorship to be planted on U.S. soil by finding that such restrictions are enforceable here