23,194 research outputs found
Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs
We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining games with complete information. We show that the set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for different strictly positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set are strictly positive. Furthermore, we prove that every bargaining game is a market game. By using the results of Qin (1993) we conclude that for every possible vector of weights of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists an economy that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive payoff vector. We relate the literature of Trockel (1996, 2005) with the ideas of Qin (1993). Our result can be seen as a market foundation for every asymmetric Nash bargaining solution in analogy to the results on non-cooperative foundations of cooperative games.Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution, Competitive Payoffs, Market Games
Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games
We prove the existence of subsidy free and sustainable pricing schedule in multiproduct contestable markets. We allow firms to discriminate the local markets that are composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Results are obtained under an assumption of fair sharing cost and under boundary condition of demand functions. The pricing problem is modelled in terms of equilibrium-core allocations of parameterized cost games.Cooperative games, contestable markets, sustainability, subsidy free, parameterized cost games.
An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem
We propose a novel method to find Nash equilibria in games with binary
decision variables by including compensation payments and
incentive-compatibility constraints from non-cooperative game theory directly
into an optimization framework in lieu of using first order conditions of a
linearization, or relaxation of integrality conditions. The reformulation
offers a new approach to obtain and interpret dual variables to binary
constraints using the benefit or loss from deviation rather than marginal
relaxations. The method endogenizes the trade-off between overall (societal)
efficiency and compensation payments necessary to align incentives of
individual players. We provide existence results and conditions under which
this problem can be solved as a mixed-binary linear program.
We apply the solution approach to a stylized nodal power-market equilibrium
problem with binary on-off decisions. This illustrative example shows that our
approach yields an exact solution to the binary Nash game with compensation. We
compare different implementations of actual market rules within our model, in
particular constraints ensuring non-negative profits (no-loss rule) and
restrictions on the compensation payments to non-dispatched generators. We
discuss the resulting equilibria in terms of overall welfare, efficiency, and
allocational equity
Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core
[cat] En aquest treball introduĂŻm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs dâassignaciĂł de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir dâun joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core dâaquests jocs dâassignaciĂł Ă©s estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.[eng] We introduce the class of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, which generalizes the well-kown two-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games to situations with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the extreme core allocations of any multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game by means of an associated convex game defined on the set of sectors instead of the set of sellers and buyers. We also study when the core of these games is stable in the sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern
The effect of (non-)competing brokers on the quality and price of differentiated internet services
Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in (virtualized) service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players, i.e. providers and brokers, at each level compete in a Bertrand game while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providersâ level. We also study cooperation among a subset of brokers. Numerical simulations demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.Accepted manuscrip
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