False-name-proof combinatorial auction design via single-minded decomposition

This paper proposes a new approach to building false-name-proof (FNP) combinatorial auctions from those that are FNP only with single-minded bidders, each of whom requires only one particular bundle. Under this approach, a general bidder is decomposed into a set of single-minded bidders, and after the decomposition the price and the allocation are determined by the FNP auctions for single-minded bidders. We first show that the auctions we get with the single-minded decomposition are FNP if those for single-minded bidders satisfy a condition called PIA. We then show that another condition, weaker than PIA, is necessary for the decomposition to build FNP auctions. To close the gap between the two conditions, we have found another sufficient condition weaker than PIA for the decomposition to produce strategy-proof mechanisms. Furthermore, we demonstrate that once we have PIA, the mechanisms created by the decomposition actually satisfy a stronger version of false-name-proofness, called false-name-proofness with withdrawal

Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions

We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically, we compute a unique point in the core that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from a reference point, for example, from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties. Furthermore, we discuss the benefits of this combinatorial auction, explore the use of alternative reserve pricing approaches in this context, and indicate the results of several hundred computational runs using CATS data.Auctions, spectrum auctions, market design, package auction, clock auction, combinatorial auction

Mechanism design : a new algorithmic framework

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2013.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 168-175).A modern engineering system, e.g. the Internet, faces challenges from both the strategic behavior of its self-interested participants and the inherent computational intractability of large systems. Responding to this challenge, a new field, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, has emerged. One of the most fundamental problems in this field is How to optimize revenue in an auction? In his seminal paper [Mye81], Myerson gives a partial solution to this problem by providing a revenue-optimal auction for a seller who is looking to sell a single item to muLtiple bidders. Extending this auction to simultaneously selling multiple heterogeneous items has been one of the central open problems in Mathematical Economics. We provide such an extension that is also computationally efficient. Our solution proposes a novel framework for mechanism design by reducing mechanism design problems (where one optimizes an objective function on "rational inputs" ) to algorithm design problems (where one optimizes an objective function on "honest inputs"). Our reduction is generic and provides a framework for many other mechanism design problems.by Yang Cai.Ph.D

Computational Mechanism Design

Computational mechanism design brings together the concern in microeconomics with decision making in the context of distributed private information and self-interest and the concern in computer science with computational and communication complexity. In constructing mechanisms, with application to the design of electronic markets and to protocols for automated negotiation, many new issues arise in resolving tensions between incentive, computation and communication constraints.Engineering and Applied Science

Proceedings of the 18th Irish Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science

These proceedings contain the papers that were accepted for publication at AICS-2007, the 18th Annual Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science, which was held in the Technological University Dublin; Dublin, Ireland; on the 29th to the 31st August 2007. AICS is the annual conference of the Artificial Intelligence Association of Ireland (AIAI)

Stake-governed tug-of-war and the biased infinity Laplacian

In tug-of-war, two players compete by moving a counter along edges of a graph, each winning the right to move at a given turn according to the flip of a possibly biased coin. The game ends when the counter reaches the boundary, a fixed subset of the vertices, at which point one player pays the other an amount determined by the boundary vertex. Economists and mathematicians have independently studied tug-of-war for many years, focussing respectively on resource-allocation forms of the game, in which players iteratively spend precious budgets in an effort to influence the bias of the coins that determine the turn victors; and on PDE arising in fine mesh limits of the constant-bias game in a Euclidean setting. In this article, we offer a mathematical treatment of a class of tug-of-war games with allocated budgets: each player is initially given a fixed budget which she draws on throughout the game to offer a stake at the start of each turn, and her probability of winning the turn is the ratio of her stake and the sum of the two stakes. We consider the game played on a tree, with boundary being the set of leaves, and the payment function being the indicator of a single distinguished leaf. We find the game value and the essentially unique Nash equilibrium of a leisurely version of the game, in which the move at any given turn is cancelled with constant probability after stakes have been placed. We show that the ratio of the players' remaining budgets is maintained at its initial value $\lambda$; game value is a biased infinity harmonic function; and the proportion of remaining budget that players stake at a given turn is given in terms of the spatial gradient and the $\lambda$-derivative of game value. We also indicate examples in which the solution takes a different form in the non-leisurely game.Comment: 69 pages with four figures. Updated to include discussion of the economics literature of tug-of-wa

Putting the User at the Centre of the Grid: Simplifying Usability and Resource Selection for High Performance Computing

Computer simulation is finding a role in an increasing number of scientific disciplines, concomitant with the rise in available computing power. Realizing this inevitably re- quires access to computational power beyond the desktop, making use of clusters, supercomputers, data repositories, networks and distributed aggregations of these re- sources. Accessing one such resource entails a number of usability and security prob- lems; when multiple geographically distributed resources are involved, the difficulty is compounded. However, usability is an all too often neglected aspect of computing on e-infrastructures, although it is one of the principal factors militating against the widespread uptake of distributed computing. The usability problems are twofold: the user needs to know how to execute the applications they need to use on a particular resource, and also to gain access to suit- able resources to run their workloads as they need them. In this thesis we present our solutions to these two problems. Firstly we propose a new model of e-infrastructure resource interaction, which we call the user–application interaction model, designed to simplify executing application on high performance computing resources. We describe the implementation of this model in the Application Hosting Environment, which pro- vides a Software as a Service layer on top of distributed e-infrastructure resources. We compare the usability of our system with commonly deployed middleware tools using five usability metrics. Our middleware and security solutions are judged to be more usable than other commonly deployed middleware tools. We go on to describe the requirements for a resource trading platform that allows users to purchase access to resources within a distributed e-infrastructure. We present the implementation of this Resource Allocation Market Place as a distributed multi- agent system, and show how it provides a highly flexible, efficient tool to schedule workflows across high performance computing resources