We propose a novel method to find Nash equilibria in games with binary
decision variables by including compensation payments and
incentive-compatibility constraints from non-cooperative game theory directly
into an optimization framework in lieu of using first order conditions of a
linearization, or relaxation of integrality conditions. The reformulation
offers a new approach to obtain and interpret dual variables to binary
constraints using the benefit or loss from deviation rather than marginal
relaxations. The method endogenizes the trade-off between overall (societal)
efficiency and compensation payments necessary to align incentives of
individual players. We provide existence results and conditions under which
this problem can be solved as a mixed-binary linear program.
We apply the solution approach to a stylized nodal power-market equilibrium
problem with binary on-off decisions. This illustrative example shows that our
approach yields an exact solution to the binary Nash game with compensation. We
compare different implementations of actual market rules within our model, in
particular constraints ensuring non-negative profits (no-loss rule) and
restrictions on the compensation payments to non-dispatched generators. We
discuss the resulting equilibria in terms of overall welfare, efficiency, and
allocational equity