Timor-Leste: stability at what cost?

UN peacekeepers withdrew from Timor-Leste in December 2012, ending a thirteen-year presence after two successful elections underscored the country’s continued stability. Pragmatic decisions by local leaders after the 2006 crisis to use swelling petroleum industry revenues to buy peace have paid dividends. But that strategy rests on three anchors: the authority of the current prime minister; the deferral of institutional reforms in the security sector; and the flow of oil and gas revenues from the Timor Sea. The dependence on the petroleum industry is unsustainable, and the need to develop alternative anchors may be more urgent than it appears. Timor-Leste has recovered well from the 2006 crisis, when tensions spilled onto the streets as police, army and disaffected veterans fought one another, and over 100,000 Dili residents were displaced. Oil and gas revenues have helped provide the cure. The Petroleum Fund began to swell after production from the Timor Sea began in 2004 and now stands at $11.7 billion. The money gave the Aliança da Maioria Parlamentar (AMP) government headed by Xanana Gusmão the confidence and the resources to spend its way out of conflict. It gave rewards to the surrendering “petitioners”, whose desertions from the army had set the crisis in motion; offered cash grants to persuade the displaced to return; funded lavish pensions for disgruntled veterans; and put potential spoilers to work pursuant to lucrative construction contracts. The 2012 elections bore testament to greater political stability but placed power in the hands of a few. Gusmão’s party returned with a broader mandate and streamlined coalition; his former guerrilla army subordinate (and recent armed forces chief), Taur Matan Ruak, became president. Both mobilised the structures of the resistance to aid their elections, while business interests also played a large role in the parliamentary poll. Though he formed a 55-member cabinet, Gusmão has been reluctant to delegate political authority to potential successors, instead centralising power under himself and a few key ministers. All political parties face internal problems, and the question of who will succeed such a dominant figure remains. Ruak is one possibility – he has been a vocal government critic, providing some accountability not offered by a weak parliament. But there are few other obvious successors, and the transition could be messy. Overly centralised political power sharpens risks from the dual lack of effective oversight and of adequate institutional arrangements in the security sector. Gusmão, who reappointed himself joint security and defence minister, has used his personal authority to tamp down tensions among and between the various security forces rather than make long-term policy. The police are without clear leadership and hobbled by inadequate investigative skills and discipline problems. Proposals to establish a separate criminal investigation service to address the poor track record of prosecutions may only weaken the force as a whole. The military has become more professional, but as it doubles in size and deploys across the country, the reluctance to outline a clear division of labour between the security forces poses greater risks. That task will not be made easier by the anomaly that though the country faces almost no external threats, the army’s ambitions are expanding. The government will also have to work harder to ensure improved and more equitable returns on its investments. The Petroleum Fund provides considerable independence from donor-driven priorities and freedom to spend without going into debt. The government views spending as an economic stimulus measure and improvements to infrastructure as a prerequisite to sustainable growth, but returns have been woeful. In recent years, over half the state budget has been devoted to construction projects, but actual execution has sometimes seemed an afterthought. Limited investment in the weak education and health sectors is not doing enough to ensure the welfare of future generations. The greatest challenge facing this government will be to make progress in providing economic opportunities without exhausting national wealth. It will have to prioritise the search for more sustainable employment for a rapidly growing workforce, driven by one of the world’s highest birth rates. It will also need to find ways to tackle the perceived growth in social inequality, as elites largely centred in the capital benefit from access to increased spending. It must produce visible results against alleged corruption. And in designing major measures, such as land-titling legislation and decentralisation, it will need to work with parliament and civil society in order to produce legislation and policies that enjoy a greater degree of public legitimacy. Timor-Leste deserves praise for the success with which it has implemented pragmatic policies designed to bring rapid stability following the 2006 crisis. Promoting confidence at home and abroad is important for transforming any post-conflict economy. But it likely has a very limited window of opportunity during which to make investments – both political and financial – that might mitigate the still real risks of an eventual return to conflict

Timor-Leste after Xanana Gusmão

This report looks at the highly personalistic system of post-independence governance in which a tiny elite of ageing resistance leaders has dominated political life. Overview When Xanana Gusmão steps down as Timor-Leste’s prime minister, it will mark the beginning of a long-deferred transition of power from the closed circle of ageing leaders that has dominated the country’s politics since the nationalist movement began. The timing remains unclear. Many are now sceptical he will resign in September as he said he would in late 2013, but it seems clear that he will leave office before the next election in 2017. His departure could signal a healthy move away from highly personalised governance to greater institutional development, particularly in the security sector. His successor will face the challenge of how to address potential sources of social and political unrest without Gusmão’s unparalleled authority. In the twelve years since the country’s independence, all the threats to stability have been internal. Many have emerged from bitter feuds among members of Falintil, the guerrilla army that fought for independence, as well as jockeying by members of the former diaspora elite for influence after independence. Both have obstructed institutional development of the country’s security forces; together, they have sometimes led to violence. Both were important factors in a violent upheaval in 2006 that saw the state’s command of its security forces briefly collapse. Gusmão’s announced plan to step down was triggered by the return from self-imposed exile of a former guerrilla named Mauk Moruk, who in 1984 became the last man to directly challenge Gusmão’s authority (then as chief commander of Falintil). He immediately attempted something similar when he came back, gathering a few hundred followers, launching a “revolutionary council”, attacking Gusmão’s “authoritarian” leadership style and calling for the dissolution of parliament. While government leaders were concerned by his potential ability to spark broader unrest, they appeared to be even more rattled by his version of history, and it was in the course of a nationally televised five-hour lecture to refute it that Gusmão announced his retirement. Mauk Moruk’s charges against Gusmão drew attention to the latter’s critical role in managing the security forces. To deal with residual tensions from the 2006 crisis, Gusmão in 2007 merged the defence and interior ministries into a single Ministry of Defence and Security and put himself in charge. In doing so he succeeded in tempering inter-service rivalries and restoring stability but at the cost of reinforcing the old Falintil chain of command rather than allowing the development of independent civilian control. His successor will have to guard against re-emergence of police-army rivalry, handle demands of veterans for more benefits and confront the politically sensitive issue of how to retire still-serving Falintil fighters. Gusmão had the personal authority to keep these issues under control; his successor may have a harder time. The political path to Gusmão’s resignation has been opened by his rapprochement with his old rival, Mari Alkatiri, the country’s first prime minister, and greater cooperation between their respective parties, Timorese National Congress for Reconstruction (Congresso Nacional da Reconstrução Timorense, CNRT) and Fretilin. It is not clear whether the new warmth will last, but Alkatiri’s assurance that he will not seek to head the next government is probably a prerequisite of Gusmão’s stepping down. The question is how the succession will serve the cause of transition from the old guard of the resistance, the so-called 1975 Generation, to a younger leadership less mired in the past. A resignation later this year would yield little real change in the short term: Gusmão’s replacement would almost certainly come from within his own party, and none of the potential successors has the charisma or independent political base required to win a future election. More lasting change will have to wait until the 2017 election, when many believe that Taur Matan Ruak, current president and former army chief (and the last to serve as Gusmão’s deputy in Falintil), is the most likely contender to become prime minister. The Falintil-government link would thus continue, but Ruak is a decade younger than Gusmão or Alkatiri and he has shown more interest in grooming a new generation to take over. Gusmão’s successors will face major challenges. The first is dealing with potential troublemakers, including dissident veterans, gangs and martial arts groups and unemployed youth. The second is reducing the capture of resources by the elite that is producing corruption and growing income inequality that itself could become a source of unrest. The third is addressing old social and political cleavages that continue to fester. Finally, there is what to do about Gusmão himself. He could move quietly into retirement, or he could be given some form of institutionalised role, either as a Minister Mentor, following the Singaporean model created for Lee Kuan Yew, or as part of a Council of Elders in which others like Alkatiri could also be included. That would only postpone the real transition of power than Timor so badly needs

Tapol bulletin no, 72, November 1985

Contents: West Papuan refugees forcibly deported to Jayapura -- Australia tries to keep refugees out -- The story of Mambesak -- Aceh: spotlight on torture -- Fretilin invites UN Secretary General for consultations -- Fretilin greets TAPOL -- Indonesian colonialism in East Timor -- There is no military government in Indonesia -- Anti-communist witch-hunt, 1985 -- Transmigration closed to "ex-PKI" -- A clean-up for Suharto's image -- Subversion trials run into trouble -- Al-Ickwan trials -- Tanjung Priok massacre on trial -- Severe sentences being passed -- The Sand-Collector

Crossing the Border Historical and Linguistic Divides Among the Bunaq in Central Timor

The Bunaq are a Papuan language-speaking people straddling the border of Indonesian West Timor and independent East Timor. This paper looks at the history of the Bunaq as a “border“ people in Timor. “Border“ is interpreted here in two ways, as referring to: (i) a political division, the boundary line separating one country from another, and (ii) a linguistic division, the distinguishing line between Papuan and Austronesian languages. I examine the effect that the Bunaq position at the political and linguistic borders of Timor has had on the people and their language

PERAN KOMANDO PASUKAN SANDHI YUDHA (KOPASSANDHA) DALAM OPERASI SEROJA DI TIMOR-TIMUR PADA TAHUN 1976-1979

Kopassandha (Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yudha) merupakan satuan elit Indonesia dibawah naungan TNI-AD. Secara umum Kopassandha merupakan cikal bakal Kopassus di masa sekarang ini. Sesuai dengan namanya Kopassandha memiliki kemampuan khusus seperti bergerak cepat di setiap medan, menembak dengan tepat, pengintaian, dan anti teror. Pada saat operasi seroja selesai dengan masuknya Timor-Timur ke Indonesia Operasi Seroja masih terus berlangsung. Alasan kelanjutkan operasi tersebut karena kekuatan dari Fretilin masih belum menurun malah semakin gencar melakukan propaganda. Hal ini lah yang membuat Indonesia khawatir akan adanya penyebaran paham komunis yang semakin meluas. Maka dari itu penulis mengambil penelitian terkait Peran Kopassandha dalam Operasi di Timor-Timur pada tahun 1976-1979. Penelitian ini mengambil rumusan masalah yaitu tentang keterlibatan kembali Kopassandha dalam operasi seroja pasca integrasi, peran dari Kopassandha dalam operasi seroja, dan hasil dari keterlibatan Kopassandha dalam operasi seroja. Penulis menggunakan metode penelitian sejarah yang terdiri dari heuristik, kritik sumber, interpretasi, dan historiografi. Sumber penulisan disini menggunakan sumber tertulis yang berupa catatan , koran dan dokumen yang sezaman pada waktu itu. Hasil penulisan menunjukan bahwa dengan keterlibatan Kopassandha dalam bertugas mendapatkan dampak baik yang dalam Operasi Seroja ini. Kopassandha berhasil menewaskan dan menangkap tokoh-tokoh Fretilin seperti Presiden Nicolau Lobato. Setelah berhasilnya dalam menewaskan presiden Nicolau Lob ato hal ini membuat moral yang dimiliki oleh Fretilin melemah karena tidak ada garis komando lagi dalam perjuangan Fretilin. Serta berhasilnya Indonesia dalam menghambat pertumbuhan paham Komunis di Timor-Timur.Kata Kunci: Kopassandha, Seroja, Timor-Timu

Tapol bulletin no, 59, September 1983

Contents: New bloodbath engulfs East Timor: OV10 Broncos operating again -- Interview with former Bishop of East Timor -- Junta ... and dynasty? -- Australian MP's report "tendentious, superficial and misleading" says dissenting Senator MacIntosh -- "If people could live where they liked, there would be no food shortage in East Timor" -- Forced labour widespread in Timorese resettlement camps -- Amnesty exposes Indonesian brutalities in East Timor -- Amnesty protests against authorised torture in East Timor -- Army killings continue: press reporting now banned -- The mysterious jeep on the Cimedang Bridge -- Lawyers escape kidnap attempt -- Papuan kills Indonesian in revenge for barbarism -- IGGI commends military regime for its political courage -- Book review: A People Betrayed, James Dunn -- Former political prisoner sues government -- New anti-PKI purges in progres

Tapol bulletin no, 58, July 1983

Contents: Army killer squads spread terror in the cities -- Death squads in action -- LBH chairman speaks out on death squads -- Prisma: Indonesian Journal of Social and Economic Affairs: social sciences monthly rebuked -- Indonesia negotiates with Fretilin -- Catholic institute prevented from visiting E. Timor -- Hawke reneges on ALP's East Timor policy -- ABRI must get out of politics! -- Ex-Kopkamtib commander takes control of labour -- The situation in East Timor today -- Highlights from LBH report on human rights -- Red light for PNG and Pacific -- Film and book review: The Year of Living Dangerously, an MGM film directed by Peter Weir, based on the book written by C.J. Koc