

West Papuan refugees forcibly deported to Jayapura

During the past two months, the Papua New Guinea government's treatment of the West Papuan refugees has deteriorated dramatically, highlighted by the brutal repatriation of twelve men on 12 October and by the threatened forced repatriation of at least 27 more. These deportations were in fact only the latest of a series of secret deportations.

On 21 November, Michael Somare was removed from office by a vote of no confidence. His successor, Paias Wingti, is leader of the People's Democratic Movement. The day after taking office, he told AFP he was "happy at the state of relations with Indonesia" and that he admired Lee Kwan Yew's style of leadership. The coming to power of a new government means that all pressure should be brought to bear on it to change the disastrous policy of its predecessor. But it must be stressed that the policy is very much the creation of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the police and intelligence forces. Unless drastic changes take place at this level, the refugees will continue to be in grave danger of deportation.

A furtive operation

Under cover of dark, early in the morning of 12 October, a group of refugees some of whom who had been taken from Telefomin camp to Vanimo, were escorted by armed PNG police onto a flight to Jayapura, capital of Irian Jaya. Altogether 16 refugees were to have been deported, but four had escaped before reaching Vanimo and fled into the bush. When the 12 refugees realised in mid-flight what was happening, a fight broke out, forcing the pilot to return to Vanimo. Several witnesses report that the men were then beaten up by the police (*Times of PNG*, 13 October), handcuffed and forced back onto aircraft for the flight to Jayapura.

On arrival, they were arrested by the Indonesian authorities and were then subjected to prolonged interrogation for at least 2 weeks. (*Kompas*, 29 October) It is not difficult to imagine the maltreatment and torture they have suffered since then, and the Indonesian press has reported that some at least are likely to be charged with subversion.

At least seven of the deported men had long ago expressed a wish to re-settle in a third country. Their names were on a list of 31 refugees in Blackwater and Telefomin camps, which was sent to TAPOL in August. Efforts to find sanctuary for these refugees have so far foundered on the inability of the UNHCR to convince any states to accept them, despite the desperate situation in which the refugees are placed.

Acting Foreign Minister deliberately misleads the court

About 12 hours before the deportations took place, Father John Etheridge, Bishop of Vanimo learnt of the plans and informed lawyer Bernard Narokobi, who immediately applied to the court for an injunction. This was refused because no copy of the deportation order could be presented. In fact, the deportation order had been signed by the Foreign Minister, John Giheno, on 4 October just before leaving for the Commonwealth Conference, but Acting Foreign Minister, Tony Bais deliberately misled the court, stating that no

deportation order had been signed.

Acting on this false information, the judge refused to grant an injunction with calamitous consequences. Twelve men were delivered, bound, to their persecutors, and refugees at Blackwater exploded in anger at this grotesque injustice. They now face charges for "illegal assembly" and guilty verdicts could result in their own deportation.

Two hundred refugees in Blackwater camp walked the several miles to Vanimo to protest the deportations. (*The Australian*, 16 October) They attacked several government buildings and the office which had chartered the aircraft used. A week later, on 19 October, their camp was surrounded and searched for "offensive weapons" by the police. All the men, a total of 108, were rounded up and taken into custody, to be formally charged. Already two of them, Sam Marakena and John Rumbino have been jailed "for possessing home-made bombs". (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 October)

Background to the 12 October incident

Although Indonesia has publicly conveyed the impression that repatriation of West Papuans is a matter for PNG alone, there is no doubt that the deportations are part of a process of strengthening its links with Indonesia. What Jakarta needs above all from PNG is proof that it will stamp out anti-Indonesian activities on its soil. What better way of doing this than handing back OPM activists to Indonesia?

It was clear in the months before 12 October that relations between PNG and Indonesia were getting very much warmer, in contrast to the acrimonious exchanges that occurred last year. General Surono, Minister-Coordinator for Political and Defence Affairs attended PNG's 10th anniversary celebrations and announced plans to carry out exchanges of journalists, students and senior politicians and officials, while the Indonesian press has recently been unusually flattering about PNG.

In September, the Joint Border Commission met in Rabaul with Indonesia's Interior Minister, General Roestam

Soepardjo attending, the first time an Indonesian minister has attended border negotiations, and on 30 September, a "Memorandum of Understanding" on border issues was signed. The contents of this Memorandum have not been disclosed, nor has anything been revealed about any discussions in Rabaul regarding the refugees.

PNG Provincial Intelligence approves deportations

At the very time the Rabaul negotiations were taking place, a far more secret meeting took place in Vanimo on 26 September, with deportations very much on the agenda. This was a meeting of the West Sepik Provincial Intelligence Committee which drew up a list of 27 refugees to be deported as soon as possible, in addition to those who were deported on 12 October.

The confidential minutes of this meeting were leaked and have circulated widely. They reveal that behind the cloak of an apparent lack of clear PNG government policy regarding the refugees, the police and intelligence services are resolutely pursuing a policy of deportation,

Gross misuse of UNHCR funds planned by PNG border police

The minutes of the 26 September meeting of the West Sepik Provincial Intelligence Committee (PIC) which names 27 West Papuan refugees who are to be deported, makes it clear, as the following quotations reveal, that police and intelligence officials plan to use UNHCR funds to round up West Papuan refugees for deportation:

"PPC [the Provincial Police Chief, Joel Kean] mentioned that the only way to have these WI's [West Irianese, for West Papuans] returned is for our own officers to travel and get hold of them.... PSLD [the Provincial Security Liaison Officer] pointed out that BAO [Border Administration Officer] has two separate funds, that is UNHCR and Border Admin funds and he should use either of these funds for Officers to travel and get hold of these WI's. Whilst waiting for BLO, we request BAO [a member of the PIC, though he was not present at the meeting] to release funds from the UNHCR accounts and have two (2) or three (3) officers to travel to work this way."

"PIC resolves that BLO liaise with Immigration for funds and two officers to travel to various locations and get hold of those WI's who absconded from Blackwater Camp."

The deportations were delayed till Indonesian border officials returned to Jayapura

The minutes also stated that the first deportation, of the 16 refugees (of whom 4 escaped) was to have taken place on the day of the meeting (26 September) but "due to Indonesian officials in Rabaul attending JBC [Joint Border Committee] it will be executed next Thursday (3rd October)". The PIC "hereby resolved that the deportation of sixteen (16) deportees be deferred until the arrival of Indon Officials in Jayapura." [As we know, these deportations took place on 12 October.]

TAPOL has asked the UNHCR whether any of its funds have indeed been used for such illegal purposes and has asked for assurances that such things will not be allowed to happen. There must surely be an investigation into these criminal activities of the PNG border police.

with the approval of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Since moreover, the government has failed to grant formal refugee status to any of the refugees, there is nothing

to prevent the police from carrying out deportations on whatever pretext they wish.

Many of the refugees in PNG are well-known opponents of Indonesian rule in West Papua, the very people the military regime would like to get their hands on. There is now growing evidence of close cooperation between the PNG police in the border provinces and the security forces in Irian Jaya. and in November, the West Sepik chief-of-police, Joel Kean, visited Jayapura with an eight-man delegation, to give a clean bill of health on Indonesia's treatment of returned villager-refugees.

It now appears, from a statement by Colonel Buntaran, chief-of-police in Irian Jaya, that the deportations on 12 October were only the latest of seven such group deportations, and that some of those previously expelled from PNG have been sentenced to two or three years in jail. (Asiaweek, 8 November)

But what of the UNHCR? Although the agency has been involved in providing physical sustenance for the refugees, it has been prevented from carrying out its protection work to determine who of the approximately 12,000 West Papuans now in PNG should be granted refugee status. The agency was not given a chance to ascertain the status of the deported men and was not even informed that anyone would be sent back. (Asiaweek, 8 November)

Widespread protest

The Somare government was heavily criticised both at home and abroad as soon as news of the 12 October criminal deportations broke. Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were at the Commonwealth Conference at the time. Deputy Prime Minister, Father John Momis of the Melanesian Alliance, tried to assuage public opinion by issuing a long statement outlining what he proclaimed was a new and more humane policy towards the refugees. The statement contained numerous weaknesses which TAPOL criticised in a letter to the Deputy Prime Minister. But the nature of Momis' policy has now become largely academic with the fall of the Somare government, and all efforts need to be concentrated on urging the Wingti government to abandon the disastrous policy of its predecessor, and accord the refugees proper protection.

Protest in Australia has been expressed by many organisations and in the columns of the press. Amnesty International launched an urgent action in mid-October, expressing fears that the 12 men under arrest in Jayapura could be tortured. The London-based organisation, Survival International, has also issued an urgent action, calling on the PNG government to stop deporting refugees.


STOP PRESS

Four deportees returned in June were all killed

A report has just reached TAPOL from a well-connected OPM source in Jayapura that all four West Papuans who were deported to Jayapura on 24 June have been killed. Nabot Wanma who had been a corporal in Battalion 751 in Irian Jaya and deserted in February last year, was deported by the PNG authorities together with three civilians, Izak Waeami, Ones Sorontouw and Abraham Hamong.

Initially, Hamong was released while Wanma was taken to the Military Command HQ and the other two were held at Panorama, the interrogation centre of the paracommandos (Kopassus). Then all three were transferred to Ifar Gunung Prison, outside Jayapura, and shot dead there early in July.

Abraham Hamong was re-arrested on 8 July and held at POM (Military Police HQ). He was taken from his cell on the night of 9 July and murdered in Borowai, near Lake Sentani.



Izak Rumpaisum who was deported on 12 October

Australia tries to keep refugees out

Australia has now become embroiled in the West Papuan refugee issue. In addition to five West Papuans who reached Australia's Thursday Island in the Torres Strait last June, another three arrived on Boigu Island in October. Although the Immigration Minister, Christopher Hurford, had decided that the first five would not be granted refugee status, the government-appointed Determination of Refugee Status Committee contradicted him by finding that the men were genuine refugees. Faced with such a humiliating rejection of his decision, the Minister announced that he was returning the report to the Committee "for clarification". (The Australian, 31 October)

There are signs that Hurford in fact favours a policy of accepting West Papuan refugees but only as their second country of refuge, after they have made their way to Papua New Guinea. This apparently has the advantage for Australia of discouraging Papuans within canoe-ride distance from making their way south for refuge rather than going east. Indeed for anyone in the southern district of Merauke wishing to escape from Indonesian harassment, a sea voyage is less risky than travelling overland to PNG.

But both Prime Minister Hawke and Foreign Minister Hayden are adamant that, come what may, no West Papuans will be given refuge in Australia. Canberra is by now so bent on currying favour with Jakarta that it is not likely to "jeopardise" relations with the generals' regime for the sake of a few Papuans. There are even regrets being expressed in Australian government circles that the islands in the Torres Strait are Australian territory. Life would have been so much easier had PNG been allowed to take control!

As one writer aptly put it: "A government that shouts its humanitarian credentials from the rooftops...risks looking just a little silly when it is thrown into confusion by the arrival of a few unarmed tribesmen at its own backdoor." (The Age, 2 November)

More refugees ready to enter Australia

Robin Osborne reports (The Australian, 12 November) that up to 16 more West Papuans have made their way to the southern tip of PNG, 4 km from Boigu Island, ready to make the crossing to Australia, but they have been positively discouraged by officials who told one of their number when he landed on Boigu that it was government policy not to accept refugees from West Papua.



THE GUERRILLA STRUGGLE IN IRIAN JAYA ROBIN OSBORNE

Robin Osborne's newly-published book will soon be available to TAPOL readers at a price to be announced shortly.

The story of Mambesak

By Constantinopel Ruhukail, now a refugee in Telefomin, Papua New Guinea

I first got to know Arnold Ap well in 1969 when he was studying geography at the Faculty of Pedagogics at Cendrawasih University (Uncen). At the time I was only in the second grade of the Jayapura Teachers Secondary School in Abepura. We first became friends through the Church, in the Christian Youth Choir. It was a friendship based on a talent we both shared and on the love we shared for art, in particular traditional music and drama. Often on Christian holidays we performed dramas based on religious themes with friends like Sam Kapissa, Andy Usjor and Demson Rumbewas.

It was from these beginnings that we developed our interest in artistic activities. In 1978, a group of us including Sam Kapissa, Marthiny Md. Sawaky, Tony Wolas Krenak, Joel Kafiar and Berth Tenawani decided to turn our attention to developing traditional Melanesian music and dance in West Papua. On 4 August, we set up the Mambesak Group at the Museum of Anthropology of Cendrawasih University. This was a folk-song group dedicated to encouraging and popularising people's songs and traditional West Papuan dance to the outside world.

Popularising Papua song and dance

Since Arnold happened to be head of Uncen's Museum of Anthropology, this became the base for our Mambesak activities. Every afternoon, we sang, danced, held exhibitions and made recordings on Museum premises. During those years, we devoted almost all our time and energies to developing regional art and culture forms through the Mambesak group.

The group spread its wings from Uncen Museum to other regions outside Jayapura, and art groups came into being all over the place, all serving the same purpose. A feverish interest in people's songs spread far and wide, from the towns into the villages. Mambesak became more and more popular among the native people especially after cassettes of Volume One of the Collection of Irian Jaya People's Songs recorded by Mambesak began to circulate in the regions.

The West Papuan people began to make the switch from Indonesian pop music to their own regional music. The strains of the Mambesak group singing could be heard in homes throughout the country, especially among the native

people. It was as though the West Papuan people had rediscovered something of their very own which had been buried for years.

Protecting the environment

We then began to turn our attention to the protection of the environment. In 1980, Mambesak became involved in environmental campaigns concerned in particular with the sea around Jayapura and the Cendrawasih Bay which was already polluted by explosives being used by coastal fishermen from Sulawesi and Buton.

From 1978 to November 1983 when Arnold was arrested, the two of us regularly broadcast on the Pelangi Art Programme on Nusantara V Jayapura RRI (Indonesian Radio) station every Sunday afternoon, speaking the Irianese dialect of Indonesian which is an excellent means of communicating with the people of West Papua.

These were the things the two of us became involved in, together with Sam Kapissa, Marthiny Sawaki, Tony Wolas Krenak, Berth Tanawani, Demianus WariapKurni, Eddy Mofu, MarthinRumbabar, AulemanRumbewas and Danny Mandowen, all of us members of the Mambesak group which now exists in name only. As enthusiasts and heirs of the noble values of our regional culture, we tried to make Mambesak its means of growth. But in political eyes, our activities

were seen as a grave threat to national resilience.

Mambesak, a 'threat to national security'

I still remember clearly how in November 1979, a year after Mambesak was born, three of us, Arnold, Sam Kapissa and myself, were summoned by the Provincial Military Command (Laksusda/Kodam XVII) and interrogated on the origins and aims of the Mambesak group. Already in those early days, the security forces were paying special attention to the activities of our Mambesak group. They saw Arnold and his Mambesak as a group that had revived the people's love for their own regional culture, thus obstructing the process of development. This was at variance with government policy for a programme of cultural assimilation. Mambesak was therefore seen as laying a foundation that might one day threaten the spirit of national unity.

The security forces continued to watch the group closely and in 1982, Laksusda had already made up its mind to dissolve the Mambesak group for reasons of national security. Without doubt, they had come to look upon Arnold and his Mambesak group as a dangerous threat to security in the region and to the government's policy of cultural assimilation.

These suspicions ultimately led our two beloved friends, Arnold Ap and Eddy Mofu to their tragic end. They both fell victim to an act of gross inhumanity.

Those beautiful experiences I shared with Arnold and Eddy will remain with me as long as I live.

Acheh: Spotlight on torture

Barbarous tortures of political prisoners are being practised daily in jails throughout Acheh, Sumatra. The following account, supplied to TAPOL by the National Liberation Front of Acheh Sumatra, describes methods of torture currently used by Indonesian army personnel on political prisoners, suspected members or sympathisers of the Front. Prisons where these forms of torture are known to have been practised, according to the Front, include Kedah Military Prison in Kutaraja, Bandar Acheh, Sigli Prison, Langsa Prison and Lhok Seumawe Prison.

1) The legs of heavy steel chairs are placed on the prisoner's toes. An interrogator then sits on the chair, soon causing blood to gush forth.

2) The flesh on the shins is scraped with the sharp nails of a soldier's boot until the bone is bared.

3) Burns are inflicted on all parts of the body, even inside the nose and ears, until the prisoner's body is covered with wounds.

4) Prisoners are dipped head first in a barrel of water, with hands tied behind their backs. They are pulled out after losing consciousness. Upon regaining consciousness, the process is repeated.

5) High-voltage current is applied to the genitals until the prisoner loses consciousness. This treatment almost always inflicts permanent damage on the genitals.

6) The prisoner is made to stand in a barrel of water so that he/she must stand on tiptoe in order to breathe. Then a huge block of ice is placed on the head and the prisoner is left like this until losing consciousness or until the ice melts, which can take up to four hours.

7) The prisoner is placed in sewage containing human excrement. The nostrils are punctured by fish-hooks attached to lines manipulated by interrogators. If the prisoner manages to hold the head free, the filth is sprayed on his/her face.

8) The prisoner must stand with legs wide apart and both hands tied and pulled towards the back in opposite directions. An interrogator climbs on the prisoner's knees. Fifteen minutes of this treatment can result in paralysis for at least 6 months.

9) The hands are tied behind the prisoner's back for months on end. This treatment often drives the victim mad.

10) A prisoner is bound by the neck and pulled in opposite directions until losing consciousness. He/she is revived with a bucket of cold water then subjected to the same torture again.

11) A prisoner is made to lie on a concrete floor, then a log of timber is placed on the body and an interrogator

jumps on the log until the prisoner loses consciousness. This treatment can also break bones.

12) Women are stripped naked, the ultimate humiliation for any Achehnese woman.

13) Thorny durian fruits are used to scrape a prisoner's face until badly disfigured.

14) A prisoner is clubbed in the face. One prisoner, Teuku Sharifuddin, lost both eyeballs and was in such a frightful state that the soldiers shot him dead. The death certificate gave 'heart failure' as the cause of death.

15) Muslim prisoners are humiliated by being forced to drink alcohol and having it sprayed on their faces.

16) Younger prisoners are forced to masturbate, then to swallow their own semen.

17) Pubic hair is pulled out.

18) The prisoner is pushed into a mud-pool full of buffalo excrement. The head is forced downwards until the prisoner loses consciousness.

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Many prisoners die while being tortured. When this happens, the body is carried away in a plastic bag and the deceased is said to have died of 'natural causes'.

A primary objective of such treatment is to break the victim's self-respect. Other forms of psychological pressure are used such as telling a prisoner her/his parents have died, or saying that a man's wife has been unfaithful, in an attempt to destroy his morale.

Sometimes a prisoner is threatened with execution, and even taken to the place of execution, keeping up the pretence till the last moment.

In supplying this information to TAPOL, the National Liberation Front of Acheh, Sumatra urges human rights organisations to turn their attention to these massive violations and calls for support to its struggle for Achehnese freedom from the Indonesian colonial regime.

Fretilin invites UN Secretary General for consultations

In a radio message to Lord Avebury, chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, transmitted from East Timor on 20 October, 1985, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao has invited the UN Secretary-General to a meeting with Fretilin leaders. On 25 November, Lord Avebury conveyed this invitation to Mr Peres de Cuellar.

To explain the background to this important new development, we publish extracts from the recent exchange of messages between Lord Avebury and Xanana Gusmao.

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The following is an extract from Lord Avebury's radio message to Xanana:

Now the United Nations has called on the Secretary General to use his good offices to find a solution (to the East Timor question) in consultation with all parties concerned. We have continually pressed the Secretary General, and the governments of the countries which supported the resolution, to acknowledge that the people of East Timor are the most important of all the parties, and we have asked what steps have been taken to consult you, either by means of a visit of the Secretary General or his representative to East Timor, or by extending an invitation to your leaders to meet him on neutral territory such as Australia. Maybe you could tell me whether any approach has been made to Fretilin on this important matter.

If the answer is that you have received no communication from the Secretary General, would you be prepared to invite him to meet you? And if so, could you let me know so that I could pass this information on to the Secretary General?

I realise that the military situation may make it difficult for him to visit East Timor, though it would be possible in theory for the UN to offer to arrange a truce, with perhaps a small UN force to monitor it. What would you think of that idea, or alternatively, would you agree to meet the Secretary General in Darwin, if he would arrange passage out of East Timor and back again afterwards for your representatives?

* * * * *

In his reply, Xanana said:

In the face of the formidable difficulties surrounding our struggle, Lord Avebury, we recognise from the very depths of our souls the great and incontestable loyalty of our friends. We ask that they continue to support East Timor and to persuade governments to change their policies and support the UN Secretary General's efforts to find a just solution for a firm and lasting peace in East Timor. We would also like to add that, as far as we know, neither the UN nor its Secretary General has attempted to make contact with Fretilin. We would therefore fully agree to the suggestions you have presented to us. We feel that a meeting between Fretilin and the Secretary General would be a necessary development in our campaign and an important step towards ending the suffering of the Maubere people. With regard to the prospect of a visit to East Timor by the Secretary General, we declare that there are no preconditions for this on our part because we want to ensure that the Secretary General is free to fulfil the task entrusted to him by the UN General Assembly. We also declare that there are no preferences on our part regarding the choice of locale. The meeting could be held in Dili, or the Secretary General can go to any town in the interior of the country readily within our reach. If the Secretary General were unable to come to East Timor, we would be amenable to having a delegation of ours meet him in Darwin.

We are extremely grateful for the sentiments expressed


by you, Lord Avebury, and we accept your kind offer. We hereby agree to extend a formal invitation to the Secretary General to meet with Fretilin leaders. The meeting could take place in East Timor or abroad, providing that, in the latter case, the delegation can enjoy the security due to them during their travels.

We know...[the message is garbled for a few words] the facts of this initiative, but we have absolute faith in our belief that you, Lord Avebury, will spare no effort in support of the heroic effort of our people. Your affirmation that no-one must consider ours a lost cause does not just provide moral support. It holds inestimable significance for us as we conclude the tenth anniversary of our resistance to the power which has so brutally occupied our homeland. As you have made us realise, one struggle may also lead to greater peace and stability for all human beings.

Support the Fretilin invitation to the UN

Lord Avebury asked TAPOL to reproduce the above extracts from his exchange of messages with Fretilin leader, Xanana. He also appeals, through the columns of TAPOL Bulletin, to all our supporters and readers to draw the attention of their governments and MPs in their country to the Fretilin initiative, and to mobilise support for it. The invitation is in line with UN General Assembly resolution 37/30 adopted in 1982 which asked the Secretary General "to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem".

TAPOL is reproducing the full texts of the radio exchanges of TAPOL and Lord Avebury with Fretilin in its new series, **Occasional Reports**. These are available on request. Single copies supplied gratis. A charge will be made for larger orders.



The Grim Game: Sweden's role in Indonesia's Genocide in East Timor 1975-85 is published by the Swedish East Timor Committee.

Fretilin greets TAPOL

The following is a message from Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, leader of Fretilin, chairman of the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance and Commander-in-Chief of Falintil, the East Timorese armed resistance movement, to TAPOL. The message was transmitted by radio from East Timor to Australia on 21 October 1985.

We send our warm fraternal greetings and our gratitude for TAPOL's solidarity in struggle. To all the members of TAPOL, we wish to say that we have the same enemy. The Indonesian militarists make no distinctions among their victims, in order to perpetuate their oppression over two fraternal peoples. We realise that the struggle of our people for the liberation of our homeland is part of the struggle of the fraternal people of Indonesia for the restoration of democratic liberties in their homeland. The fraternal people of Indonesia and the heroic people of East Timor are today both gagged in the same way, and in East Timor, their prison warders are not only the murderous *nanggalas*) but the mighty killing machine or the bloodthirsty generals in Jakarta. The blood of hundreds of thousands of our people has joined the river of blood that flowed from the murder of millions of Indonesians. It is not an empty phrase nor a vain hope when we say that, because of our struggle, we believe that the democratic forces in Indonesia will recognise our determination, and will be able to find more adequate forms of recognising too our fundamental right to the independence of our homeland.

Indeed, the predominance of RPKAD2) officers in key positions... means incontestably that ... but we believe that the Indonesian people will not allowed themselves to be fooled for ever by the TNI (Indonesian Army) who say that '*ada program-program besar*' [great programmes (of development) are under way].

In our own country we are only too familiar with the bloody scenes of children crying and the horrifying screams of adults who have become real-life actors in the drama of these 'program-program', for it is in order to secure the implementation of these 'program-program' that at least one RPKAD battalion is stationed in each *concelho* (district), with *anggotas* (members) of the RPKAD spread out even to the remote corners of our country. [The next sentence is incomprehensible because of a gap.]

However bad the atrocities perpetrated in Indonesia, those committed in our country are worse - against women, children, old people, young people, against adults, against everyone, with the sole exception of the few servile lackeys who get everything they want.

War crimes help promotion prospects

Not only does the war situation in East Timor provide



Xanana Gusmao with Colonel Purwanto, at the negotiations between Fretilin and the Indonesian Army of occupation in March 1983.

an opportunity for rapid promotion for ABRI3) officers. The best opportunity for promotion for RPKAD soldiers is the number of arrests and tortures and above all the number of massacres they perpetrate against our people. As a result, Kodim4) officers even compete against each other and, in order to obtain faster promotion, encourage

Extracts from TAPOL's message to Fretilin

The following are extracts from a radio message by Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL to Fretilin in September, 1985:

Many of us in Western Europe, in different organisations, are working together to support your right to self-determination, in Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, France, West Germany, Portugal, Switzerland, Holland and the United Kingdom. We meet regularly to discuss and plan our activities. Most governments in this part of the world only want to see Indonesia as a market for their exports and a profitable arena for capital investment, so they close their eyes to the reality of Indonesian rule while competing with each other to sell weapons to ABRI.

Since Benny Murdanibecame ABRI commander-in-chief, the predominance of RPKAD-trained officers has become greater than ever. Many regional commands and top positions in ABRI as well as in the state apparatus are now in the control of RPKAD men, most of whom have the blood of the East Timor people on their hands. It is acknowledged that active service in the war against your people is the best guarantee for quick promotion even though these *nanggalas* murderers have failed to defeat you after so many years....

I very much agree with your proposal that a team of independent observers including Amnesty International representatives should visit East Timor to make a thorough investigation of conditions but we all know how difficult this will be because of the Indonesian blockade. Perhaps we should try to break the blockade the other way round, by receiving a mission from you, with people from areas under your control and from the concentration camps.... I realise that such people would almost certainly not be able to return home to continue the struggle but the sacrifice of their loss to you might be worth while because of the impact such a visit would have on world opinion.

*hansips*5) to cut off the heads of defenceless people living in the bush whom they capture, as evidence of their operations against the guerrillas. Moreover, if one *nanggalas* captures five members of the population of a concentration camp, an intel official will capture six, and the *dandim* (kodim commander) will order ten suspects to be fetched for torture. They all engage in a wild, bloody competition for the greatest number of prisoners that the war situation permits.

For Indonesian soldiers in general and for the *nanggalas* in particular, a Maubere citizen is nothing more than an animal for slaughter. Nevertheless, this has not succeeded in weakening for a single moment our determination to struggle until the enemy is defeated. On the contrary, this has inculcated in us a stronger will to continue the struggle and a clearer realisation of the need to liberate our homeland in order to liberate our people.

History has repeatedly shown us that unless the movement and the people of a country fight for their rights, governments that talk demagogically, their mouths full of principles and rights, will close their eyes to the violations of these principles and rights. Apartheid in South Africa for example has not worried, nor does it now worry, western governments any more than the dictatorships in Chile, Paraguay, the Philippines, Indonesia and so on upset them, causing them to devote some attention these countries. We are well aware of this. If the brutal repression in South Africa today provokes comments and a certain degree of interest, with timid demands being made by some governments for sanctions, this is because the economic interests of these countries in South Africa are under threat. At root, it is not on behalf of the rights of the black population of South Africa that many western countries are now hesitantly and reluctantly using this rhetoric. What has made the difference is the qualitative development in the struggle of the Azanian people, the determination with which the black population of that country faces repression and death in order to defend their right to overthrow the intolerable white-minority, racist regime and the way it has won support from ever-growing international condemnation of the regime.

An unshakable will to win

From the start of the Indonesian aggression, we realised that our struggle would be difficult and very arduous, and that it would demand from all true nationalist patriots firmness of conviction and an unshakable will to struggle. Our national liberation struggle continues to be firm and will be increasingly so in the future. We are well aware of the military power of ABRI but our slogan is: Struggle, struggle, struggle until victory. The past ten years have shown the determination of our people to carry forward its resistance. The guerrillas of Fretilin know that they are dying for a sacred cause, the liberation of their country and of the Maubere people, and they accept the sacrifice of their lives with a smile of confidence, and with the courage which our ancestors displayed in the wars of independence. Although subject to a blockade which seeks to cut all links with the outside world, the Maubere people have continued to direct their efforts to reinforcing steadily their heroic resistance, confident in the certainty of victory, and believing that we have contributed by our liberation struggle to the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the whole world.

Breaking the blockade which conceals the truth is crucial

Jakarta's brazen and stubborn refusal to lift the blockade of East Timor which is more effective than an iron curtain in preventing independent observers from coming into contact with the true condition of our people, is a crucially important aspect of our struggle. We call it crucial because it encapsulates all the

contradictions and inconsistencies in Jakarta's propaganda as well as providing underlying testimony to the truth of our victories.

We therefore regard the idea that we should send a Fretilin delegation abroad as logical, and one which has many important implications. It would give us a better chance thoroughly and objectively to unmask not only Jakarta's lies but also the false image which all sorts of visitors who have been manipulated by the Indonesian generals have been trying to project around the world about the situation in East Timor.

We want to thank you in advance for any efforts you can make to this end in order that together, we may make it possible for the struggle of the Maubere people to make a significant advance towards a difficult but certain victory.

Abroad, the Maubere people will always value the support given by its friends, a necessary complement to the activities carried out by its external wing, the Fretilin External Delegation. We recognise that the militarist Indonesian regime has, in all respects, an overwhelming superiority in the unequal war that has been forced on our people, and for that reason, we continue to need your constant support to defend our rights, to publicise our struggle, to denounce the crimes committed by the forces of occupation, and to encourage international public opinion to wage a campaign of pressure on their respective governments to ensure that the people of East Timor are not denied their inalienable rights. This work also supports the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to work for a just solution of the conflict in the light of the principles laid down in the United Nations Charter and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

For our part, we affirm our complete solidarity with your struggle, the struggle of TAPOL, in the sincere conviction that now more than ever, the efforts of both of us should be better coordinated since the crossing of our paths has given us a common platform for our struggles. We stand in solidarity with the fraternal people of Indonesia, in solidarity with the democratic forces opposed to Jakarta's militaristic fascism, and in particular, in solidarity with the political prisoners, victims of the bloody regime, like our own people who have been herded into concentration camps.

The struggle continues on all fronts!
Homeland or death!
To resist is to win!

Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, Commander-in-Chief of Falintil.


- 1) *nanggala*: a knife-carrying soldier. This is how the Timorese refer to all the killer-paracommandos.
- 2) RPKAD: the first name for the elite paracommando regiment, later changed to Kopassandha, then Kopassus. Among the Timorese, the original name has stuck.
- 3) ABRI: Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.
- 4) Kodim: District Military Command.
- 5) *hansip*: civil guards.



NT News, 25 July 1985

EAST TIMOR

according to a report of the Revolutionary Council for National Resistance (CRRN), broadcast by Radio Maubere on 16 September 1985.



Indonesian colonialism in East Timor

"I feel the Timorese are not open. They do not speak out, as if they're hiding something. I would like them to open up."
A young doctor from West Java working in East Timor
quoted in *Asiaweek*, 2 August 1985.

"People, myself included, we feel as if we are in a jail in our country. The only people who go in and out of Timor are the Javanese."

Mgr Belo, head of the Catholic Church in East Timor
in an interview with AFP, 8 August 1985.

Ten years after the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975, East Timor displays all the hallmarks of a colonised territory. All the efforts of the military regime to 'integrate and develop' East Timor serve a single purpose, to convince the outside world that Timor's integration is an inevitable and irreversible historical fact.

Jakarta's '27th province' has become the focus for *pembangunan* (development) "so as to catch up with the development of the other provinces (sic) of Indonesia". (Indonesian Embassy Press Release, Bonn, 3 September 1985) According to Indonesian propaganda, extra efforts are needed to 'catch up' because of the 'backwardness' of East Timor and its population. Per capita expenditure is higher in East Timor than any 'other' Indonesian province and it also has more civil servants per capita on the government payroll, a total of 10,050. Behind the fantasy of Indonesian statistics is the reality exposed by Mgr Belo who, when asked to comment on the huge sums Jakarta is pumping into East Timor, replied: "The only problem in Timor is the problem of freedom of the inhabitants." (AFP, 8 August 1985)

In the same interview, Mgr Belo likened East Timor to a jail. It is the jail called East Timor, or more precisely those parts under Indonesian administration, that is the subject of this article. We have carefully studied Indonesian propaganda material and the mass of reports that appear in the Indonesian press, analysing the information with the help of what we know from church sources and letters smuggled out.

Indonesia's chief civilian administrator in Dili

Since his appointment as governor of East Timor in October 1982, Mario Carrascalao has become the focus of Indonesian media attention. He is repeatedly interviewed

by foreign as well as Indonesian journalists. Any public appearance or statement he makes, in Dili or in Jakarta, is widely reported, and he often appears in photographs together with Suharto or Murdani, to emphasise that he has their full backing and blessing. He is often acclaimed as the experienced administrator in charge of *pembangunan* in Indonesia's '27th province'.

Carrascalao is certainly more suited to Jakarta's needs than his predecessors and has been allowed to function more prominently as governor. He has proven capable of serving Jakarta well as a man with administrative experience, sometimes promoting moves to 'clean up' corruption and inefficiency and appearing to be in charge of the huge bureaucracy in East Timor. Whereas before 1983, foreign journalists and diplomats on guided tours of East Timor would be briefed primarily by the area's military commander and the *Sekwilida* (Regional Secretary), a position always held by a military man, Carrascalao has been the main spokesman since then. The emergence of 'Governor' Carrascalao has helped to 'civilianise' and 'Timorise' the administration at a time when East Timor remains Jakarta's most vulnerable target of international condemnation.

Carrascalao comes from one of East Timor's richest families with huge interests in coffee-growing. Jakarta's decision to restore the family's 521 hectares of coffee land in 1980 was instrumental in winning him over to their side. Although he started out in life strongly pro-Portuguese, it required no major adjustment to become as fervently pro-Indonesian; in other words, he is a typical 'native' colonial administrator, working loyally with whatever system has asserted itself.

He has displayed a remarkable adjustment to the arrogant style of Indonesian bureaucrats, sporting their official safari dress, smoking their *kretek* cigarettes

Fretilin-controlled areas exist in several regions (See map opposite)

A Fretilin military communique transmitted by radio on 16 September 1985 reports that Fretilin has established stable areas of control in several regions. The areas are inhabited by civilian families, in some places as many as fifty families (not related to the guerrillas). Normal village pursuits take place and each base has an elected 5-member revolutionary democratic council and its own centre of national resistance (*cernac*). The councils all have women members.

The Revolutionary Council of National Resistance is the supreme resistance organisation with representatives from all the Fretilin-controlled areas and from areas under Indonesian control. It also includes representatives of Falintil, the guerrilla movement, and brigade commanders. It thus provides political and military leadership, including leadership of the diplomatic struggle abroad. The establishment of the radio link has enormously facilitated the consultations and exchange of views between the internal leadership and Fretilin's External Delegation.



Mario Carrascalao always gets the spotlight when Suharto meets provincial governors. (Jakarta Post, 1 July, 1985)

and propagating their Pancasila ideology. He freely accepts the Jakarta view of East Timorese as a 'backward people', and is indeed a prime advocate of this view. Nor does he gainsay Jakarta's condemnation of Portugal's 'centuries of neglect' for East Timor although up to 1975, he believed that East Timor should remain a Portuguese province.

A military project

But for all Carrascalao's prominence, East Timor is primarily a military project. In late 1983, centralised control of the East Timor military command structure was reinforced when Kostrad, the Army's Strategic Reserve Command, set up a *Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan Timor Timur* (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security in East Timor) to take control of all military and security operations in the region. Thus while Colonel Rahardjo, commander of *Korem Wira Dharma*, the sub-regional military command based in Baucau is under *Kodam IX/Udayana*, the Nusatenggara regional military command based in Bali, he is at the same time operationally under Kostrad's special East Timor Command. The first commander of this Command was Brigadier-General Sugito of the para-commandos (Kopassus) who has recently been appointed commander of the crucially important Jakarta Military Command, a post that always goes to an officer highly regarded by the Armed Forces leadership. (See *Military Profile* in this Bulletin.) We do not know who has been appointed as Sugito's successor in East Timor.

Unlike Colonel Purwanto who, as East Timor Korem commander, entered into negotiations with Fretilin in March 1983 and enjoyed a high profile, Colonel Rahardjo takes a low profile and is rarely mentioned in the press. (Colonel Purwanto's immediate successor was Colonel Rudito who was apparently taken ill and died not long after he took up the post.)

Rahardjo's troops are responsible for security and order in the *pemukimans* or concentration-camp villages where the vast majority of East Timorese live. At this level, civil administration as the local extension of Carrascalao's bureaucracy has virtually no role to play. It is Army control that is the reality for people in the countryside, not the fantasy world of development projects which Carrascalao and the bureaucrats so energetically promote.

The troops on operational and territorial duties in East Timor are continually replenished with troops from Java. Thus, for instance, Infantry Battalion 403/Wira Sada Pratista of Jogjakarta has been on one-year stints doing 'territorial guidance duty' in East Timor three times since 1975. (*Indonesia Reports*, No 11, September 1985, quoting *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 27 August.) Troops of the Air Defence Artillery Regiment 1 of Jakarta Military Command, the regiment involved in shooting down demonstrators in Tanjung Priok in September 1984, have regularly served in East Timor. (*Indonesia Reports*, quoting *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 21 August)

The colonial bureaucracy

East Timor is administered by a bureaucracy the upper echelons of which are composed of civil servants brought in from various parts of Indonesia. According to Lincoln Kaye (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 August 1985), posting to East Timor is coveted by ambitious officials not only because of premium salaries, which now include 'hardship' bonuses of up to 95%, according to a presidential decree introduced earlier this year, but also because a stint in East Timor promotes career prospects. These special bonuses are also paid to Indonesians working in health, education and the military. Since the military alone account for well over 10,000 people, the burden on East Timor's 'high per capita' budget of these inflated Indonesian salaries is clearly enormous.

Besides Carrascalao's "handpicked", "top-notch" administrators (to use Kaye's turn of phrase) brought in from all parts of Indonesia to run his 'provincial' administration, the development programmes in East Timor are run by the *Kepala Kantor Wilayah* (Kakanwil) or Heads of Regional Offices representing all the Jakarta-based government departments. These Kakanwil are all officials from Java or Bali as is patently obvious from their names which frequently appear in the Indonesian press. They control the programmes and activities mapped out for East Timor in Jakarta. Moreover, since 1978, the administration of East Timor has been the responsibility not of the Interior Affairs Department but of the Department of Defence and Security.

The civil service in East Timor now consists of 10,050 people but as Carrascalao himself admits, many are Timorese who are kept on the payroll without being required to do a job of work because, he asserts, if they work, "they can hurt people". (*Asiaweek*, 2 August 1985) Many of these Timorese worked for the former Portuguese colonial administration or were brought into the service by Carrascalao's predecessors, both of them from the Apodeti party. They appear to come low in Carrascalao's estimation though he seems keen enough to buy their loyalty.

The Jakarta government is always boasting about the large sums of money poured into its '27th province'. There is little the outsider can do to examine the reliability of official figures, but some simple comparisons make their claims suspect. For instance, Antara News Agency claimed in July this year that expenditure in East Timor in the past nine years has amounted to \$320 million (*Jakarta Post*, 19 July), but according to a Press Release of the Indonesian Embassy in Bonn (3 September 1985), it was \$361 million. The rupiah equivalents showed an even greater discrepancy... in the opposite direction! Antara said it was Rp 350 billion, while the Bonn Embassy's figure was Rp 278 billion.

For fiscal 1984/85, the budget was given as \$66 million with \$20 million for routine expenditures, \$23 million for development projects and \$23 million for Inpres



In national gatherings, it is the Timorese participant who invariably gets the spotlight. Here, Mrs Suharto 'symbolically' pins a badge on a Timorese woman at a Pancasila indoctrination course. (*Jakarta Post*, 16 June)

(special presidential decision) projects. The routine budget was more than double the previous year's figure of \$9 million due to the sharp rise in the number of government officials. Carrascalao told a meeting of district chiefs in May this year that Jakarta had authorised another 290 development projects worth about \$22 million, but a few months earlier he had complained that only a quarter of the development expenditure budgetted for 1983/84 had been spent. There were even projects for the year before that had not yet been implemented; some of them had been simply abandoned. (*Sinar Harapan* 19 July)

The development projects being sponsored by Jakarta have given contractors and sub-contractors a field-day. The building fever has led to rampant land speculation in and around Dili. It was reported in July this year that government officials are buying up land from local peasants for the construction of luxury homes for Dili's new elite of bureaucrats. *Pejabat*s (Indonesian officials) are acquiring land at \$3.5 per square meter, a fraction of land prices in Java. Things have become so bad that Carrascalao has complained of widespread corruption and the harmful effects of this land speculation.

The appearance of Dili has inevitably undergone a drastic transformation. An East Timorese who has been away from Timor for some years was struck during a recent visit to see how Dili has lost its Timorese character and has become a Javanese town.

Agriculture

According to Indonesia's fourth Five-Year Plan (1984-1989), food production, plantation crops, animal-husbandry and fisheries are the main areas of 'growth' in East Timor. Jakarta claims that a 'food surplus' has already been achieved in the districts of Ainaro, Bobonaro, Kovalima, Baucau, Manatuto and Liquica.

Rice production has gone up from 16,521 tons in 1979 to 33,572 tons in 1984. This is clearly the result of foreign aid programmes which are financing irrigation projects in certain parts of the country like the 10,000 hectare project in the district of Bobonaro. But these 'achievements' are irrelevant to the vast majority of Timorese peasants stashed away in heavily-controlled *pemukimans*. Nothing has been done to restore East Timorese agriculture which has been wrecked by the catastrophic population upheavals that followed in the wake of the Indonesian occupation and the countrywide bombing campaign in the late 1970s.

The authorities show nothing but contempt for East Timor's 'backward' farmers and constantly emphasise that the rise in rice production is the result of 'the increase in the farming skills of the people' made possible by the influx of 'model' farmers from Bali. These Balinese farmers, brought over in the course of transmigration programmes implemented since 1982, have been placed in several new villages together with East Timorese villagers, known in Indonesia's developmentalist jargon as 'translocals', people who were uprooted from their own villages.

The myth of these 'model' farmers was shattered by a recent report in the Indonesian press that young Balinese transmigrants had told journalists they were not farmers at all but senior high school graduates who had gone to East Timor under the impression that they would get jobs as businessmen or civil servants. (*Indonesia Reports*, September 1985, quoting *Sinar Harapan*, 28, August)

It is clear that *pembangunan* in East Timor is producing two quite distinct types of new *pemukiman* or settlements. There are the settlements where the vast majority of the population live, under tight control of the military and constantly restricted in their movements. These villagers have been completely sidetracked by Indonesian-style development. But there are also a small number of settlements being set up in conjunction with new irrigated-rice projects and plantation sites which are getting a great deal of attention and capital investment from local and central government. These are known as *desa potensial* or 'villages of potential'.



These 'model' Balinese farmers, photographed in May this year, turn out not to have been farmers at all. The Balinese governor seeing them off can't have been unaware of that! (*Jakarta Post*, 13 May)

Two of these 'desa potensial' are Tunubibi in Bobonaro district and Beco in Kovalima district both of which are frequently spotlighted in the Indonesian press. They are the pet projects of Drs Basuki Adikusma, head of the provincial office (Kanwil) of the Department of Transmigration in East Timor. Tunubibi was founded in 1982 and has a population of 50 Balinese families and 50 'translocals'. As a result of considerable government investment, Tunubibi is now using solar energy for its electricity and fresh-water supplies; it also has equipment for producing bio-gas and a whole range of other hi-tech facilities. During a visit to Beco earlier this year, Drs Basuki Adikusma said that the village was inhabited by 169 'translocal' families. In May, 37 Balinese ('model farmer?') families were brought in and later, another 66 families were transported from Bali. Indonesian-style development requires that a Balinese family must live alongside each 'translocated' Timorese family.

At present it is impossible to know how many of these 'desa potensial' have been set up but their creation is clearly part of a major project to obliterate Timorese village life-styles once and for all, while at the same time transforming agriculture in East Timor to make it serve a cash-crop-based market economy. It is a system which enables Jakarta to control a potentially huge agricultural surplus while leaving the vast majority of Timorese to wither away in concentration camps with little land to cultivate and subjected to security regulations limiting their agricultural pursuits. These *pemukimans* are kept strictly out of the view of visiting diplomats and journalists.

Ir Hadiono, the Javanese head of the East Timor office of the Department of Agriculture, recently gave foreign journalists a glowing picture of the direction being taken by Indonesian plans for East Timor's agriculture. He told them that one day, East Timor's 14,600 square kilometers will be transformed into a neatly and carefully organised "cottage garden" with 15% of the land given over to producing vegetables, 9% set aside for pasturing, 10% for tree-crop plantations, 24% commercial forests, 10% for irrigated-rice production and the remainder for non-agricultural uses. That's all very neat and tidy, but Ir Hadiono was silent on how the Timorese population would fit in with these plans and it seems that the journalists didn't question him on this aspect of the plan, either.

Because of the highly controlled nature of press reporting about East Timor, virtually nothing has seeped

BOOKS ON EAST TIMOR

Alexander George, *East Timor and the Shaming of the West*. Foreword by Lord Avebury. TAPOL, London, 1985.

Ten years of brutal warfare, with aerial bombardment, the resettling of the population in concentration camps and widespread violation of human rights, has resulted in the death of at least a quarter of the population. In one of the most impressive liberation struggles in recent years, Fretilin continues to fight Indonesia's occupation with the support of an indigenous population outraged by Indonesian brutality.

To commemorate the 10th anniversary of the invasion, TAPOL has published a short text by Alexander George documenting the war, outlining press coverage and charting the responsibilities of the governments of industrialised countries for Indonesian occupation and annexation.

In a style similar to that of Chomsky in his *East Timor and the Western Democracies*, George focusses on the policies of the British government, contrasting private policies and public statements during the 10-year period. To give a flavour of the text, there is the case of David Owen who, as Foreign Secretary in 1978, argued that the Labour Government "played a leading part in efforts to reach an internationally acceptable settlement in East Timor". Two months earlier, Owen's peace-seeking government had underwritten the sale of eight Hawk ground-attack aircraft which were soon to play a role strengthening the combative capability of the Indonesian Air Force which was bombing East Timor.

I recall a conversation at the time with a relatively young defence expert protege MP, Robin Cook who assured me these were only "trainer versions" of the plane, and would be used solely for this purpose. He had been assured by the company building the planes, British Aerospace... A selective reader, Cook had quietly ignored, for public consumption, the Aerospace booklets which stressed that the Hawk offered "full ground attack capability."

I cite this example because the 1975-79 Labour Government has much to answer for. It did nothing to publicise the facts of Indonesian brutality, of which it was well aware as it had access to detailed reports provided by Australian intelligence. There are more examples to add to the cases presented by George. In October 1975, two British citizens were killed by Indonesian troops in East Timor. The British government knew this very soon afterwards yet did nothing to investigate the murders. Despite this and the widespread starvation following the 1978 bombings, the Labour Government refused to press Jakarta to admit the International Red Cross (ICRC). There are many other cases. The contrast between private and public utterances is stark, and even more so with the present Tory Government though at least it asked Suharto to extend ICRC activities in East Timor, even if it has done little else.

In looking at the responsibility of the West, we also have to look at the former colonial power, Portugal. Since there is little on this in George's book, it is worth noting a few points. Had the Portuguese adopted a firmer policy towards Indonesia before the invasion, it could have been delayed or even prevented. Yet, at crucial moments, they acquiesced in Indonesian action. They publicly stressed a commitment to East Timor yet privately agreed to the Indonesian takeover. For example, Almeida Santos, now a leading member of the Socialist Party, declared

wholehearted support for the East Timorese on a tour in October 1975. He stated he had found something of which he had previously been unaware, a "love for Portugal" in East Timor. So concerned was he to honour this love that he stopped over in Jakarta and Sydney on his way back to Lisbon to discuss the results of his secret meeting with Ali Murtopo prior to his East Timor trip - to build on Prime Minister Goncalves' view that independence for East Timor was "nonsense".

The years 1974-75 are replete with such cases. Portugal's responsibility for the ensuing events is direct. The colonial power did nothing about the genocide of the population for whom, legally, it remained responsible. At this very moment, it is discussing with Indonesia such pressing issues as maintaining a Portuguese heritage in East Timor. In October and November 1975, when Indonesian troops were crossing the East Timor border, Portuguese Governor Lemos Pires, sent many cables to Lisbon requesting assistance, advice and making important suggestions such as getting the UN to incorporate East Timor as a Trust Territory. He received no replies whatsoever. This silence symbolises Portugal's response - and its responsibility.

John Taylor

Klemens Ludwig and Korinna Horta, *Osttimor, Das Vergessene Sterben: Indonesische Volkermord unter Ausschluss der Öffentlichkeit* (East Timor, Forgotten Deaths: Indonesian Genocide Hidden from the Public), June 1985, Program Taschenbuecher 1013, Gesellschaft fur bedrohte Volker, Gottingen, Germany.

The publisher of this book is the only organisation in the German-speaking world that defends the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. It campaigns against genocide and ethnocide and, like Amnesty International, is politically neutral. It is in this context that this book should be read and understood. The first thing that catches the eye is the many co-publisher Christian organisations, with a foreword by Father Franz Kamphus, Bishop of Limburg and chairman of the German Commission for Justice and Peace.

It gives a comprehensive account of the plight of the East Timorese, their colonial history, the history of Indonesia's brutal occupation and the international diplomatic effort, with a chapter on efforts at the UN. It also discusses the role of the Federal German Republic, the solidarity of the Catholic Church and slowly evolving support from other churches.

There is a useful appendix and a chronology going back to 1520. A collection of letters and documents provides a vivid picture of the tragic conditions of the Timorese people under Indonesian occupation. There is a worldwide survey of press reports and an bibliography on the Timor issue. It is readable, informative and well researched and of special interest to German readers for the detail it provides about the FDR's economic involvement with Indonesia, its political stance, and a criticism of the 'Roeder press', Roeder being a journalist from Munich whose reports about East Timor have been a major source of pro-Indonesian reporting for media in many parts of the world. [Roeder wrote *The Smiling General*, a very flattering biography of Suharto, Indonesia's president.]

All this plus the authors' strict neutrality and the many Christian organisations expressing solidarity makes this a work of interest to a broad spectrum of readers. Some no doubt will be disappointed by the lack of deep political analysis, but there is enough information for everyone to draw their own conclusions.

It is important to have a book on East Timor in German, in fact, the first one written about East Timor. Let us hope it will help break down the wall of silence that surrounds East Timor despite the international solidarity expressed since 1975.

Dorothea Savage

Books also received:

Robert Mitton, *The Lost World of Irian Jaya*, published by Oxford University Press Melbourne, 1984. UK price £28.50.


Finngeir Hiorth, *Timor - Past and Present*, South East Asian Monograph No 17, James Cook University, Townsville, Queensland. A\$8.00.

We hope to publish reviews in the next issue.

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NOTE: Part IV of our series on "The Reorganisation of ABRI" has been held over till the next issue.

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This new TAPOL publication is available for £1.20 including postage (£2.00 airmail). TAPOL plans several new publications in 1986, and will also be producing Occasional Reports on a variety of subjects.

There is no military government in Indonesia

By TAPOL's special correspondent in Jakarta

There is no military government in Indonesia. Who else could say such a thing if not General Amir Machmud, chairman of Indonesia's two legislative bodies, the DPR and the MPR? At a meeting with nine newly appointed Indonesian ambassadors, he said: "There is no military government in Indonesia. The world should be told that besides theocratic, liberal and socialist systems, there is another, the Pancasila system." And he said: "The PKI leaders were executed in compliance with legal procedures."

Amir Machmud was replying indirectly to the many denunciations by the European Parliament made since June this year. The military regime in Indonesia is trying desperately to extricate itself from the corner into which it was driven by the European Parliament resolution denouncing the Indonesian government for its barbarity and its total lack of humanitarianism. This was a serious moral condemnation yet it was not the moral question that had the Suharto government worried, but rather the fear of economic sanctions. They fear that these denunciations by the European Parliament could affect the amount of credit and investment being received by Indonesia.

Why does Amir Machmud constantly let off steam like this? It's a case of over-compensation and there are two possible explanations. Either he's a PKI traitor or a CIA agent. Now it's no secret that he joined the PKI in 1947 in Cirebon and was sworn in by Tjimung, then district head of Cirebon, and Djoko Sudjono. When he was Military Commander of East Kalimantan, his contact with the PKI Central Committee was Sofyan, leader of the PKI East Kalimantan Provincial Committee.

During the critical period in late 1965, Amir Machmud was recalled to Jakarta to replace Umar Wirahadikusumah as Jakarta Military Commander, an appointment supported by the PKI. It was PKI leader Tjugito who proposed the Amir appointment to Dr Subandrio, then still First Deputy Prime Minister, and the proposal was accepted by President Sukarno. Amir Machmud was regarded as a 'progressive-revolutionary' general. Either his PKI membership was a hoax or he was a genuine CIA agent. No-one should therefore be surprised at his over-acting, which is typical for an opportunist.

When he first became Jakarta Military Commander, there

were banners in Banteng Square, headquarters of the Jakarta Military Command, proclaiming: "Long live Sukarno, the Armed Forces and the People!" and "Long live the Great Leader of the Revolution!" But now?

Is there or is there not a military government in Indonesia? Maybe not in name but that's what it is, one hundred percent, whatever the wrappings. We only hope that the European Parliament will follow through its resolution consistently.

The *dwi-fungsi* (dual function) of the Armed Forces means that everyone from president down to lurah (village head) must be military. Everyone running the top legislative bodies, the judiciary and the state enterprises must be an active or retired general. Was it not General Sayidiman Suryodiprodjo who said: military cadres are the only ones committed to and acceptable to the people; such leadership qualities do not yet exist among civilians? Is this not blunt recognition that military cadres are the only ones who govern and who are capable of governing?


Take for instance the recent appointment of the governor of Riau. The man elected by the regional assembly was Ismail Suko, a civilian member of Golkar, but he was forced to withdraw. Major-General Iman Munandar, the present governor who had lost the assembly's support, was re-appointed instead. So, who holds the reins of power, the people or the army? Need we say more?

Or take the bloody Tanjung Priok incident. There is no such thing as martial law in Indonesia yet the police were kept out of the affair; the army was brought in to murder an assembled crowd of people. There is not one shred of evidence that anyone in the crowd was armed, no proof that people in Tanjung Priok were planning a revolt which might have been cause for the Army to mow down hundreds of souls without process. So what kind of government is this?

Or take yet another blatant example of militarism under the Suharto government. At a Golkar meeting in Tangerang, West Java on 30 September, attended by many top-level officials such as General Alamsyah, Minister-Coordinator for Social Affairs, the Governor of West Java and the chairman of the West Java Golkar provincial committee, Lieutenant-Colonel Tadju Sobirin who is the district head of Tangerang handed a knife to General Yogie S. Memet, governor of West Java province, saying: "Use this knife

to slit my throat if Golkar loses the (1987) general election. And if this should happen, I will first slit the throats of the chairman of Tangerang Golkar and all the sub-district and village heads!" Tadju Sobirin also handed the chairman of Golkar West Java branch a whip used to flay beasts of burden. (Behind all the histrionics is the fact that in the past three elections, Golkar votes in Tangerang have fallen steadily against a rise in the Muslim vote.)

Notwithstanding all the evidence that Indonesia is governed by the military, they still try to deny it. The general election, proclaimed ad nauseum as a 'feast of democracy', is being launched with weapons of death and torture, reeking with blood.



British Rapier missiles, supplied under a contract signed last year with British Aerospace, were on show in Jakarta on Armed Forces Day, 5 October.

Anti-communist witch-hunt, 1985

The military regime is currently engaged in a campaign to whip up hysteria against former members or sympathisers of the banned Communist Party (PKI). The campaign is directed not only against former political prisoners but against alleged members or sympathisers of the many mass organisations banned when the military took power in 1965. Moreover, it is being directed increasingly against the offspring and relatives of these alleged members and sympathisers. At a time when there are signs of growing social unrest, the regime is using the 'G30S/PKI' symbol) to intimidate the forces of social and political opposition.

In the last issue of TAPOL Bulletin, we pointed out that the re-registration of ex-tapols (political prisoners) to determine their right to vote in the general elections to be held in April 1987 is just an excuse to tighten up control of ex-tapols. As the operation proceeds, it is clear that anyone remotely connected with the PKI is likely to become a target of the current hysteria. The following reports are only a selection of news items that have appeared in the national and regional press in the past two months.

Interior Ministry directs the campaign

In October, the Department of the Interior convened a Coordination Meeting of the heads of all the Department's provincial directorates of social and political affairs to "examine and assess as well as guide and supervise the G30S/PKI". (Sinar Harapan, 9 October) Major-General (retired) Hari Soegiman, the Department's head of Social and Political Affairs, who was previously a senior official of Kopkamtib, the Army's Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, warned the meeting that so far, only 1.7 million 'followers of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)' had as yet been re-registered, whereas the PKI chairman, D.N. Aidit claimed at the beginning of 1965 that the PKI had a following of 20 million.

The Election Law as amended earlier this year gives the government absolute powers to examine and assess the voting rights of all former members of the PKI and its mass organisations, as well as anyone 'directly or indirectly involved' in the G30S/PKI, said Major-General Soegiman. Collection of data concerning these people is complicated by the fact that since 1979, former political prisoners have returned to society, while many have moved home without the proper administrative procedures.

"There must be meticulous and selective examination of the right to vote of each and every one of them," he said. As for the task of 'guidance and supervision', this rests primarily with government officials at the lowest level of administration, the lurahs and village heads and their residential units, known as the RT and RW.

Jogjakarta has 'lost' 2,833 ex-tapols

According to press reports, the 1985 re-registration of ex-tapols in Jogjakarta, Central Java has been far from satisfactory, because the authorities complain that they have 'lost' no fewer than 2,833 of the 43,118 who were registered in 1982.

Following this alarming discovery, Sugeng Kadaroesman, the local head of Social and Political Affairs announced that he had made contact with his counterparts throughout the country to check the whereabouts of these people. "If they're dead, we must know where their graves are; if they have moved, we must know where to." (Sinar Harapan, 26 September)

Stressing that PKI people "never abandon their ideology", Kadaroesman said they operate a system of "organisation without form" and "four changes" - change of name, change of address, change of profession and change of appearance. Moreover, we in Jogjakarta have been "caught napping" (*kecalongan*), complained Kadaroesman, because "people with ties to former G30S/PKI prisoners" have participated in local elections and have even been elected onto village administrations in five

places, four in the district of Sleman and one in the district of Kulonprogo.

N.H. Soedirdjo, a retired lieutenant-colonel and former chairman of the Jogjakarta Assembly added his voice to the hysteria, proclaiming that all 'ex-PKlers' who still hold jobs in village administration, in the civil service or as teachers must be "pensioned off". (Sinar Harapan, 1 October) This gentleman asserts his right to speak because he played a leading part, as a captain in a Kostrad infantry brigade, in "wiping out" the PKI in the district of Kulonprogo in late 1965 and had many "frightful" experiences at the time. [Jogjakarta was an area of particularly ferocious killings during the late-1965 massacres.]

Lieutenant-Colonel (Infantry) Anotono Margo of the Jogjakarta Military Command is also upset about the 'lost' ex-tapols and said their families were being "checked out" to find out where they had gone. He said that there were altogether more than 300,000 'exPKlers' in Jogjakarta and it was not yet certain how many of them would be allowed to vote. (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 5 October)

US oil company sacks pre-1965 trade unionists

The major US oil company Caltex was among several oil companies which sacked hundreds of employees in November on orders of Kopkamtib because they had been members of the oil-workers union, Perbum before it was banned in 1965. Altogether 1,638 oil-workers were dismissed, 637 by Caltex which operates in Riau, 962 by the state oil company Pertamina and another 39 by the Tesoro Indonesia Petroleum Company which operates in Kalimantan.

Announcing these dismissals, Pertamina said the fired workers would be prevented from getting jobs in all oil companies operating joint ventures with Pertamina. It is being suggested in Indonesia that this politically-inspired vindictive move is being taken partly to conceal economic retrenchment at a time of contracting markets for Indonesian petroleum and widespread redundancies throughout the economy.

A spokesman claimed that the 'PKI background' of the people in question had been known since 1965 but they were not dismissed earlier because they held "highly-skilled jobs" and could not have been dismissed without causing disruption. (Jakarta Post, 7 December) However, the same paper had reported a day earlier that according to Sinar Harapan, most of the sacked Caltex workers were "low-category workers of the company's transportation and warehousing departments," so that the mass dismissals would not affect company operations.

Admiral Sudomo, now Labour Minister who was commander of the security agency, Kopkamtib until 1983, has explained that these dismissals have been planned for a long time, since before he took on his present job. The dismissals are based on Kopkamtib Regulation No 28 passed while he was still at Kopkamtib, regarding dismissals of 'members of banned PKI organisations'. Would others follow, he was asked. All enterprises would have to resolve this 'G30S/PKI' problem, he said ominously (Sinar Harapan, 6 November), while Merdeka quotes him as saying as many as 6,000 could be affected in the oil sector alone.

The witch-hunting Kopkamtib regulation

Kopkamtib Regulation No 28 was issued in 1975 and dealt specifically with 'Category C' suspects. In the late 1960s and 1970s when hundreds of thousands of PKI suspects were in detention, 'Category A' referred to a relative small number awaiting trial, 'Category B' to tens of thousands who could not be tried 'for lack of evidence' and were to be detained indefinitely, and 'Category C' to an even greater number who were eligible for release, though this did not mean that they ceased to be suspects. 'Category C' was also used for 'PKI suspects' who were never arrested but who nevertheless were the subject of Kopkamtib control.

Regulation No 28 sub-divided 'Category C' people into C1 for those 'involved in the Madiun Affair' (of 1948), C2 for 'ordinary members of PKI-oriented mass organisations' and C3 for 'PKI sympathisers'. The Regulation required all C1 people to be dishonorably dismissed from jobs in the state sector or other 'vital sectors'. C2 and C3 people could be kept on, but should be placed under surveillance and 'given guidance'. But it


was understood that in due course, C2 and C3 people would also be appropriately 'dealt with'.

According to Labour Minister Sudomo, the recent oil sector mass dismissals are directed against these C2 and C3 employees. (*Tempo*, 16 November)

This shows how, after so many years, people are being hounded for blatantly political reasons with not the slightest chance of defending themselves against arbitrary dismissal.

Elected village-head discovered to be an 'ex-PKI Muso' man's son

A person elected village-head in a village in the district of Nganjuk, East Java was discovered, after the election, to be the son of an 'ex-PKI Muso' member and his installation could not therefore take place. [Muso was the leader of the PKI for a brief period nearly 40 years ago, in 1948.] Reporting the strenuous efforts of local army officers to prevent the man from assuming his post, *Surabaya Post* (5 October) points out that a decision issued by the governor of East Java in 1983 stipulates that anyone whose natural father or mother were directly involved in the 'G30S/PKI' is prohibited from being a candidate in village elections.



(Published in *Kompas*, 22 October.) While the two non-government officially-sponsored parties have been forced to divest themselves of their political identity, Golkar has declared that its target for the 1987 elections is 61,391,869 votes.

Transmigration closed to "ex-PKI"

Acting on orders from the President, the Minister for Transmigration, Martono had announced that 'ex-PKI people' will no longer be allowed to participate in the transmigration programme. The Minister said that 426,498 'ex-PKI' family-heads with family members totalling in all 1,759,492 have already been transmigrated to sites spread over twenty provinces. The figure seems to be preposterously high; nor is it likely that the Department would have such precise figures. It sounds more likely that the Minister has pulled figures out of a hat just to emphasise that the 'communist threat' now endangers all parts of the country, not only Java where PKI strength was concentrated before 1965.

For those who were transmigrated before the ban was imposed, said Martono, the President has given Regional Military Commanders powers to introduce a system of 'continual guidance'.

Officials in Lampung, till recently a major target-area for transmigration, have also announced that surveillance of 'ex-PKI transmigrants' has been intensified because some of them have 'disappeared' from their settlements,

while in parts of South Sumatra, others have 'slipped in' without permission. The military commander of South Sumatra, Major-General Siswadi said that one of them had even got himself appointed village-head though he had now (thankfully!) been dismissed. Siswadi claims that there are 60,000 [note how precision has given way to a round figure] 'ex-PKI' family-heads among the transmigrants in Lampung. (*Kompas*, 5 October)

Transmigration Minister rejects foreign criticism

At the same time as announcing the ban on 'ex-PKI' transmigrants, the Minister for Transmigration also responded angrily to criticism from abroad coming, he said, mainly from Scandinavian countries, that transmigration is a violation of human rights. Some people are trying to influence world opinion by condemning the programme for destroying the environment by cutting down forests and denuding the mountains. They hope to convince foreign countries to stop supporting the programme, he complained.

Meanwhile, we have learned that Bas Suebu, chairman of the Irian Jaya Provincial Assembly, has been sent on a mission to London, The Hague and possibly other European capitals to beef up IGGI support for the transmigration programme.

Jakarta's new military commander fresh from Timor

Fresh from East Timor where he served as commander of an operational command for the restoration of security, Brigadier-General (now Major-General) Sugito, 46 years old, was installed as commander of the Jakarta Military Command (Kodam Jaya) on 9 August.

Sugito graduated from the Military Academy in 1961 and has spent almost all his army career since then in the elite para-commando corps known first as RPKAD, then as Kopassandha and now as Kopassus. This is the first time the Jakarta Military Command has been placed under a para-commando officer.

Sugito has a reputation as a 'fighting' officer, a man who has always taken on so-called 'tough' assignments. He was among the first RPKAD troops to be parachuted into East Timor at the time of the Indonesian invasion in December 1975. (*Tempo*, 17 August 1985)

The biographical details so far made available in the Indonesian press about Jakarta's new commander are unusually sketchy. In fact, the public heard little about him until this latest appointment, although in Armed Forces circles, he is regarded as a highly proficient officer and a swift decision maker.

All that is known of his career apart from his RPKAD background is that from 1978 to 1982, he was military attache in Hanoi and after returning from that post, he spent a year at the National Defence Institute (Lemhanas). Since then, he has occupied two command positions concurrently: as commander of the Air Defence Fighting Command (Kopur Linud) and as commander of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security in East Timor.

The existence of this latter Command has not, to our knowledge, been mentioned previously. The East Timor operational command, superimposed on the regular territorial command structure, was created in late 1983 at a time when General Murdani was clearly frustrated at the lacklustre results of his August 1983 offensive. Little has been revealed in the press about the tasks and achievements of the new East Timor command under Brigadier-General Sugito except that he brought about "many improvements" according to *Tempo*. As if to convince the public that Indonesian military commanders actually enjoy some popularity among the people of that occupied territory, *Tempo* claimed that his departure from East Timor would be "a heavy blow to some of the population". In the words of *Sinar Harapan* (1 October) Sugito had given a "sense of security to his troops".

Sugito is said to take a fourfold approach to his operational duties: persuasive-educative, preventive, limited repressive and total repressive. This, according



Major-General Sugito, centre, with General Rudini, Army Chief-of-Staff, left, and ex Jakarta commander, Major-General Try Sutrisno, now Deputy Army Chief-of-Staff.

to commentators, makes him *luwes* (flexible). When interviewed by journalists about his new post, he said he would adopt the same "flexible" approach as in East Timor. A major operational duty in Jakarta would be to safeguard security at all the subversion trials now under way in the capital which "are being flooded by masses of people who are sometimes unable to control themselves". (*Sinar Harapan*, 21 August)

Sugito is regarded as a Murdani stalwart used for the past two years to assume control of operations in East Timor and now expected to keep control of the country's capital in the face of expected 'riots and subversion'.

Whoever replaces him in East Timor will doubtless make little difference to the people there, but it is clear that Jakarta has gained a vicious, dedicated and tough commander.

ABRI's two new infantry divisions

A major objective of the current re-organisation of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) is shortening lines of command and providing the regime with a far more effective, centrally-controlled strike force. This is being achieved by reinforcing the Army's Strategic Reserve Command, *Kostrad*, the prestigious corps which Suharto used as his base for taking power in 1965.

In October this year, two new infantry divisions were installed under the command of *Kostrad*: Infantry Division I and Infantry Division II. They have taken over the functions and personnel of two battle commands, the Air Defence Command (Kopur Linud) and the II Ind Battle Command (Kopur II) which were liquidated to make way for the new divisions. General Rudini, Army Chief-of-Staff, declared that both infantry divisions would have the full complement of forces at their disposal including cavalry (tanks), field artillery, air-defence artillery, plus their own sea and air power including a marine unit each, LST craft and Hercules C-130 troop-carrier aircraft. In other words, they will both operate "at full capacity". (*Sinar Harapan*, 3 October)

Infantry Colonel Warsito and Infantry Colonel Muslim Masewa have been appointed respectively commanders of Infantry Divisions I and II. They are both 1961 graduates of the national Military Academy.

The "bitter pill" of East Timor

The *Sinar Harapan* defence correspondent, Atmadji, explains that, up to now, infantry divisions attached to the territorial divisions have been far from effective, mustering little more than a few companies and never achieving battalion strength. In view of this and the Army's "bitter pill" (sic) in East Timor, he writes, all infantry brigades attached to the territorial commands have been liquidated and transferred to *Kostrad*'s two new infantry divisions.

The ten territorial divisions will continue to be responsible for maintaining security in their respective regions but the two *Kostrad* divisions, functioning as a rapid deployment force, will be on call for operations

throughout the country. Military spokesmen make it clear that these infantry divisions are needed primarily for operations against 'internal subversion' because the regime does not consider Indonesia to be under threat of external attack from any quarter. In the words of General Rudini, Infantry Divisions I and II must "safeguard (Indonesia's) territorial integrity and protect social and political stability from all forms of unrest, disturbances and threats, particularly security disturbances from within the country". (*Angkatan Bersenjata*, 10 August)

Western powers who are busily competing for orders to equip ABRI's rapid deployment force should note that these arms supplies will only strengthen the regime against internal political unrest and the liberation struggles in East Timor and West Papua, for these are the clearly defined targets of ABRI's revamped strike force.

A clean-up for Suharto's image

Every year, when 1 October comes round, the Indonesian public is treated to a heavy dose of anti-communist propaganda as a reminder, in case anyone has forgotten, that the Suharto regime holds the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) responsible for masterminding an attempted coup on 1 October 1965, the day on which Suharto took control of the Armed Forces as the first step in his own seizure of state power. 1985 being the 20th anniversary, the dose this year was heavier than usual. But there was a special edge to it as well, that of polishing up Suharto's bloodthirsty image.

A major topic in the press this year was the murder of D.N. Aidit, chairman of the PKI who, as is already known from earlier 1 October-related articles, was shot down in cold blood on 22 November 1965 by Colonel Yasir Hadibroto, commander of the Fourth Infantry Brigade of Kostrad, the Army Strategic Command whose commander was Major-General, now General(ret'd)/President Suharto. Colonel Yasir who is now a major-general and governor of the province of Lampung, has given a public account of the murder of Aidit no fewer than three times since 1980 but each time, crucial aspects of the story have changed.

The most important 'modification' relates to the role of Suharto in instructing Yasir to murder Aidit. In Yasir's first account, published in the Sunday edition of *Kompas* on 5 October, 1980 (for an unabridged translation, see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 41/42, September/November 1980), Yasir makes no attempt to hide the fact that the order to kill the PKI chairman - to deal with him, was the expression used - came from Suharto. The account gives the clear impression that Yasir was acting under orders from Suharto and includes not the slightest hint that the decision to shoot his captive was in any way his own responsibility.

The account he gave three years later (in the Sunday edition of *Sinar Harapan*, 2 October 1983) eliminates all reference to any order from Suharto except insofar as he was under Suharto's command to take his Kostrad troops to Central Java to 'restore order'. The decision to shoot Aidit now appears as a personal decision, taken because Aidit vehemently protested at being handcuffed by a lieutenant while he was being driven to Semarang in an army vehicle with Yasir sitting in the front seat. Aidit's 'rebellious' attitude 'upset' Yasir (the Indonesian word used is *pusing*), 'forcing' him to stop the convoy and issue an order to shoot his captive. Aidit's body was 'left there' and Yasir proceeded to Semarang to report to the Central Java military command on what he had done.

In this version, Yasir claims to have been very worried that he could be charged and punished once Sukarno, then still Indonesia's president, discovered that Aidit, a minister-coordinator in Sukarno's government, had been

bumped off. Emphasis on his own responsibility and his 'sense of guilt' eliminates all impression that he committed the murder on Suharto's orders.

The 1985 version


Yasir's account Mark III got a far wider airing than the previous accounts and was published in at least four Jakarta dailies (*Suara Karya*, *Sinar Harapan* and *Berita Buana*, 1 October, and *Jakarta Post*, 2 October, 1985) The element of personal responsibility and 'guilt' is even stronger. Aidit's 'rebelliousness' is now made to look far more provocative. The story this time is that Yasir had decided to take Aidit to Jakarta (presumably to meet - and be freed by? - President Sukarno) but became infuriated on the way to Semarang when Aidit started 'yelling his head off' about an imminent 'communist victory' in Indonesia. This time, Yasir presents his own reaction as being that, if this man is allowed to go free, 'Indonesia's history will be very different'.

Thus provoked, he ordered the convoy to make for the base of one of his battalions. On arriving there, he took Aidit out, stood him by a well and, after allowing him to 'make a speech' for about ten minutes, shot him dead with his Owen rifle, a weapon he had kept with him for the past 15 years. "With this weapon, I didn't need to take aim. I just shot from the hip... and loor-loor." Aidit's body fell into the well and was covered up to conceal its presence. A few days later, Yasir returned to throw wood down the well and set fire to it.

Yasir's account Mark-III is taken up in *Suara Karya* the following day (2 October) by Major-General (ret'd) Wahono, now governor of East Java, who was Suharto's Assistant for Operations at Kostrad in 1965. Describing himself as someone who was at Suharto's side night and day during those early critical months, Wahono asserts that the news that Aidit had been shot dead 'caused consternation' (as if Suharto was taken completely by surprise by Aidit's death). So Suharto ordered Wahono to prepare a report for Sukarno. "At all costs, Pak Harto should not be rebuked (over the affair) by Bung Karno," thought Wahono while preparing this report, according to



D.N. Aidit



A diagram published by *Sinar Harapan* (2 October 1983) claims that this is how Yasir captured Aidit who was hiding in a cupboard.



Yasir Hadibroto

Suara Karya. "What was so worrying was that Bung Karno had asked Pak Harto to bring Aidit who had fled to Central Java back to Jakarta."

As soon as the report was ready, Suharto went to see the President while Wahono waited anxiously back at Kostrad HQ. Suharto returned from the Palace "looking somewhat gloomy" but said that nothing had happened. "Bung Karno only said, 'if he's already dead, what else is there to do?', said Suharto, as he untied his boots."

Extra-judicial murder officially confirmed

Aidit's cold-blooded murder by his Army captor occurred at a time when hundreds of thousands of people were being slain by or at the instigation of Suharto's troops in many parts of the country. It is symptomatic of the deathly silence surrounding these ghastly massacres that Aidit's murder is the only one to have been officially acknowledged by the Suharto regime. This murder was crucial to the future of Suharto's rule because, of all people, Aidit could have explained the extent and limitations of the PKI's support for the Army officers who launched the kidnap plot on 1 October 1965 which paved the way to Suharto's seizure of power.

Yasir Hadibroto, now in his second term as governor of Lampung, was Aidit's assassin. Like so many paid killers, he has now been required to take the rap and 'clear Suharto's name' though in Indonesia's perverted system of justice, no-one gets punished for bumping communists off. On the contrary, they get promotion and acclaim.

Aidit's extra-judicial murder should be the subject of an international investigation which should not look only at Yasir's role but at the far more important role of Yasir's commander, Indonesia's present-day president.

The 'disappeared' photographs

Every time Yasir speaks about Aidit's murder, he never fails to mention that, during the hours Aidit was in his custody, an officer took a number of photographs. He says that the negatives were taken away for development, and he later received only three prints which he was then ordered to burn, along with the document Aidit allegedly wrote or dictated. Yasir may bemoan the loss of these photographs but many years later, an unidentified source in Indonesia sent seven of these photos to TAPOL, copies of which we have reproduced in a number of Bulletins.

Taking 'the path of the law'

The other 1985 image-polishing operation has been performed by a trusted law officer of the Indonesian

military, Major-General (ret'd) Ali Said who now presides over the country's Supreme Court.

Ali Said described at great length for the benefit of the Indonesian press (*Sinar Harapan*, 30 September) how he was involved in the interrogation of PKI detainees soon after the 1 October 1965 affair and was instrumental in selecting the first communist leader to be brought for trial. This was Njono, for many years leader of Indonesia's main trade union federation, SOBSI, who was secretary of the PKI Jakarta Committee in 1965. After performing as an interrogator, Ali Said then assumed the role of presiding judge of the Extraordinary Military Tribunal which tried Njono and sentenced him to death. (So much for the principle of 'fair trial'!)

In December 1965, Suharto secured his own appointment by Sukarno as the officer responsible for convening the Extraordinary Military Tribunals which would try those allegedly responsible for the 1 October affair. By this time, Aidit, the man above all others who should have been the first to answer questions about the affair under Suharto's 'way of the law', was safely dead.


What happened at the Njono trial is secondary to Ali Said's 1985 commemorative reminiscence. He focusses on describing how Suharto "prayed to the Almighty to be given the strength to uphold the law and not seek vengeance". Ali Said then explains how the Njono trial provided irrefutable proof of the PKI's involvement in the 1 October 1965 affair, omitting to mention that Njono's 'confession' which provided this 'irrefutable proof' was retracted by Njono in court.

While the Njono trial was still in progress, Ali Said says that he sent a letter to Suharto saying that if he (Suharto) was intending to ban the PKI, he should go ahead without awaiting the results of the trial. In case anyone doubts the existence of this letter, Ali Said assures us that it is stored with the documents of the Njono trial, adding, "I hope it hasn't been lost." The virtuous Suharto's reply was brief: "Don't think about anything else. Just concentrate on what you're doing."

Ali Said recollects thinking at the time that the trial should not be allowed to delay banning the PKI. "After thinking it over for a long time, it became clear (to me) that Pak Harto's attitude was the right one, patiently waiting for strong legal grounds (sic) upon which to base the PKI ban."

Twenty years on, Suharto is clearly worried about his image. Yasir, Ali Said, Wahono and others besides have done what they can to cover up any hint of his murderous and iron-fist methods. But the lengths they have gone to only emphasises just how much Suharto has to hide.

Suharto's imagery dominated the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the Indonesian Armed Forces on 5 October. Thousands of women were used to hold up the boards.



Subversion trials run into trouble

The subversion trials now under way in many Indonesian cities are not going smoothly for the regime. Defendants and their lawyers are taking a stand on many issues and what is more, the disputes are being reported in some sections of the press. While some of the disputes are concerned with important procedural matters, the underlying cause for dissatisfaction is the anti-subversion law itself.

Contesting the Anti-Subversion Law

Members of the Petition-of-50 wrote to the President on 8 October calling for the repeal of the law and insisting that it has "lost its reason for existence". According to *The Australian* (18 October), the letter was made public ten days later though we should add that it has not been reported in the Indonesian press.

A report on opposition to the law has however been published by *Tempo* (23 November). It points out that the first comprehensive attack on the law was made by the team of lawyers who defended Hariman Sirgar, a student leader who was tried in 1974. The attack was made in their 'eksepsi' or demurrer, an occasion at the commencement of any trial for the defence to challenge legal aspects of the indictment or the court. Since then, many demurrers have made the same objections, arguing that the law which was introduced by presidential decree as a temporary measure in 1963 is so vague in its definition of 'subversive crime' that it can be, and indeed has been, used to try anything from political dissent to corruption, smuggling and even bribery. Some demurrers argue cogently that the way the 1963 presidential decree was enacted as law in 1969 was unconstitutional.

None of the complaints made in these defence demurrers has ever been acknowledged by any panel of judges, though the judges trying H.R. Dharsono did, according to the Petition-of-50 protest last month, go so far as to admit that "historically, the anti-subversion law was created in emergency conditions, by presidential decree which by nature was temporary...." All judges are government employees and as such are required to join Korpri, the association of civil servants, which makes obedience to government ideology compulsory. This means that they are not free agents and are incapable of challenging the prosecution, still less challenging the law which the regime has used ever since the first 'G30S/PKI' trial in January 1966 to 'legitimise' its crackdown on political opposition.

Fatwa's lawyers walk out in protest

Many procedural abuses have caused the defendants and their lawyers to protest in court but the most effective protest was staged by the lawyers defending A.M. Fatwa when the court refused to call Ali Sadikin as a witness

for the defence. When the lawyers walked out, Fatwa also walked out, insisting that because he is being tried under the anti-subversion law and can therefore be sentenced to death, he must by law have legal assistance.

The lawyers had presented a list of six defence witnesses but the judges, using what they called their 'discretionary powers of selection', were only willing to allow four to appear, excluding Ali Sadikin. The lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court for a judgement, but when the judges hearing the Fatwa trial decided to proceed without awaiting this judgement, the lawyers walked out. This walk-out forced the judges to suspend the hearing.

The refusal to allow Ali Sadikin to appear was all the more incredible because he had testified only a week earlier in the Dharsono trial. It is more than likely, however, that his powerful impact at that trial explains the reluctance of Fatwa's judges to allow a repeat performance. But the very close relationship between Sadikin and Fatwa over many years, not only in the Petition-of-50 group but also when Sadikin was Governor of Jakarta, made the refusal quite intolerable. The defence lawyers argued however that their primary objection lay in the fact that the judges do not have the right to select defence witnesses, according to the 1981 Procedural Code, KUHP.

A week later, the court made a climbdown, announcing that Ali Sadikin would after all be allowed to appear. No explanation was given for the change of heart, nor had the Supreme Court issued any judgement on the affair. As with so many aspects of these subversion trials, it is obvious that decisions were taken behind the scenes on purely political grounds.

Events surrounding the calling of defence witnesses in the Dharsono have taken a rather different turn. In this case, the team of lawyers did not contest the court's decision to call only six of the twelve witnesses requested by the defence. However, it later transpired that two of the defence witnesses, Syafruddin Prawiranegara and retired general Sudirman, formerly commander of the East Java Divisional Command would not appear. Initially, this was said to be because of 'illhealth' but, according to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (28 November), Syafruddin's testimony has been "postponed indefinitely" because he is threatened with a

Abdul Qadir Djaelani challenging a court ruling. (*Tempo*, 23 November) Djaelani is accused of 'spreading hatred' and 'agitating the public against the government'. In a statement to the court entitled, "Jungle law is still valid after 40 years of Indonesian independence", he retracted 'confessions' made under interrogation, and said he was beaten unconscious, his hair and moustache were removed and he was prevented from saying Friday prayers.



separate persecution for a sermon he preached in August. (See **TAPOL Bulletin**, No 71 for an extract from this sermon.) The **Review** suggests that the decision not to call these witnesses was taken by the defence.

Other walkouts... and expulsions

When the Muslim preacher, Abdul Qadir Djaelani tried to walk out from a hearing because his defence lawyers were not able to be present, the court ordered him to be returned to the court-room, then announced his expulsion from the court. The hearing then proceeded in the absence of both the defendant and the defence lawyers!

The Mawardi Noor trial has also proceeded without either defendant or lawyers in court. In this instance, Noor was absent for reasons of ill-health, but the court refused to accept this without a doctor's certificate and ordered court officials to bring the defendant to court. His still refused to appear. A doctor's certificate was duly presented at the next session but the judges proceeded with the hearing nevertheless, again in the absence of both defendants and lawyers.

Lawyers could now face legal proceedings themselves

The chief prosecutor for Jakarta, Bob Nasution has turned on the defence lawyers, accusing them of staging an organised "strike" against the trials. He even alleges that the walkouts are a deliberate attempt to prevent the trials from being completed by December, by which time some of the defendants would have to be released because the one-year period of detention without trial permitted under the Anti-Subversion Law will then expire.

As for Lieutenant-General (retired) Ali Said, the Army's main 'upholder of the law' since 1965, he has threatened to initiate proceedings against the lawyers for "insulting the courts". (No doubt, the anti-subversion law could be stretched to cover that.)

Single lawyers association foisted on the profession

After years of effort, the government's leading law-enforcer, Ali Said, Chairman of the Supreme Court, has succeeded in forcing the legal profession to create a single organisation for lawyers to replace the several organisations now in existence.

The decision to push for this was taken at a meeting of the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice and chairmen of all the high courts, in February, 1982. The merger was seen as being a way "to facilitate control over lawyers" (*Tempo*, 23 November, 1985)

The founding conference of the new association, *Ikatan Advokat Indonesia* (Indonesian Association of Lawyers), did not go all the government's way because its favoured candidate for chairman, Golkar lawyer Albert Hasibuan was roundly defeated by Harjono Tjitrosoebeno, the present chairman of the most prestigious lawyers organisation, Peradin. Harjono is also defending some of the accused now on charges of subversion. Albert Hasibuan did however succeed in gaining the position of Secretary General.

Al-Ickwan trials

The editor of the banned Muslim periodical **Al-Ikhwān**, Irfan Suryahardi, and a distributor of the journal, A. Zonet Sumarlan are now on trial on charges connected with the publication. Irfan could face the death penalty as he is being charged under the anti-subversion law while Zonet Sumarlan could get anything up to 20 years.

Al-Ikhwān (The Brotherhood), published by Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid (Mosque Youth Communications Body), was banned in May this year. It was the successor to another Muslim periodical, **Ar-Risalah**, which was banned in October 1983 and had become a very popular journal, selling 10,000 copies every issue, not only in major Javanese cities but in Kalimantan, Lampung (South Sumatra) and Ujung Panjang as well.

Both trials are attracting large crowds who make no secret of their sympathy for the accused. The two men have shown their contempt for court procedures by refusing to comply with the wishes of the judges. Irfan Suryahardi's trial was delayed several weeks because he refused to appoint defence lawyers, complaining that confinement to a cell made it impossible to contact lawyers freely. Arguing that the trial cannot proceed without defence lawyers because the accused faces a possible death sentence, the judges asked several legal organisations, among them the local Legal Aid Institute (LBH), to form a defence team. The LBH did not comply with this request, though two other groups did.

During one hearing, the defendant's sister was taken into custody after she was discovered passing a letter to her brother. During another hearing, two members of the public were ordered out of the court and later arrested for shouting words of support for Irfan Suryahardi.

The indictment alleges that in 1979, the defendant joined the 'Komando Jihad', a body which by all accounts exists only in the imagination of the government. In 1980, he allegedly joined the Mosque Youth Communications Body, and in 1982, he joined the Jogjakarta branch of the Indonesian Mubaligh Corps (many of whose national leadership are also on trial). The periodicals Irfan Suryahardi edited were allegedly established to promote an Islamic state and undermine the so-called 'Pancasila State'.

Crowds following the hearing outside the courtroom grew angry when the loudspeaker went dead every time the defendant or one of the defence lawyers spoke.

A. Zonet Sumarlan has repeatedly challenged court rulings and succeeded in forcing the prosecution to revise the charge-sheet because of blatant inaccuracies. He too has refused to have any legal defence, arguing that only Allah can defend him.

Some newspapers, notably **Suara Karya**, the Golkar daily, go out of their way in their reports to depict the two men as being "unruly" and acting "strangely" because of their intransigent attitude.



Bambang Sispojo who was sentenced to death last year was manhandled in court by troops for refusing to comply with court discipline. (*Tempo*, 23 November 1985)

Death-sentence prisoners may be moved to Nusakembangan
Kompas reports (17 October) that three Muslim prisoners, two of whom are under sentence of death may be transferred to the Nusakembangan prison island, following a request for transfer made by the Jogjakarta High Court. The Court complains that the three men are "agitating and preaching" at Wirogunan Prison, Jogjakarta and are having a "disruptive" effect on other prisoners.

The two under death sentence are Bambang Sispojo and Abdullah bin Umar. The third is Muhd. Sudiyanto who was given a life sentence earlier this year. A spokesman of the High Court also said Nusakembangan would be "the safest place" for the executions. He added that the executions will take place as soon as an order has been received from the President.

Tanjung Priok massacre on trial

The trial of retired Lieutenant-General Hartono Rekso Dharsono which commenced in Jakarta on 19 August 1985 represents the regime's first attempt to deal head-on with the dissident retired army officers associated with the Petition-of-50 group which has been circulating critical documents about the government since March 1980.

Dharsono was not a signatory of the original petition but has been closely associated with its activities. Armed Forces (ABRI) commander, General Benny Murdani has shown intense irritation with Army officers who turn on the government in their retirement. In most cases, the ABRI leadership has been able to buy them off. Having tried but failed to buy off Dharsono, Murdani hopes to make an example of him as a warning to other officers so many of whom have gone into retirement in the current generational transfer and Armed Forces re-organisation.

The regime is using the trial to establish a link between Dharsono and the Muslims already sentenced for alleged involvement in the bomb attack on two branches of the Bank Central Asia in October last year, thus hoping to discredit Dharsono and other 'disgruntled Army pensioners' in the eyes of past and present ABRI officers. The main charge relates to a meeting in Jakarta on the evening of 18 September (four days after the Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984), attended mainly by Muslims, at which Dharsono allegedly delivered an 'inflammatory lecture' inciting those present to turn to 'armed rebellion' in revenge for the Tanjung Priok affair.

The testimony of witnesses who attended this meeting hardly bears out this charge. According to the press reports available, the impression created in court was that, far from 'inciting youths to rebel' as the indictment alleges, Dharsono tried to calm people down and spoke about using 'constitutional' methods to protest against the Tanjung Priok tragedy.

Dharsono has been charged under the anti-subversion act for 'attempting to undermine state security', 'inciting rebellion' and 'organising subversive meetings'. Apart from the 18 September evening meeting, the 'subversive meetings' refer to two meetings of the Petisi-50 group held on 15 and 18 September 1984 at which a White Paper was produced, presenting an account of the 12 September Tanjung Priok massacre sharply at variance with the official version announced by Murdani a few hours after the massacre, and calling for a fact-finding commission to investigate the incident. (See TAPOL Bulletin, No 66, November 1984, page 2)

Dharsono's presence at all three meetings is being used by the regime to link the BCA bombings with the Petisi-50 group as a whole.

Ali Sadikin testifies

When Lieutenant-General (retired) Ali Sadikin, a (pre-1965) commander of the Marine Corps who was governor of Jakarta from 1966 till 1977 appeared as a defence witness on 31 October, the courtroom was packed, with a crowd of some two thousand following the proceedings outside, clapping and cheering many of his statements. Sadikin was the first of six witnesses called by the defence. The defence wanted to call twelve witnesses but only six were allowed by the Court.

Ali Sadikin has played a prominent role in the Petisi-50 group. Meetings of its study-group are regularly held at his home and it was at such meetings that the White Paper was drafted and then signed. He objected to the meetings being called 'illegal'. Admiral Sudomo, now Labour Minister, formerly commander of the top security command, is a close neighbour and has dropped by while past meetings were in progress, so there is nothing secretive about them, Sadikin told the Court.

He focussed attention on the White Paper and explained in detail the differences between its account of the Tanjung Priok incident and that of General Murdani. None

of these details were given in press reports of Sadikin's testimony. He also asked for the White Paper to be read out in Court because it has never been published in the Indonesian press. Although the document was read in full, no newspapers gave any details of the contents. When defence lawyer Buyung Nasution questioned Ali Sadikin about the shooting in Tanjung Priok, the Court ruled that such questions were out of order.

Script for trials written by Kopkamtib

Ali Sadikin, the popular former governor of Jakarta, has no illusions about the political trials now under way. He knows too that once Dharsono has been found 'guilty' and sentenced, other Petisi-50 members, himself included, are likely to be tried. Indeed, he and eight other Petisi members were named in the indictment of Dharsono as his "accomplices...each of whom will be brought as the accused in separate cases..." (This unprecedented indictment by proxy was challenged by Dharsono's lawyers as unlawful, but the Court allowed the indictment to proceed.)

In an interview with UPI (26 October) Ali Sadikin warned that the verdicts are pre-determined. He said the script for the trials was drafted by Kopkamtib, the Army's Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. "They've already set up the scenario. The military coaches the witnesses. Mentally, they are already down, broken."

He described the Suharto government as "very arrogant... much worse than Marcos. Sovereignty is not in the hands of the people. It is in the hands of the rulers. (Suharto) has the armed forces. He has all the government employees. Nobody controls him. People are still very afraid."

"We are the only opposition who dares to say the truth in Indonesia. There are now only 15 or 20 people to tell the people the truth. But I have a feeling that many people agree with us."

Tanjung Priok victims testify

Two young men who were shot in Tanjung Priok on 12 September 1984 also appeared as witnesses for the defence. Yusron was one of 28 people tried earlier this year for participating in the demonstration which was shot down by troops. He was wounded several times and still has a bullet lodged in his body. (For more about his testimony at his own trial, see TAPOL Bulletin, No 69, May 1985, page 7) The other man to testify about the events in Tanjung Priok was Eddi Nurhadi, a street vendor who did not attend the demonstration but returned home and went to sleep. He woke at 2 am, went out to find some food and was picked up by security officers who, for no apparent reason, shot him in the leg then left him unattended. The leg has since been amputated.



Severe sentences being passed

A number of Muslims on trial in Jakarta and elsewhere have now come to an end, with severe sentences being passed.

15 and 10 years in Ternate

Two students tried on subversion charges for "assembling a group of students at the Sultan Hairun University and reading out a document entitled *A Brief Report of the Bloody Tragedy in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta*, the contents of which were completely at variance with the government's explanation" were found guilty at the Ternate District Court in North Maluku. **Hasbullah Sidik** was given a sentence of 15 years, and **Syamsi Haji Rauf** got a 10-year sentence. (*Jakarta Post*, 26 October)

This trial got hardly any coverage in the national press. The only other reference available was a brief report in *Kompas* (16 October) which described the charges in the same way as above and reported that the prosecutor had demanded sentences of 15 and 10 years.

20 years for preacher

A Muslim preacher, **Yayan Hendrayana**, was found guilty of subversion for delivering 'inflammatory sermons' between June and September last year and was given a sentence of 20 years. (For a full report of the charges, see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 71, September 1985.) Evidence from prosecution witnesses made it clear that the security forces had been spying on meetings addressed by the defendant for many months. However, they waited till after the Tanjung Priok massacre before arresting him and charging him among other things with "inciting the masses" and "causing" the Tanjung Priok to occur, resulting in much loss of life. The prosecutor claimed in his summing up that "the masses, most of whom were 'little people' (*rakyat kecil*), were easily taken in by his incitements". (*Suara Karya*, 13 September)

After the prosecutor announced his demand for a life sentence, trial hearings had to be postponed several times because the defendant was seriously ill.

12 years for broadcasting cassettes

Ali Masrum (Mudhoffar) is a well-known broadcaster for commercial radio in Surabaya, which is probably why his trial on charges of subversion attracted such huge crowds. He was accused of receiving cassettes of speeches by Amir Biki and Syarifin Maloko in Tanjung Priok on 12 September 1984 which he reproduced and broadcast. He also distributed the cassettes as well as 'illegal leaflets' to his friends. The prosecutor felt this deserved a 20-year sentence. The panel of judges at the Surabaya District Court was a little more 'lenient' and gave him 12 years.

During the trial, the defence protested at the Court's decision to exclude the public from the session when the tapes were re-played. The judges justified this on the grounds of "national security". (*Kompas*, 10 September)

8 and 5 years for 'Imron followers'

Fuad had been in detention for four years already when he was brought for trial in Surabaya, accused of being associated with a Muslim congregation under Imron who was tried and sentenced to death several years ago. The prosecution asserted that, as a member of the Mosque Youth in Surabaya, he gave talks critical of Pancasila and the state constitution, arousing hostility towards the government.

When sentence was passed, he was in a state of shock. His mother said afterwards that since his arrest, he has often had spells of silence and listlessness.

The prosecutor who wanted a 15-year sentence is likely to appeal against the Court's verdict. (*Suara Karya*, 9 September)

Islamic Crash-Course trials

Six men tried for activities in the *Lembaga Pendidikan Pondok Pesantren Kilat* (Crash-Course Pesantren Educational Institute, or LP3K) have all been found guilty. Details of the charges against LP3K activities were given in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 71. The heaviest sentence went to the two men tried in Surabaya: **Simpuang Abdul Malik** got a 20-year sentence while **Andri Harto** was given a 12-year sentence. Both were found guilty largely on evidence from a witness named David Frans who was relied on heavily by the prosecution to link them with bombing incidents. The type of 'subversive' activities used to pass the heavy sentences was - preparing and circulating leaflets called "An Open Letter to the Armed Forces" and "Drag General Murdani to court to account for the Tanjung Priok incident".

Andi Sukisno (21), **Murdjoko (26)**, **Faisal Fachri (21)** and **Sugeng Budiono (20)**, all tried in Malang, were each sentenced to 8 years. The prosecutor, who had asked for 15-year sentences in all these cases, announced that he would appeal against the verdict.

KMI deputy-chairman gets 20 years

H. Salim Qadar (50), a deputy-chairman of the Indonesian Corps of Mubalighs (lay-preachers) was given a sentence of 20 years. He was accused primarily of 'inciting the Tanjung Priok demonstration' and delivering 'inflammatory lectures' just before the incident. Several of the prosecution witnesses had clearly been spying on him in the months prior to September 1984, and accused him of attacking government policies such as the birth control programme the sole-principle law.

STOP PRESS

West Papuan deportees face death penalty

A PNG journalist who visited Jayapura in November was told by a provincial official that eleven of the 12 deportees forced back to Irian Jaya on 12 October (see page 1) would stand trial in the next few months, nine of them on heavy charges that could result in the death penalty. (*Niugini News*, 19 November) The official said, "If they killed somebody, the penalty is death." [He should have added that you don't need to kill anyone under the anti-subversion law to get the death penalty.]

The journalist who met the deportees spoke of their "weary appearance". One had a black eye and another limped badly as they were taken out for a press photo. The report quoted statements made by the men's spokesman **Izaak Rumpaisum**, but he was clearly not speaking as a free agent as the prison director sat among the detainees during the interview.

Foreign journalists reprimanded

Three foreign journalists were given severe warnings by the government for articles about the current re-organisation of the Armed Forces. Two, **Lincoln Kaye** and **Paul Handley**, are from the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and the third, **Andree Feillard** writes for *Asiaweek*. Only last year, the FEER lost its Jakarta correspondent, **Susumu Awanohara**.

According to the *Jakarta Post* (8 November), they were accused of giving their readers a misleading conception of what is happening in the Armed Forces by using such terms as "unwanted transfer" and "reduced promotion possibilities".

The *Sydney Morning Herald* reports that an issue of *Asiaweek* which contained an article about Papua New Guinea which commented on the situation in Irian Jaya was withheld from circulation.

The Sand-Collectors

by: Angelica Stuart

From the bridge it was possible to observe the gruelling labour of the Balinese sand-collectors. This activity of the Balinese (a curious occupation) held sensational appeal for tourists. Such observation was a somewhat vulgar pastime, a tinge sadistic, voyeuristic, indulged in each day by a motley group of Australian, French and German tourists whom I recall basking their plump bellies and flabby thighs each day on the beach adjacent to their luxurious hotel. The tourists were titillated, perhaps obtaining an understandable if somewhat perverted satisfaction in the chasm which separated and protected them from the hellish work to which the Balinese women were chained.

The procession of women bearing huge empty baskets atop their heads, ranging in age from 12 to 60 years, perhaps older, perhaps younger, trod the path through the mud, their steps leading further, deeper into the river, in which gradually were immersed their ankles, then their knees, then their thighs, then their buttocks, waist, breasts, neck and finally their heads. As they disappeared entirely beneath the surface of the river, only the baskets on their heads remained visible. At regular intervals their heads emerged, having scooped the sand from the river bed and deposited it in the basket whose cargo of sand and weight gradually increased.

When the baskets were entirely filled, the procedure was repeated in reverse: heads reappeared from beneath the river surface, then shoulders, breasts, navels, finally their full length was visible as these women moved, now encumbered by their burden, the product of their labour atop their heads which they dared not upset as the 5 rupiahs (a fraction of a US cent) which they received for the sand cargo represented each day the difference between starvation or survival for themselves and their families. Slowly, ponderously, they re-traced their steps, the punishing, exhausting climb up the steep hill to the road, their posture amazingly erect despite the cruel loads they were obliged to bear on their heads.

Again and again, they repeated the grotesque procedure, from sunrise to sunset, children, pregnant women, aged women, throughout the suffocating heat, every day of their lives, obtaining 5 rupiahs per basket which at the end of each day's labour had accumulated (if their strength sustained) to 500 rupiahs, the wages for effort which seemed, to any observant tourist, almost unendurable.

After several years during which a large part of their day was spent in this activity, immersed in often polluted water, the women gradually and almost inevitably contracted diseases of the bladder or the intestines, uterine infections, and so on and so forth. Many of these diseases are irreversible. Medical facilities to treat these ailments that might be responsive to treatment did not exist in sufficient supply, and these women bore with spartan resignation the damage to their bodies which subsequently disabled their lives.

This attitude, sometimes referred to as the 'remarkable Balinese submissiveness', had its source perhaps in despair, a sense of futility, in an experience, a memory which still seared deeply, branded into the consciousness or sub-consciousness of these Balinese - the ineradicable memory of the events of 1965, and the consequences of their effort to resist being reduced to beasts of burden, their struggle to recover their human dignity, their struggle to rise above subsistence living conditions.

This struggle was crushed in 1965 with such efficient atrocity as to intimidate these Balinese and annihilate in them any such impertinent and subversive idea that it was somehow unnecessary for them to squander their lives

in this form of slavery to the rupiah while other persons who seldom exert the slightest effort somehow manage to possess numerous yachts, mansions, immense wardrobes and jewelry, a fraction of the cost of which could have restored the entire colony of Balinese sand-collectors to the world of the living. The rebellion of these Balinese was smashed with a bloodbath which imposed upon them, once and for all, a clear awareness of 'their place' in the established order.

According to reports of Western observers assigned in New Zealand during 1965-66, the fiercest resistance to the overthrow of Sukarno occurred among the people of Bali. Following the coup that deposed Sukarno, Suharto's US-trained and supported troops perpetrated what conservative estimates describe as the slaughter of approximately one million human beings in Indonesia, a massacre described by Chomsky and Herman as "the second largest holocaust of the 20th century".¹⁾

As punishment for having attempted to reclaim their human status, and as an example to deter further defiance (so essential a part of any assertion of autonomy by historically oppressed people), 10 percent of the population of Bali were murdered by armed forces trained by the US government, whose methods of terrorisation were reminiscent of the tortures inflicted upon early Christian martyrs. Vast numbers of Balinese, including those who tried to resist the coup or who had simply had 'the finger pointed at them', had their heads chopped off. Their heads were impaled atop tall, spiked columns which were placed at hideously regular ten-foot intervals on all the roads and footpaths throughout the island of Bali. People travelling the roads during that period would have found their routes decorated on both left and right sides by high pillars dripping blood from severed sections of tortured human bodies. And the traveller gazing upward saw the remnant of a human face shrivelled and contorted in agony.

1) Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, Volume I, 1979, South End Press, Boston, pp 206, 207.

Bali, April 1981

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