Evaluation of augmented reality tools for the provision of tower air traffic control using an ecological interface design

One of the major problems faced by the growth of air traffic in the last decade is the limited capacity of the runway especially during low visibility procedures (LVP) due to fog and bad weather. To solve this issue, the project \u201cResilient Synthetic Vision for Advanced Control Tower Air Navigation Service Provision\u201d (RETINA) project, a two-years exploratory research project, under SESAR2020 program, proposes to use new Synthetic Vision (SV) and Augmented Reality (AR) technologies for the tower controllers to allow them to conduct safe operations under any Meteorological Conditions while maintaining a high runway throughput, equal to good visibility. In this paper we introduce the Ecological Interface Design (EID) as a methodology to investigate the potential and applicability of SV tools and Virtual/Augmented Reality (V/AR) display techniques for the Air Traffic Control (ATC) service provision by the airport control tower. We explain how the EID framework can be used in RETINA, we experiment the framework on a suitable airport and we provide the EID results comparing normal and LVP conditions with operations using RETINA technologies

Perfection and Stability of Stationary Points with Applications in Noncooperative Games

It is well known that an upper semi-continuous compact- and convex-valued mapping ö from a nonempty compact and convex set X to the Euclidean space of which X is a subset has at least one stationary point, being a point in X at which the image ö (x)has a nonempty intersection with the normal cone at x.In many circumstances there may be more than one stationary point.In this paper we refine the concept of stationary point by perturbing simultaneously both the set X and the solution concept.In case a stationary point is the limit of a sequence of perturbed solutions on a sequence of sets converging continuously to X we say that the stationary point is stable with respect to this sequence of sets and the mapping which defines the perturbed solution.It is shown that stable stationary points exist for a large class of perturbations.A specific refinement, called robustness, is obtained if a stationary point is the limit of stationary points on a sequence of sets converging to X.It is shown that a robust stationary point always exists for any sequence of sets which starts from an interior point and converges to X in a continuous way.We also discuss several applications in noncooperative game theory.We first show that two well known refinements of the Nash equilibrium, namely, perfect Nash equilibrium and proper Nash equilibrium, are special cases of our robustness concept.Further, a third special case of robustness refines the concept of properness and a robust Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game.In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a symmetric proper equilibrium.Applying our results to the field of evolutionary game theory yields a refinement of the stationary points of the replicator dynamics.We show that the refined solution always exists, contrary to many well known refinement concepts in the field that may fail to exist under the same conditions.noncooperative games;stationary point;stability;equilibrium analysis

Non asymptotic sharp oracle inequalities for the improved model selection procedures for the adaptive nonparametric signal estimation problem

In this paper, we consider the robust adaptive non parametric estimation problem for the periodic function observed with the Levy noises in continuous time. An adaptive model selection procedure, based on the improved weighted least square estimates, is proposed. Sharp oracle inequalities for the robust risks have been obtained

A model-based method for organizing tasks in product development

"Revised November 1993."Includes bibliographical references (p. 18-20).Funded jointly by the National Science Foundation, General Motors Corporation and MIT Leaders for Manufacturing Program.Steven D. Eppinger ... [et al.]

Perfection and Stability of Stationary Points with Applications in Noncooperative Games

It is well known that an upper semi-continuous compact- and convex-valued mapping ö from a nonempty compact and convex set X to the Euclidean space of which X is a subset has at least one stationary point, being a point in X at which the image ö (x)has a nonempty intersection with the normal cone at x.In many circumstances there may be more than one stationary point.In this paper we refine the concept of stationary point by perturbing simultaneously both the set X and the solution concept.In case a stationary point is the limit of a sequence of perturbed solutions on a sequence of sets converging continuously to X we say that the stationary point is stable with respect to this sequence of sets and the mapping which defines the perturbed solution.It is shown that stable stationary points exist for a large class of perturbations.A specific refinement, called robustness, is obtained if a stationary point is the limit of stationary points on a sequence of sets converging to X.It is shown that a robust stationary point always exists for any sequence of sets which starts from an interior point and converges to X in a continuous way.We also discuss several applications in noncooperative game theory.We first show that two well known refinements of the Nash equilibrium, namely, perfect Nash equilibrium and proper Nash equilibrium, are special cases of our robustness concept.Further, a third special case of robustness refines the concept of properness and a robust Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game.In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a symmetric proper equilibrium.Applying our results to the field of evolutionary game theory yields a refinement of the stationary points of the replicator dynamics.We show that the refined solution always exists, contrary to many well known refinement concepts in the field that may fail to exist under the same conditions.