The role of perceived social norms on attitudes and behavior: An examination of the false consensus effect

This paper examined the role of perceived social norms in relation to people\u27s attitudes and behavioral intentions, specifically in regards to the false consensus effect (FCE). People are prone to numerous biases in judgments about peers\u27 beliefs, including overestimating support for their own position (i.e., false consensus). These misperceptions can then shape people\u27s beliefs and guide their behavior. This series of studies assessed the influence of this type of misperception on attitudes and behavioral intentions regarding controversial social issues. Study 1 demonstrated that people displayed false consensus for current social issues. Alterations in wording and order of presentation did not affect the findings. Study 2 showed that this bias subsequently predicts behavioral intentions in a modified test of the theory of reasoned action. Study 3 reduced the false consensus effect by exposing participants to information supporting both sides of social issues. Recommendations for interventions that effectively change and promote beneficial social norms are discussed

Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example

We examine the effects of social preferences and beliefs about the social preferences of others in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are reciprocally oriented. Part of the effect can be explained by a false consensus effect: selfish players tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another selfish player and reciprocators tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another reciprocator. Thus, reciprocators contribute more as leaders partly because they are more optimistic than selfish players about the reciprocal responses of followers. However, even after controlling for beliefs we find that reciprocally-oriented leaders contribute more than selfish leaders. Thus, we conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader must in large part reflect social motivations.reciprocity, contribution preferences, leadership, leading-by-example, false consensus effect

Regaining Consensus on the Reliability of Memory

In the last 20 years, the consensus about memory being essentially reliable has been neglected in favor of an emphasis on the malleability and unreliability of memory and on the public’s supposed unawareness of this. Three claims in particular have underpinned this popular perspective: that the confidence people have in their memory is weakly related to its accuracy, that false memories of fictitious childhood events can be easily implanted, and that the public wrongly sees memory as being like a video camera. New research has clarified that all three claims rest on shaky foundations, suggesting there is no reason to abandon the old consensus about memory being malleable but essentially reliable

Directional Bias

There is almost a consensus among conditional experts that indicative conditionals are not material. Their thought hinges on the idea that if indicative conditionals were material, A → B could be vacuously true when A is false, even if B would be false in a context where A is true. But since this consequence is implausible, the material account is usually regarded as false. It is argued that this point of view is motivated by the grammatical form of conditional sentences and the symbols used to represent their logical form, which misleadingly suggest a one-way inferential direction from A to B. That conditional sentences mislead us into a directionality bias is a phenomenon that is well-documented in the literature about conditional reasoning. It is argued that this directional appearance is deceptive and does not reflect the underlying truth conditions of conditional sentences. This directional bias is responsible for both the unpopularity of the material account of conditionals and some of the main alternative principles and themes in conditional theory, including the Ramsey’s test, the Equation, Adams’ thesis, conditional-assertion and possible world theories. The directional mindset forgets a hard- earned lesson that made classical logic possible in the first place, namely, that grammatical form of sentences can mislead us about its truth conditions. There is a case to be made for a material account of indicative conditionals when we break the domination of words over the human mind

Do You Know That I Am Biased? An Experiment

This experiment explores whether individuals know that other people are biased. We confirm that overestimation of abilities is a pervasive problem, but observe that most people are not aware of it, i.e. they think others are unbiased. We investigate several explanations for this result. As a first one, we discuss a possible unfamiliarity with the task and the subjects' inability to distinguish between random mistakes and a real bias.  Second, we show how the relation between a subject's belief about others and his belief about himself might be driven by a false consensus effect or self-correction mechanism. Third, we identify a self-serving bias when comparing how a subject evaluates his own and other people's biases.Bias, Overconfidence, Beliefs, Experimental Economics, Self-Serving Bias

Disconfirmation modulates the neural correlates of the false consensus effect: A parametric modulation approach

The false consensus effect (FCE) - the tendency to (erroneously) project our attitudes and opinions onto others - is an enduring bias in social reasoning with important societal implications. In this fMRI investigation, we examine the neural correlates of within-subject variation in consensus bias on a variety of social and political issues. Bias demonstrated a strong association with activity in brain regions implicated in self-related cognition, mentalizing, and valuation. Importantly, however, recruitment of these regions predicted consensus bias only in the presence of social disconfirmation, in the form of feedback discrepant with participants' own attitudes. These results suggest that the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying the tendency to project attitudes onto others are crucially moderated by motivational factors, including the desire to affirm the normativity of one's own position. This research complements social psychological theorizing about the factors contributing to the FCE, and further emphasizes the role of motivated cognition in social reasoning

A short note on the rationality of the false consensus effect

In experiments which measure subjects’ beliefs, both beliefs about others’ behavior and beliefs about others’ beliefs, are often correlated with a subject’s own choices. Such phenomena have been interpreted as evidence of a causal relationship between beliefs and behavior. An alternative explanation attributes them to what psychologists refer to as a ‘false consensus effect’. It is my impression that the latter explanation is often prematurely dismissed because it is thought to be based on an implausible psychological bias. The goal of this note is to show that the false consensus effect does not rely on such a bias. I demonstrate that rational belief formation implies a correlation of behavior and beliefs of all orders whenever behaviorally relevant traits are drawn from an unknown common distribution. Thus, if we assume that subjects rationally update beliefs, correlations of beliefs and behavior cannot support a causal relationship

‘We want our country back’ – stop sneering, start listening

The post-mortem is now well under way and the general consensus seems to be that those who voted leave were gullible fools led astray by a combination of a partisan press and slick political operators selling a particularly potent brand of snake oil, one part false promises, two parts undiluted bigotry. Notwithstanding the quality of the overall political debate around Brexit (it was awful on both sides), such a view might make Remainers feel better about themselves but offers little in making sense of what actually happened last Thursday and why

To Screen or Not to Screen: Prostate Cancer in Liver Transplant Candidates

Prostate cancer screening is a controversial topic in the general population and is even more contested among liver transplant candidates. Not only should transplant programs be concerned about the risk of false positive screening results but also the competing risks of death and the diagnostic and therapeutic effects of true prostate cancer, which often does not cause significant morbidity or mortality in organ transplant recipients. Our letter highlights a best-practices approach to prostate cancer screening in transplant candidates using available research and consensus guidelines

Neutralizing misinformation through inoculation:Exposing misleading argumentation techniques reduces their influence

Misinformation can undermine a well-functioning democracy. For example, public misconceptions about climate change can lead to lowered acceptance of the reality of climate change and lowered support for mitigation policies. This study experimentally explored the impact of misinformation about climate change and tested several pre-emptive interventions designed to reduce the influence of misinformation. We found that false-balance media coverage (giving contrarian views equal voice with climate scientists) lowered perceived consensus overall, although the effect was greater among free-market supporters. Likewise, misinformation that confuses people about the level of scientific agreement regarding anthropogenic global warming (AGW) had a polarizing effect, with free-market supporters reducing their acceptance of AGW and those with low free-market support increasing their acceptance of AGW. However, we found that inoculating messages that (1) explain the flawed argumentation technique used in the misinformation or that (2) highlight the scientific consensus on climate change were effective in neutralizing those adverse effects of misinformation. We recommend that climate communication messages should take into account ways in which scientific content can be distorted, and include preemptive inoculation messages