4 research outputs found
A Cue for Rational Reasoning: Introducing a Reference Point in Cognitive Reflection Tasks
The dual process framework posits that we reason using the quick System 1, and the deliberate System 2, both of which are part of our "adaptive toolbox". The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) estimates which system was used to solve a reasoning problem. Usually, the CRT tasks are solved incorrectly by using System 1, and correctly through System 2. We have applied the reference point hypothesis to the tasks of the CRT and proposed that this change would facilitate the switch between systems, resulting in better performance on the version of the test with a reference point, compared to the CRT without one. The results confirmed our assumptions, as evidenced by a generally higher score on the CRT with a reference point, albeit with different effects between items
Extended cognition
Glavni cilj ovog istraživanja јeste razvoj jednog održivog okvira za
kompjutacione modele proširene kognicije (ProKog) koji bi bio kompatibilan sa
glavnim pretpostavkama standardne kognitivne nauke. Primarna motivacija za
ostvarenje ovog cilja je neosnovanost tvrdnje da je ProKog suštinski različita od
standardnog pristupa kogniciji, koju mnogi autori u debati o proširenju kognicije
implicitno ili eksplicitno zastupaju. Ovakav stav prema odnosu ProKog i standardne
kognitivne nauke vodi negativnoj percepciji ProKog kao teze koja protivreči mnogim
tvrdnjama i rezultatima dobijenim u oblasti kognitivne nauke. Ukoliko uspemo da
pokažemo da ProKog, ili barem neke njene verzije, dele paradigmu sa standardnim
pristupom ona se može usvojiti kao prirodni nastavak rada u standardnoj kognitivnoj
nauci i kao korisno heurističko oruđe koje bi vodilo današnje istraživanje kognicije
preko granica ljudske lobanje. Širi cilj kojim ćemo se voditi je istraživanje granica
proširenja kognicije, vrsta realizatora kognitivnih fenomena i, najvažnije, pokušaćemo
da procenimo i uporedimo različite vrste epistemoloških i ontoloških tvrdnji u prilog
proširenju kognicije kao i njihove međusobne odnose. Ovim pitanjima ćemo pristupiti
iz perspektive filozofije kognitivne nauke.
Započećemo istraživanje sa nekoliko istorijskih naznaka o samom rođenju
kognitivne nauke, što će nam pomoći da odredimo predmet kognitivne nauke kao
istraživanje procesa koji uzrokuju inteligentno ponašanje i mehanizama koji stoje u
njihovoj osnovi. Ovo će nam, zauzvrat, obezbediti opravdanje da odbacimo one pristupe
ProKog koji za svoj predmet postavljaju neke druge kognitivne fenomene. Nakon ovih
uvodnih napomena nastavićemo sa osnovnim postulatima situiranih pristupa kogniciji, i
identifikovaćemo nekoliko različitih pravaca mišljenja koji su vodili ovakvim
shvatanjima. Ovo će nam omogućiti da razumemo različite motive i razloge za
opravdanje ProKog, kao i za tvrđenja da je ova teza radikalna i kontroverzna.
U drugom poglavlju ćemo usmeriti pažnju na pitanje “Šta se tvrdi hipotezom
proširene kognicije i kako je možemo opravdati?” Kako bismo odgovrili na ovo pitanje
uvešćemo demarkaciju između mnogovrsnih verzija ProKog i upoznaćemo se sa
„argumentom pariteta“, najpoznatijim i preovlađujućim argumentom u prilog ProKog...The overall aim of this dissertation will be to develop a sustainable
framework for computational models of Extended Cognition (ExCog), which would be
compatible with main assumptions of standard cognitive science. The main motivation
for pursuing this goal is an unwarranted claim that ExCog is deeply different from the
standard approach to cognition that many authors implicitely or explicitely advocate,
and which leads to negative perception of ExCog as a thesis that contradicts many of the
statements made and results gathered in standard cognitive science. If we succeed in
showing that ExCog, or at least some of its versions, can be seen as sharing a paradigm
of standard approach, it could be endorsed as a continuation of the work done in
cognitive science and a helpful heuristic device in leading the current investigation of
cognition across the borders of human skull. A wider goal is to explore the limits of
cognitive extension and the kinds and types of the realizers of cognitive extension, and,
most importantly, to assess and compare different types of epistemological and
ontological claims about extended cognition and their interrelationship. We are going to
approach these questions from the perspective of philosophy of cognitive science.
We will begin with some historical notes on the birth of cognitive science,
which will help us determine the subject matter of cognitive science as processes that
cause intelligent behaviour and mechanisms that realise them. This, in turn, will justify
us in rejecting those approaches to ExCog which take a different subject matter for their
investigation. After these introductory notes we shall proceed with basic tenants of
Situated approaches to cognition, and identify several lines of thinking which preceded
these approaches. This will make us understand different motives and reasons for
making claims about cognitive extension, as well the claims about radical, and
controversial status of ExCog.
In the second chapter we will be mostly focused on the question “What is
claimed by ExCog and how can we defend it?” In order to answer this question we are
going to demarcate between many versions of ExCog and introduce a reader with the
Parity argument, most prominent argument in favour of ExCog..