Communicated beliefs about action-outcomes: The role of initial confirmation in the adoption and maintenance of unsupported beliefs

As agents seeking to learn how to successfully navigate their environments, humans can both obtain knowledge through direct experience, and second-hand through communicated beliefs. Questions remain concerning how communicated belief (or instruction) interacts with first-hand evidence integration, and how the former can bias the latter. Previous research has revealed that people are more inclined to seek out confirming evidence when they are motivated to uphold the belief, resulting in confirmation bias. The current research explores whether merely communicated beliefs affect evidence integration over time when it is not of interest to uphold the belief, and all evidence is readily available. In a novel series of on-line experiments, participants chose on each trial which of two options to play for money, being exposed to outcomes of both. Prior to this, they were exposed to favourable communicated beliefs regarding one of two options. Beliefs were either initially supported or undermined by subsequent probabilistic evidence (probabilities reversed halfway through the task, rendering the options equally profitable overall). Results showed that while communicated beliefs predicted initial choices, they only biased subsequent choices when supported by initial evidence in the first phase of the experiment. Findings were replicated across contexts, evidence sequence lengths, and probabilistic distributions. This suggests that merely communicated beliefs can prevail even when not supported by long run evidence, and in the absence of a motivation to uphold them. The implications of the interaction between communicated beliefs and initial evidence for areas including instruction effects, impression formation, and placebo effects are discussed

Human Frontal–Subcortical Circuit and Asymmetric Belief Updating

How humans integrate information to form beliefs about reality is a question that has engaged scientists for centuries, yet the biological system supporting this process is not well understood. One of the most salient attributes of information is valence. Whether a piece of news is good or bad is critical in determining whether it will alter our beliefs. Here, we reveal a frontal–subcortical circuit in the left hemisphere that is simultaneously associated with enhanced integration of favorable information into beliefs and impaired integration of unfavorable information. Specifically, for favorable information, stronger white matter connectivity within this system, particularly between the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and left subcortical regions (including the amygdala, hippocampus, thalamus, putamen, and pallidum), as well as insular cortex, is associated with greater change in belief. However, for unfavorable information, stronger connectivity within this system, particularly between the left IFG and left pallidum, putamen, and insular cortex, is associated with reduced change in beliefs. These novel results are consistent with models suggesting that partially separable processes govern learning from favorable and unfavorable information

Myside bias in probabilistic ethical decision making

This study examined the extent to which myside bias was observed in the context of ethical decision making. In judgment and decision making research the resistance of myside bias is described as a component of rational thinking. Thus, to some effect, this study aimed to examine the extent to which people act rationally when making ethical decisions. Measures of thinking dispositions (actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition) as well as measures of cognitive reflection and probabilistic knowledge were included in the study to examine their associations with myside bias in ethical decisions. Modest myside bias effects were observed between and within-subjects, however, for within-subjects bias the effect failed to reach statistical significance. Exploration of the data beyond the study’s main research questions revealed significant myside bias effects for participants categorized as utilitarian. Finally, actively open-minded thinking was found to moderate myside bias effects

Neural network integration during the perception of in-group and out-group members

Group biases guide social interactions by promoting in-group favouritism, but the neural mechanisms underpinning group biases remain unclear. While neuroscience research has shown that distributed brain circuits are associated with seeing in-group and out-group members as “us” and “them”, it is less clear how these networks exchange signals. This fMRI study uses functional connectivity analyses to investigate the contribution of functional integration to group bias modulation of person perception. Participants were assigned to an arbitrary group and during scanning they observed bodies of in-group or out-group members that cued the recall of positive or negative social knowledge. The results showed that functional coupling between perceptual and cognitive neural networks is tuned to particular combinations of group membership and social knowledge valence. Specifically, coupling between body perception and theory-of-mind networks is biased towards seeing a person that had previously been paired with information consistent with group bias (positive for in-group and negative for out-group). This demonstrates how brain regions associated with visual analysis of others and belief reasoning exchange and integrate signals when evaluating in-group and out-group members. The results update models of person perception by showing how and when interplay occurs between perceptual and extended systems when developing a representation of another person.ISSN:1873-3514ISSN:0028-393