Implementasi Algoritme Morus V2 untuk Pengamanan Data Pada Perangkat Bluetooth Low Energy

Pengamanan data merupan bagian penting dalam penerapan jaringan berbasis Internet of things (IoT). Sistem IoT membutuhkan sebuah protokol komunikasi, seperti Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). BLE dinilai cepat dan hemat energi dalam pengiriman data jarak dekat. BLE digunakan sebagai komunikasi client-server yang menerima data dari sensor. Pengiriman data tidak aman tanpa adanya proses pengaman data. Kriptografi menjadi salah satu pilihan dalam pengaman data. Pada pengembangan diperlukan pertimbangan beberapa aspek seperti, resource yang digunakan, serta waktu untuk proses enkripsi dan dekripsi. Pada penelitian ini algoritme MORUS V2 dipilih untuk mengamankan data dari serangan. Algoritme ini mudah diimplementasikan pada hardware. Kecepatan dari algoritme ini dapat mencapai 0,69 cpb, lebih cepat dari algoritme lain. Proses enkripsi data dari sensor dilakukan pada server hingga menghasilkan ciphertext. Kemudian akan dilakukan dekripsi pada ciphertext ketika diterima oleh client, hingga plaintext ditampilkan. Dari hasil pengujian algoritme MORUS V2 telah berhasil diimplementasikan melalui pengujian test vector dengan nilai keystream yang sama. Pengujian confidentiality telah berhasil dilakukan melalui proses enkripsi dan dekripsi. Pada pengujian serangan pasif berhasil dilakukan dengan hasil nilai plaintext tidak diketahui ketika data dikirim, serta tidak ada perubahan ketika data sampai pada client. Pengujian serangan aktif menggunakan known-plaintext attack (KPA) dinyatakan gagal dalam memperoleh nilai plaintext.AbstractData security is an essential part of implementing an Internet of things (IoT) based network. IoT systems require a communication protocol, such as Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). BLE is considered fast and energy-efficient in sending data over short distances. BLE is used as a client-server communication that receives data from sensors.  Data transmission will be insecure without a data security process. Cryptography is one of the options for securing data.  The development requires consideration of several aspects, such as the resources used, as well as the time for the encryption and decryption process.  In research, the MORUS V2 algorithm was chosen to secure data from attacks. This algorithm is easy to implement on hardware. The speed of this algorithm can reach 0.69 CPB, faster than other algorithms. The data encryption process from the sensor is carried out on the server to produce ciphertext.  Then decryption will be carried out on the ciphertext when received by the client until the plaintext is displayed.  From the test results, the MORUS V2 algorithm has been successfully implemented through test vector testing with the same keystream value.  Confidentiality testing has been successfully carried out through encryption and decryption processes. The passive attack test was successfully carried out with the result that the plaintext value was unknown when the data was sent, and there was no change when the data arrived at the client. Active attack testing using a known-plaintext attack (KPA) is declared to have failed in obtaining the plaintext value

Differential Random Fault Attacks on certain CAESAR Stream Ciphers (Supplementary Material)

This document contains supplementary material to the paper with the same title available from the proceedings of the International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology (ICISC) 2019. In this supplementary material, we demonstrate that the random fault attack strategy described in the full paper can be applied to ciphers in the MORUS family, resulting in partial state recovery for these ciphers

Fault Attacks on Nonce-based Authenticated Encryption: Application to Keyak and Ketje

In the context of fault attacks on nonce-based authenticated encryption, an attacker faces two restrictions. The first is the uniqueness of the nonce for each new encryption that prevents the attacker from collecting pairs of correct and faulty outputs to perform, e.g., differential fault attacks. The second restriction concerns the verification/decryption, which releases only verified plaintext. While many recent works either exploit misuse scenarios (e.g. nonce-reuse, release of unverified plaintext), we turn the fact that the decryption/verification gives us information on the effect of a fault (whether a fault changed a value or not) against it. In particular, we extend the idea of statistical ineffective fault attacks (SIFA) to target the initialization performed in nonce-based authenticated encryption schemes. By targeting the initialization performed during decryption/verification, most nonce-based authenticated encryption schemes provide the attacker with an oracle whether a fault was ineffective or not. This information is all the attacker needs to mount statistical ineffective fault attacks. To demonstrate the practical threat of the attack, we target software implementations of the authenticated encryption schemes Keyak and Ketje. The presented fault attacks can be carried out without the need of sophisticated equipment. In our practical evaluation the inputs corresponding to 24 ineffective fault inductions were required to reveal large parts of the secret key in both scenarios

General Classification of the Authenticated Encryption Schemes for the CAESAR Competition

An Authenticated encryption scheme is a scheme which provides privacy and integrity by using a secret key. In 2013, CAESAR (the ``Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness\u27\u27) was co-founded by NIST and Dan Bernstein with the aim of finding authenticated encryption schemes that offer advantages over AES-GCM and are suitable for widespread adoption. The first round started with 57 candidates in March 2014; and nine of these first-round candidates where broken and withdrawn from the competition. The remaining 48 candidates went through an intense process of review, analysis and comparison. While the cryptographic community benefits greatly from the manifold different submission designs, their sheer number implies a challenging amount of study. This paper provides an easy-to-grasp overview over functional aspects, security parameters, and robustness offerings by the CAESAR candidates, clustered by their underlying designs (block-cipher-, stream-cipher-, permutation-/sponge-, compression-function-based, dedicated). After intensive review and analysis of all 48 candidates by the community, the CAESAR committee selected only 30 candidates for the second round. The announcement for the third round candidates was made on 15th August 2016 and 15 candidates were chosen for the third round

Masking the Lightweight Authenticated Ciphers ACORN and Ascon in Software

The ongoing CAESAR competition aims at finding authenticated encryption schemes that offer advantages over AES-GCM for several use-cases, including lightweight applications. ACORN and Ascon are the two finalists for this profile. Our paper compares these two candidates according to their resilience against differential power analysis and their ability to integrate countermeasures against such attacks. Especially, we focus on software implementations and provide benchmarks for several security levels on an ARM Cortex-M3 embedded microprocessor

Implementação em software de cifradores autenticados para processadores ARM

Orientador: Julio César López HernándezDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de ComputaçãoResumo: Algoritmos de cifração autenticada são ferramentas usadas para proteger dados, de forma a garantir tanto sigilo quanto autenticidade e integridade. Implementações criptográficas não possuem apenas exatidão e eficiência como seus principais objetivos: sistemas computacionais podem vazar informação sobre seu com- portamento interno, de forma que uma má implementação pode comprometer a segu- rança de um bom algoritmo. Dessa forma, esta dissertação tem o objetivo de estudar as formas de implementar corretamente algoritmos criptográficos e os métodos para optimizá-los sem que percam suas características de segurança. Um aspecto impor- tante a ser levado em consideração quando implementando algoritmos é a arquitetura alvo. Nesta dissertação concentra-se na família de processadores ARM. ARM é uma das arquiteturas mais utilizadas no mundo, com mais de 100 bilhões de chips vendidos. Esta dissertação foca em estudar e implementar duas famílias de cifradores auten- ticados: NORX e Ascon, especificamente para processadores ARM Cortex-A de 32 e 64 bits. Descrevemos uma técnica de optimização orientada a pipeline para NORX que possui desempenho melhor que o atual estado da arte, e discutimos técnicas utilizadas em uma implementação vetorial do NORX. Também analisamos as características de uma implementação vetorial do Ascon, assim como uma implementação vetorial de múltiplas mensagensAbstract: Authenticated encryption algorithms are tools used to protect data, in a way that guar- antees both its secrecy, authenticity, and integrity. Cryptographic implementations do not have only correctness and efficiency as its main goals: computer systems can leak information about their internal behavior, and a bad implementation can compromise the security of a good algorithm. Therefore, this dissertation aims to study the forms of correctly and efficiently implementing crypto- graphic algorithms and the methods of optimizing them without losing security char- acteristics. One important aspect to take into account during implementation and opti- mization is the target architecture. In this dissertation, the focus is on the ARM family of processors. ARM is one of the most widespread architectures in the world, with more than 100 billion chips deployed. This dissertation focus on studying and implementing two different families of au- thenticated encryption algorithms: NORX and Ascon, targeting 32-bits and 64-bits ARM Cortex-A processors. We show a pipeline oriented technique to implement NORX that¿s faster than the current state-of-art; and we also discuss the techniques used on a vectorial implementation of NORX. We also describe and analyze the characteristics of a vectorial implementation of Ascon, as well as a multiple message vectorial imple- mentationMestradoCiência da ComputaçãoMestre em Ciência da Computaçã

Security is an Architectural Design Constraint

In state-of-the-art design paradigm, time, space and power efficiency are considered the primary design constraints. Quite often, this approach adversely impacts the security of the overall system, especially when security is adopted as a countermeasure after some vulnerability is identified. In this position paper, we motivate the idea that security should also be considered as an architectural design constraint in addition to time, space and power. We show that security and efficiency objectives along the three design axes of time, space and power are in fact tightly coupled while identifying that security stands in direct contrast with them across all layers of architectural design. We attempt to prove our case utilizing a proof-by-evidence approach wherein we refer to various works across literature that explicitly imply the eternal conflict between security and efficiency. Thus, security has to be treated as a design constraint from the very beginning. Additionally, we advocate a security-aware design flow starting from the choice of cryptographic primitives, protocols and system design

High-Performance Data Compression-Based Design for Dynamic IoT Security Systems

IoT technology is evolving at a quick pace and is becoming an important part of everyday life. Consequently, IoT systems hold large amounts of data related to the user of the system that is vulnerable to security breaches. Thus, data collected by IoT systems need to be secured efficiently without affecting the IoT systems’ performance and without compromising security as well. In this paper, a high-performance dynamic security system is introduced. The system makes use of the ZedBoard’s dynamic partial reconfiguration capability to shift between three distinct cipher algorithms: AEGIS, ASCON, and DEOXYS-II. The switching between the three algorithms is performed using two different techniques: the algorithm hopping technique or the power adaptive technique. The choice of which technique to be used is dependent on whether the system needs to be focused on performance or power saving. The ciphers used are the CAESAR competition finalists that achieved the greatest results in each of the three competition categories, where each cipher algorithm has its own set of significant characteristics. The proposed design seeks to reduce the FPGA reconfiguration time by the application of LZ4 (Lempel-Ziv4) compression and decompression techniques on the ciphers’ bitstream files. The reconfiguration time decreased by a minimum of 38% in comparison to the state-of-the-art design, while the resource utilization increased by approximately 2%

Design and Analysis of Cryptographic Algorithms for Authentication

During the previous decades, the upcoming demand for security in the digital world, e.g., the Internet, lead to numerous groundbreaking research topics in the field of cryptography. This thesis focuses on the design and analysis of cryptographic primitives and schemes to be used for authentication of data and communication endpoints, i.e., users. It is structured into three parts, where we present the first freely scalable multi-block-length block-cipher-based compression function (Counter-bDM) in the first part. The presented design is accompanied by a thorough security analysis regarding its preimage and collision security. The second and major part is devoted to password hashing. It is motivated by the large amount of leaked password during the last years and our discovery of side-channel attacks on scrypt – the first modern password scrambler that allowed to parameterize the amount of memory required to compute a password hash. After summarizing which properties we expect from a modern password scrambler, we (1) describe a cache-timing attack on scrypt based on its password-dependent memory-access pattern and (2) outline an additional attack vector – garbage-collector attacks – that exploits optimization which may disregard to overwrite the internally used memory. Based on our observations, we introduce Catena – the first memory-demanding password-scrambling framework that allows a password-independent memory-access pattern for resistance to the aforementioned attacks. Catena was submitted to the Password Hashing Competition (PHC) and, after two years of rigorous analysis, ended up as a finalist gaining special recognition for its agile framework approach and side-channel resistance. We provide six instances of Catena suitable for a variety of applications. We close the second part of this thesis with an overview of modern password scramblers regarding their functional, security, and general properties; supported by a brief analysis of their resistance to garbage-collector attacks. The third part of this thesis is dedicated to the integrity (authenticity of data) of nonce-based authenticated encryption schemes (NAE). We introduce the so-called j-IV-Collision Attack, allowing to obtain an upper bound for an adversary that is provided with a first successful forgery and tries to efficiently compute j additional forgeries for a particular NAE scheme (in short: reforgeability). Additionally, we introduce the corresponding security notion j-INT-CTXT and provide a comparative analysis (regarding j-INT-CTXT security) of the third-round submission to the CAESAR competition and the four classical and widely used NAE schemes CWC, CCM, EAX, and GCM.Die fortschreitende Digitalisierung in den letzten Jahrzehnten hat dazu geführt, dass sich das Forschungsfeld der Kryptographie bedeutsam weiterentwickelt hat. Diese, im Wesentlichen aus drei Teilen bestehende Dissertation, widmet sich dem Design und der Analyse von kryptographischen Primitiven und Modi zur Authentifizierung von Daten und Kommunikationspartnern. Der erste Teil beschäftigt sich dabei mit blockchiffrenbasierten Kompressionsfunktionen, die in ressourcenbeschränkten Anwendungsbereichen eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit präsentieren wir die erste frei skalierbare und sichere blockchiffrenbasierte Kompressionsfunktion Counter-bDM und erweitern somit flexibel die erreichbare Sicherheit solcher Konstruktionen. Der zweite Teil und wichtigste Teil dieser Dissertation widmet sich Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren. Zum einen ist dieser motiviert durch die große Anzahl von Angriffen auf Passwortdatenbanken großer Internet-Unternehmen. Zum anderen bot die Password Hashing Competition (PHC) die Möglichkeit, unter Aufmerksamkeit der Expertengemeinschaft die Sicherheit bestehender Verfahren zu hinterfragen, sowie neue sichere Verfahren zu entwerfen. Im Rahmen des zweiten Teils entwarfen wir Anforderungen an moderne Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren und beschreiben drei Arten von Seitenkanal-Angriffen (Cache-Timing-, Weak Garbage-Collector- und Garbage-Collector-Angriffe) auf scrypt – das erste moderne Password-Hashing-Verfahren welches erlaubte, den benötigten Speicheraufwand zur Berechnung eines Passworthashes frei zu wählen. Basierend auf unseren Beobachtungen und Angriffen, stellen wir das erste moderne PasswordHashing-Framework Catena vor, welches für gewählte Instanzen passwortunabhängige Speicherzugriffe und somit Sicherheit gegen oben genannte Angriffe garantiert. Catena erlangte im Rahmen des PHC-Wettbewerbs besondere Anerkennung für seine Agilität und Resistenz gegen SeitenkanalAngriffe. Wir präsentieren sechs Instanzen des Frameworks, welche für eine Vielzahl von Anwendungen geeignet sind. Abgerundet wird der zweite Teil dieser Arbeit mit einem vergleichenden Überblick von modernen Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren hinsichtlich ihrer funktionalen, sicherheitstechnischen und allgemeinen Eigenschaften. Dieser Vergleich wird unterstützt durch eine kurze Analyse bezüglich ihrer Resistenz gegen (Weak) Garbage-Collector-Angriffe. Der dritte teil dieser Arbeit widmet sich der Integrität von Daten, genauer, der Sicherheit sogenannter Nonce-basierten authentisierten Verschlüsselungsverfahren (NAE-Verfahren), welche ebenso wie Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren in der heutigen Sicherheitsinfrastruktur des Internets eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Während Standard-Definitionen keine Sicherheit nach dem Fund einer ersten erfolgreich gefälschten Nachricht betrachten, erweitern wir die Sicherheitsanforderungen dahingehend wie schwer es ist, weitere Fälschungen zu ermitteln. Wir abstrahieren die Funktionsweise von NAEVerfahren in Klassen, analysieren diese systematisch und klassifizieren die Dritt-Runden-Kandidaten des CAESAR-Wettbewerbs, sowie vier weit verbreitete NAE-Verfahren CWC, CCM, EAX und GCM

Design and Analysis of Cryptographic Algorithms for Authentication

During the previous decades, the upcoming demand for security in the digital world, e.g., the Internet, lead to numerous groundbreaking research topics in the field of cryptography. This thesis focuses on the design and analysis of cryptographic primitives and schemes to be used for authentication of data and communication endpoints, i.e., users. It is structured into three parts, where we present the first freely scalable multi-block-length block-cipher-based compression function (Counter-bDM) in the first part. The presented design is accompanied by a thorough security analysis regarding its preimage and collision security. The second and major part is devoted to password hashing. It is motivated by the large amount of leaked password during the last years and our discovery of side-channel attacks on scrypt – the first modern password scrambler that allowed to parameterize the amount of memory required to compute a password hash. After summarizing which properties we expect from a modern password scrambler, we (1) describe a cache-timing attack on scrypt based on its password-dependent memory-access pattern and (2) outline an additional attack vector – garbage-collector attacks – that exploits optimization which may disregard to overwrite the internally used memory. Based on our observations, we introduce Catena – the first memory-demanding password-scrambling framework that allows a password-independent memory-access pattern for resistance to the aforementioned attacks. Catena was submitted to the Password Hashing Competition (PHC) and, after two years of rigorous analysis, ended up as a finalist gaining special recognition for its agile framework approach and side-channel resistance. We provide six instances of Catena suitable for a variety of applications. We close the second part of this thesis with an overview of modern password scramblers regarding their functional, security, and general properties; supported by a brief analysis of their resistance to garbage-collector attacks. The third part of this thesis is dedicated to the integrity (authenticity of data) of nonce-based authenticated encryption schemes (NAE). We introduce the so-called j-IV-Collision Attack, allowing to obtain an upper bound for an adversary that is provided with a first successful forgery and tries to efficiently compute j additional forgeries for a particular NAE scheme (in short: reforgeability). Additionally, we introduce the corresponding security notion j-INT-CTXT and provide a comparative analysis (regarding j-INT-CTXT security) of the third-round submission to the CAESAR competition and the four classical and widely used NAE schemes CWC, CCM, EAX, and GCM.Die fortschreitende Digitalisierung in den letzten Jahrzehnten hat dazu geführt, dass sich das Forschungsfeld der Kryptographie bedeutsam weiterentwickelt hat. Diese, im Wesentlichen aus drei Teilen bestehende Dissertation, widmet sich dem Design und der Analyse von kryptographischen Primitiven und Modi zur Authentifizierung von Daten und Kommunikationspartnern. Der erste Teil beschäftigt sich dabei mit blockchiffrenbasierten Kompressionsfunktionen, die in ressourcenbeschränkten Anwendungsbereichen eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit präsentieren wir die erste frei skalierbare und sichere blockchiffrenbasierte Kompressionsfunktion Counter-bDM und erweitern somit flexibel die erreichbare Sicherheit solcher Konstruktionen. Der zweite Teil und wichtigste Teil dieser Dissertation widmet sich Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren. Zum einen ist dieser motiviert durch die große Anzahl von Angriffen auf Passwortdatenbanken großer Internet-Unternehmen. Zum anderen bot die Password Hashing Competition (PHC) die Möglichkeit, unter Aufmerksamkeit der Expertengemeinschaft die Sicherheit bestehender Verfahren zu hinterfragen, sowie neue sichere Verfahren zu entwerfen. Im Rahmen des zweiten Teils entwarfen wir Anforderungen an moderne Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren und beschreiben drei Arten von Seitenkanal-Angriffen (Cache-Timing-, Weak Garbage-Collector- und Garbage-Collector-Angriffe) auf scrypt – das erste moderne Password-Hashing-Verfahren welches erlaubte, den benötigten Speicheraufwand zur Berechnung eines Passworthashes frei zu wählen. Basierend auf unseren Beobachtungen und Angriffen, stellen wir das erste moderne PasswordHashing-Framework Catena vor, welches für gewählte Instanzen passwortunabhängige Speicherzugriffe und somit Sicherheit gegen oben genannte Angriffe garantiert. Catena erlangte im Rahmen des PHC-Wettbewerbs besondere Anerkennung für seine Agilität und Resistenz gegen SeitenkanalAngriffe. Wir präsentieren sechs Instanzen des Frameworks, welche für eine Vielzahl von Anwendungen geeignet sind. Abgerundet wird der zweite Teil dieser Arbeit mit einem vergleichenden Überblick von modernen Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren hinsichtlich ihrer funktionalen, sicherheitstechnischen und allgemeinen Eigenschaften. Dieser Vergleich wird unterstützt durch eine kurze Analyse bezüglich ihrer Resistenz gegen (Weak) Garbage-Collector-Angriffe. Der dritte teil dieser Arbeit widmet sich der Integrität von Daten, genauer, der Sicherheit sogenannter Nonce-basierten authentisierten Verschlüsselungsverfahren (NAE-Verfahren), welche ebenso wie Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren in der heutigen Sicherheitsinfrastruktur des Internets eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Während Standard-Definitionen keine Sicherheit nach dem Fund einer ersten erfolgreich gefälschten Nachricht betrachten, erweitern wir die Sicherheitsanforderungen dahingehend wie schwer es ist, weitere Fälschungen zu ermitteln. Wir abstrahieren die Funktionsweise von NAEVerfahren in Klassen, analysieren diese systematisch und klassifizieren die Dritt-Runden-Kandidaten des CAESAR-Wettbewerbs, sowie vier weit verbreitete NAE-Verfahren CWC, CCM, EAX und GCM