Gap functions for quasi-equilibria

An approach for solving quasi-equilibrium problems (QEPs) is proposed relying on gap functions, which allow reformulating QEPs as global optimization problems. The (generalized) smoothness properties of a gap function are analysed and an upper estimate of its Clarke directional derivative is given. Monotonicity assumptions on both the equilibrium and constraining bifunctions are a key tool to guarantee that all the stationary points of a gap function actually solve QEP. A few classes of constraints satisfying such assumptions are identified covering a wide range of situations. Relying on these results, a descent method for solving QEP is devised and its convergence proved. Finally, error bounds are given in order to guarantee the boundedness of the sequence generated by the algorithm

Gap functions for quasi-equilibria

An approach for solving quasi-equilibrium problems (QEPs) is proposed relying on gap functions, which allow reformulating QEPs as global optimization problems. The (generalized) smoothness properties of a gap function are analysed and an upper estimates of its Clarke directional derivative is given. Monotonicity assumptions on both the equilibrium and constraining bifunctions are a key tool to guarantee that all the stationary points of a gap function actually solve QEP. A few classes of constraints satisfying such assumptions are identified covering a wide range of situations. Relying on these results, a descent method for solving QEP is devised and its convergence proved. Finally, error bounds are given in order to guarantee the boundedness of the sequence generated by the algorithm

A primer of swarm equilibria

We study equilibrium configurations of swarming biological organisms subject to exogenous and pairwise endogenous forces. Beginning with a discrete dynamical model, we derive a variational description of the corresponding continuum population density. Equilibrium solutions are extrema of an energy functional, and satisfy a Fredholm integral equation. We find conditions for the extrema to be local minimizers, global minimizers, and minimizers with respect to infinitesimal Lagrangian displacements of mass. In one spatial dimension, for a variety of exogenous forces, endogenous forces, and domain configurations, we find exact analytical expressions for the equilibria. These agree closely with numerical simulations of the underlying discrete model.The exact solutions provide a sampling of the wide variety of equilibrium configurations possible within our general swarm modeling framework. The equilibria typically are compactly supported and may contain $\delta$-concentrations or jump discontinuities at the edge of the support. We apply our methods to a model of locust swarms, which are observed in nature to consist of a concentrated population on the ground separated from an airborne group. Our model can reproduce this configuration; quasi-two-dimensionality of the model plays a critical role.Comment: 38 pages, submitted to SIAM J. Appl. Dyn. Sy

Assessment techniques, database design and software facilities for thermodynamics and diffusion

The purpose of this article is to give a set of recommendations to producers of assessed thermodynamic data, who may be involved in either the critical evaluation of limited chemical systems or the creation and dissemination of larger thermodynamic databases. Also, it is hoped that reviewers and editors of scientific publications in this field will find some of the information useful. Good practice in the assessment process is essential, particularly as datasets from many different sources may be combined together into a single database. With this in mind, we highlight some problems that can arise during the assessment process and we propose a quality assurance procedure. It is worth mentioning at this point, that the provision of reliable assessed thermodynamic data relies heavily on the availability of high quality experimental information. The different software packages for thermodynamics and diffusion are described here only briefly

Escaping expectation traps: how much commitment is required?

We study the degree of precommitment that is required to eliminate multiplicity of policy equilibria, which arise if the policy maker acts under pure discretion. We apply a framework developed by Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Debertoli and Nunes (2010) to a standard New Keynesian model with government debt. We demonstrate the existence of expectation traps under limited commitment and identify the minimum degree of commitment which is needed to escape from these traps. We find that the degree of precommitment which is sufficient to generate uniqueness of the Pareto-preferred equilibrium requires the policy maker to stay in office for a period of two to five years. This is consistent with monetary policy arrangements in many developed countries

Optimal Linear Precoding Strategies for Wideband Non-Cooperative Systems based on Game Theory-Part I: Nash Equilibria

In this two-parts paper we propose a decentralized strategy, based on a game-theoretic formulation, to find out the optimal precoding/multiplexing matrices for a multipoint-to-multipoint communication system composed of a set of wideband links sharing the same physical resources, i.e., time and bandwidth. We assume, as optimality criterion, the achievement of a Nash equilibrium and consider two alternative optimization problems: 1) the competitive maximization of mutual information on each link, given constraints on the transmit power and on the spectral mask imposed by the radio spectrum regulatory bodies; and 2) the competitive maximization of the transmission rate, using finite order constellations, under the same constraints as above, plus a constraint on the average error probability. In Part I of the paper, we start by showing that the solution set of both noncooperative games is always nonempty and contains only pure strategies. Then, we prove that the optimal precoding/multiplexing scheme for both games leads to a channel diagonalizing structure, so that both matrix-valued problems can be recast in a simpler unified vector power control game, with no performance penalty. Thus, we study this simpler game and derive sufficient conditions ensuring the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, although derived under stronger constraints, incorporating for example spectral mask constraints, our uniqueness conditions have broader validity than previously known conditions. Finally, we assess the goodness of the proposed decentralized strategy by comparing its performance with the performance of a Pareto-optimal centralized scheme. To reach the Nash equilibria of the game, in Part II, we propose alternative distributed algorithms, along with their convergence conditions.Comment: Paper submitted to IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, September 22, 2005. Revised March 14, 2007. Accepted June 5, 2007. To be published on IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 2007. To appear on IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 200

An Investigation of the Gains from Commitment in Monetary Policy

This paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal commitment plans, to be tempted to renege on them, and to succumb to this temptation with a constant exogenous probability known to the private sector. By interpreting this probability as a continuous measure of the (lack of) credibility of the monetary policy authority, we investigate the welfare effect of a marginal increase in credibility. Our main finding is that, in a simple model of the monetary transmission mechanism, most of the gains from commitment accrue at relatively low levels of credibility. In our benchmark calibration, a commitment expected to last for only 6 quarters is enough to bridge 75% of the welfare gap between discretion and commitment. This seems to justify the well known concern of monetary policy makers about their credibility, even in a world with limited access to commitment technologiesCommitment, discretion, credibility, welfare