Existence of the core in a heterogeneous divisible commodity exchange economy

We consider the exchange of a heterogeneous divisible commodity modeled as a measurable space. Under rational, continuous and convex preferences over characteristic measures a weak core is shown to exist. Further, a core exists if characteristic measures are mutually absolutely continuous. Applied to the land trading economy, the core existence results in Berliant (J Math Econ 14:53-56, 1985) and Dunz (Reg Sci Urban Econ 21:73-88, 1991) are obtained. © 2008 Springer-Verlag

Concave measures and the fuzzy core of exchange economies with heterogeneous divisible commodities

Cataloged from PDF version of article.The main purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of the fuzzy core of an exchange economy with a heterogeneous divisible commodity in which preferences of individuals are given by nonadditive utility functions defined on a sigma-algebra of admissible pieces of the total endowment of the commodity. The problem is formulated as the partitioning of a measurable space among finitely many individuals. Applying the Yosida-Hewitt decomposition theorem, we also demonstrate that partitions in the fuzzy core are supportable by prices in L-1. (c) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

A "double coincidence" search model of money

According to Engineer and Shi (1998, 2001) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003), the double coincidence of wants problem seems to be not essential to rationalize the use of money in a search theoretic framework. This paper analyzes an endogenous price search model of money where there is universal double coincidence of wants. The existence of a monetary equilibrium depends, essentially, on the asymmetry in the role played by economic agents in the exchange and production processes. In particular, entrepreneurs are assumed to produce a fixed amount of a divisible consumption good by means of labour services provided by workers. Entrepreneurs can offer a co-operative (barter) contract or a monetary contract to workers. Under the co-operative contract real wages are determined in the labour exchange sector, while in the monetary regime real wages are determined in the commodity exchange sector. The monetary contract is proved to be an equilibrium strategy provided that: (i) the workers' labour disutility is sufficiently high and/or (ii) the entrepreneurs' bargaining power in the commodity market is sufficiently large relative to their bargaining power in the labour market. The rationale for money comes from the fact that entrepreneurs use it as an instrument to maximize their output share.

A "double coincidence" search model of money

According to Engineer and Shi (1998, 2001) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003), the double coincidence of wants problem seems to be not essential to rationalize the use of money in a search theoretic framework. This paper analyzes an endogenous price search model of money where there is universal double coincidence of wants. The existence of a monetary equilibrium depends, essentially, on the asymmetry in the role played by economic agents in the exchange and production processes. In particular, entrepreneurs are assumed to produce a fixed amount of a divisible consumption good by means of labour services provided by workers. Entrepreneurs can offer a co-operative (barter) contract or a monetary contract to workers. Under the co-operative contract real wages are determined in the labour exchange sector, while in the monetary regime real wages are determined in the commodity exchange sector. The monetary contract is proved to be an equilibrium strategy provided that: (i) the workers' labour disutility is sufficiently high and/or (ii) the entrepreneurs' bargaining power in the commodity market is sufficiently large relative to their bargaining power in the labour market. The rationale for money comes from the fact that entrepreneurs use it as an instrument to maximize their output share.Money, Search, Double Coincidence, Bargaining

Geographical economics : A historical perspective

This paper provides a bird-eye overview of the history of spatial economic theory. It is organized around three main ideas (and authors): (i) land use and urban economics (Thünen), (ii) the nature of competition across space (Hotelling), and (iii) new economic geography and the emergence of economic agglomerations (Krugman).

Competitive Markets, Collective Decisions and Group Formation

We consider a general equilibrium model where groups operating in a competitive market environment can have several members and make efficient collective consumption decisions. Individuals have the option to leave the group and make it on their own or join another group. We study the effect of these outside options on group formation, group stability, equilibrium existence, and equilibrium efficiency.household behavior, household formation, collective decision making, general equilibrium