A Semantic Framework for Proof Evidence

International audienceTheorem provers produce evidence of proof in many different formats, such as proof scripts, natural deductions, resolution refutations, Herbrand expansions, and equational rewritings. In implemented provers, numerous variants of such formats are actually used: consider, for example, such variants of or restrictions to resolution refu-tations as binary resolution, hyper-resolution, ordered-resolution, paramodulation, etc. We propose the foundational proof certificates (FPC) framework for defining the semantics of a broad range of proof evidence. This framework allows both producers of proof certificates and the checkers of those certificates to have a clear formal definition of the semantics of a wide variety of proof evidence. Employing the FPC framework will allow one to separate a proof from its provenance and to allow anyone to construct their own proof checker for a given style of proof evidence. The foundation on which FPC relies is that of proof theory, particularly recent work into focused proof systems: such proof systems provide protocols by which a checker extracts information from the certificate (mediated by the so called clerks and experts) as well as performs various deterministic and non-deterministic computations. While we shall limit ourselves to first-order logic in this paper, we shall not limit ourselves in many other ways. The FPC framework is described for both classical and intuitionistic logics and for proof structures as diverse as resolution refutations, natural deduction, Frege proofs, and equality proofs

A Distributed and Trusted Web of Formal Proofs

International audienceMost computer checked proofs are tied to the particular technology of a prover's software. While sharing results between proof assistants is a recognized and desirable goal, the current organization of theorem proving tools makes such sharing an exception instead of the rule. In this talk, I argue that we need to turn the current architecture of proof assistants and formal proofs inside-out. That is, instead of having a few mature theorem provers include within them their formally checked theorems and proofs, I propose that proof assistants should sit on the edge of a web of formal proofs and that proof assistant should be exporting their proofs so that they can exist independently of any theorem prover. While it is necessary to maintain the dependencies between definitions, theories, and theorems, no explicit library structure should be imposed on this web of formal proofs. Thus a theorem and its proofs should not necessarily be located at a particular URL or within a particular prover's library. While the world of symbolic logic and proof theory certainly allows for proofs to be seen as global and permanent objects, there is a lot of research and engineering work that is needed to make this possible. I describe some of the required research and development that must be done to achieve this goal

Imperative LF Meta-Programming

AbstractLogical frameworks have enjoyed wide adoption as meta-languages for describing deductive systems. While the techniques for representing object languages in logical frameworks are relatively well understood, languages and techniques for meta-programming with them are much less so. This paper presents work in progress on a programming language called Rogue-Sigma-Pi (RSP), in which general programs can be written for soundly manipulating objects represented in the Edinburgh Logical Framework (LF). The manipulation is sound in the sense that, in the absence of runtime errors, any putative LF object produced by a well-typed RSP program is guaranteed to type check in LF. An important contribution is an approach for soundly combining imperative features with higher-order abstract syntax. The focus of the paper is on demonstrating RSP through representative LF meta-programs

Efficient Monitoring of ??-languages

We present a technique for generating efficient monitors for Omega-regular-languages. We show how Buchi automata can be reduced in size and transformed into special, statistically optimal nondeterministic finite state machines, called binary transition tree finite state machines (BTT-FSMs), which recognize precisely the minimal bad prefixes of the original omega-regular-language. The presented technique is implemented as part of a larger monitoring framework and is available for download

Practical Reflection for Sequent Logics

AbstractIt is well-known that adding reflective reasoning can tremendously increase the power of a proof assistant. In order for this theoretical increase of power to become accessible to users in practice, the proof assistant needs to provide a great deal of infrastructure to support reflective reasoning. In this paper we explore the problem of creating a practical implementation of such a support layer.Our implementation takes a specification of a logical theory (which is identical to how it would be specified if we were simply going to reason within this logical theory, instead of reflecting it) and automatically generates the necessary definitions, lemmas, and proofs that are needed to enable the reflected meta-reasoning in the provided theory.One of the key features of our approach is that the structure of a logic is preserved when it is reflected. In particular, all variables, including meta-variables, are preserved in the reflected representation. This also allows the preservation of proof automation—there is a structure-preserving one-to-one map from proof steps in the original logic to proof step in the reflected logic.To enable reasoning about terms with sequent context variables, we develop a principle for context induction, called teleportation.This work is fully implemented in the MetaPRL theorem prover

The Consensus Rule: A New Approach to Scientific Evidence

Founded on good intentions but unrealistic expectations, the dominant Daubert framework for handling expert and scientific evidence should be scrapped. Daubert asks judges and jurors to make substantively expert determinations, a task they are epistemically incompetent to perform as laypersons. As an alternative, this Article proposes a new framework for handling expert evidence. It draws from the social and philosophical literature on expertise and begins with a basic question: How can laypersons make intelligent decisions about expert topics? From there, it builds its evidentiary approach, which ultimately results in an inference rule focused on expert communities. Specifically, when dealing with factual issues involving expertise, the legal system should not ask factfinders the actual substantive questions, but instead should reframe its questions to be deferential to the relevant expert community. To satisfy the requirement of proving causation in a toxic tort case, the question should not be: Does drug A cause disease X? The more appropriate question is: Does the scientific community believe that drug A causes disease X? This deferential approach solves the epistemic competency problem, repairs many of the unintended structural distortions created by Daubert, and ultimately reflects a better understanding of science