1,231 research outputs found
Characterization of Model-Based Detectors for CPS Sensor Faults/Attacks
A vector-valued model-based cumulative sum (CUSUM) procedure is proposed for
identifying faulty/falsified sensor measurements. First, given the system
dynamics, we derive tools for tuning the CUSUM procedure in the fault/attack
free case to fulfill a desired detection performance (in terms of false alarm
rate). We use the widely-used chi-squared fault/attack detection procedure as a
benchmark to compare the performance of the CUSUM. In particular, we
characterize the state degradation that a class of attacks can induce to the
system while enforcing that the detectors (CUSUM and chi-squared) do not raise
alarms. In doing so, we find the upper bound of state degradation that is
possible by an undetected attacker. We quantify the advantage of using a
dynamic detector (CUSUM), which leverages the history of the state, over a
static detector (chi-squared) which uses a single measurement at a time.
Simulations of a chemical reactor with heat exchanger are presented to
illustrate the performance of our tools.Comment: Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technolog
Failure of the Point Blinding Countermeasure Against Fault Attack in Pairing-Based Cryptography
Article published in the proceedings of the C2SI conference, May 2015.Pairings are mathematical tools that have been proven to be very useful in the construction of many cryptographic protocols. Some of these protocols are suitable for implementation on power constrained devices such as smart cards or smartphone which are subject to side channel attacks. In this paper, we analyse the efficiency of the point blinding countermeasure in pairing based cryptography against side channel attacks. In particular,we show that this countermeasure does not protect Miller's algorithm for pairing computation against fault attack. We then give recommendation for a secure implementation of a pairing based protocol using the Miller algorithm
Tuning Windowed Chi-Squared Detectors for Sensor Attacks
A model-based windowed chi-squared procedure is proposed for identifying
falsified sensor measurements. We employ the widely-used static chi-squared and
the dynamic cumulative sum (CUSUM) fault/attack detection procedures as
benchmarks to compare the performance of the windowed chi-squared detector. In
particular, we characterize the state degradation that a class of attacks can
induce to the system while enforcing that the detectors do not raise alarms
(zero-alarm attacks). We quantify the advantage of using dynamic detectors
(windowed chi-squared and CUSUM detectors), which leverages the history of the
state, over a static detector (chi-squared) which uses a single measurement at
a time. Simulations using a chemical reactor are presented to illustrate the
performance of our tools
On Reachable Sets of Hidden CPS Sensor Attacks
For given system dynamics, observer structure, and observer-based
fault/attack detection procedure, we provide mathematical tools -- in terms of
Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) -- for computing outer ellipsoidal bounds on
the set of estimation errors that attacks can induce while maintaining the
alarm rate of the detector equal to its attack-free false alarm rate. We refer
to these sets to as hidden reachable sets. The obtained ellipsoidal bounds on
hidden reachable sets quantify the attacker's potential impact when it is
constrained to stay hidden from the detector. We provide tools for minimizing
the volume of these ellipsoidal bounds (minimizing thus the reachable sets) by
redesigning the observer gains. Simulation results are presented to illustrate
the performance of our tools
A Practical Second-Order Fault Attack against a Real-World Pairing Implementation
Several fault attacks against pairing-based
cryptography have been described theoretically in recent
years. Interestingly, none of these have been practically
evaluated. We accomplished this task and prove that fault
attacks against pairing-based cryptography are indeed
possible and are even practical — thus posing a serious
threat. Moreover, we successfully conducted a second-order fault attack against an open source implementation
of the eta pairing on an AVR XMEGA A1. We injected
the first fault into the computation of the Miller Algorithm
and applied the second fault to skip the final exponentiation completely. We introduce a low-cost setup that
allowed us to generate multiple independent faults in one
computation. The setup implements these faults by clock
glitches which induce instruction skips. With this setup we
conducted the first practical fault attack against a complete
pairing computation
Fault Attack on FPGA implementations of Trivium Stream Cipher
This article presents the development of an experimental
system to introduce faults in Trivium stream ciphers
implemented on FPGA. The developed system has made possible
to analyze the vulnerability of these implementations against
fault attacks. The developed system consists of a mechanism
that injects small pulses in the clock signal, and elements that
analyze if a fault has been introduced, the number of faults
introduced and its position in the inner state. The results obtained
demonstrate the vulnerability of these implementations against
fault attacks. As far as we know, this is the first time that
experimental results of fault attack over Trivium are presented.Ministerio de EconomĂa y Competitividad TEC2010-16870Ministerio de EconomĂa y Competitividad TEC2013-45523- RMinisterio de EconomĂa y Competitividad CSIC 201550E039
Fault attacks on RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystems
This thesis answered how a fault attack targeting software used to program EEPROM can threaten hardware devices, for instance IoT devices. The successful fault attacks proposed in this thesis will certainly warn designers of hardware devices of the security risks their devices may face on the programming leve
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