Generative agents for player decision modeling in games

This paper presents a method for modeling player decision making through the use of agents as AI-driven personas. The paper argues that artificial agents, as generative player models, have properties that allow them to be used as psychometrically valid, abstract simulations of a human player’s internal decision making processes. Such agents can then be used to interpret human decision making, as personas and playtesting tools in the game design process, as baselines for adapting agents to mimic classes of human players, or as believable, human-like opponents. This argument is explored in a crowdsourced decision making experiment, in which the decisions of human players are recorded in a small-scale dungeon themed puzzle game. Human decisions are compared to the decisions of a number of a priori defined “archetypical” agent-personas, and the humans are characterized by their likeness to or divergence from these. Essentially, at each step the action of the human is compared to what actions a number of reinforcement-learned agents would have taken in the same situation, where each agent is trained using a different reward scheme. Finally, extensions are outlined for adapting the agents to represent sub-classes found in the human decision making traces.peer-reviewe

Learning the Structure and Parameters of Large-Population Graphical Games from Behavioral Data

We consider learning, from strictly behavioral data, the structure and parameters of linear influence games (LIGs), a class of parametric graphical games introduced by Irfan and Ortiz (2014). LIGs facilitate causal strategic inference (CSI): Making inferences from causal interventions on stable behavior in strategic settings. Applications include the identification of the most influential individuals in large (social) networks. Such tasks can also support policy-making analysis. Motivated by the computational work on LIGs, we cast the learning problem as maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) of a generative model defined by pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). Our simple formulation uncovers the fundamental interplay between goodness-of-fit and model complexity: good models capture equilibrium behavior within the data while controlling the true number of equilibria, including those unobserved. We provide a generalization bound establishing the sample complexity for MLE in our framework. We propose several algorithms including convex loss minimization (CLM) and sigmoidal approximations. We prove that the number of exact PSNE in LIGs is small, with high probability; thus, CLM is sound. We illustrate our approach on synthetic data and real-world U.S. congressional voting records. We briefly discuss our learning framework's generality and potential applicability to general graphical games.Comment: Journal of Machine Learning Research. (accepted, pending publication.) Last conference version: submitted March 30, 2012 to UAI 2012. First conference version: entitled, Learning Influence Games, initially submitted on June 1, 2010 to NIPS 201

Modeling Human Ad Hoc Coordination

Whether in groups of humans or groups of computer agents, collaboration is most effective between individuals who have the ability to coordinate on a joint strategy for collective action. However, in general a rational actor will only intend to coordinate if that actor believes the other group members have the same intention. This circular dependence makes rational coordination difficult in uncertain environments if communication between actors is unreliable and no prior agreements have been made. An important normative question with regard to coordination in these ad hoc settings is therefore how one can come to believe that other actors will coordinate, and with regard to systems involving humans, an important empirical question is how humans arrive at these expectations. We introduce an exact algorithm for computing the infinitely recursive hierarchy of graded beliefs required for rational coordination in uncertain environments, and we introduce a novel mechanism for multiagent coordination that uses it. Our algorithm is valid in any environment with a finite state space, and extensions to certain countably infinite state spaces are likely possible. We test our mechanism for multiagent coordination as a model for human decisions in a simple coordination game using existing experimental data. We then explore via simulations whether modeling humans in this way may improve human-agent collaboration.Comment: AAAI 201

The Dreaming Variational Autoencoder for Reinforcement Learning Environments

Reinforcement learning has shown great potential in generalizing over raw sensory data using only a single neural network for value optimization. There are several challenges in the current state-of-the-art reinforcement learning algorithms that prevent them from converging towards the global optima. It is likely that the solution to these problems lies in short- and long-term planning, exploration and memory management for reinforcement learning algorithms. Games are often used to benchmark reinforcement learning algorithms as they provide a flexible, reproducible, and easy to control environment. Regardless, few games feature a state-space where results in exploration, memory, and planning are easily perceived. This paper presents The Dreaming Variational Autoencoder (DVAE), a neural network based generative modeling architecture for exploration in environments with sparse feedback. We further present Deep Maze, a novel and flexible maze engine that challenges DVAE in partial and fully-observable state-spaces, long-horizon tasks, and deterministic and stochastic problems. We show initial findings and encourage further work in reinforcement learning driven by generative exploration.Comment: Best Student Paper Award, Proceedings of the 38th SGAI International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Cambridge, UK, 2018, Artificial Intelligence XXXV, 201

Building Machines That Learn and Think Like People

Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has renewed interest in building systems that learn and think like people. Many advances have come from using deep neural networks trained end-to-end in tasks such as object recognition, video games, and board games, achieving performance that equals or even beats humans in some respects. Despite their biological inspiration and performance achievements, these systems differ from human intelligence in crucial ways. We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly human-like learning and thinking machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn, and how they learn it. Specifically, we argue that these machines should (a) build causal models of the world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recognition problems; (b) ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology, to support and enrich the knowledge that is learned; and (c) harness compositionality and learning-to-learn to rapidly acquire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations. We suggest concrete challenges and promising routes towards these goals that can combine the strengths of recent neural network advances with more structured cognitive models.Comment: In press at Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Open call for commentary proposals (until Nov. 22, 2016). https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/information/calls-for-commentary/open-calls-for-commentar