Equilibrium Computation in Resource Allocation Games

We study the equilibrium computation problem for two classical resource allocation games: atomic splittable congestion games and multimarket Cournot oligopolies. For atomic splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and player-specific affine cost functions, we devise the first polynomial time algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium. Our algorithm is combinatorial and computes the exact equilibrium assuming rational input. The idea is to compute an equilibrium for an associated integrally-splittable singleton congestion game in which the players can only split their demands in integral multiples of a common packet size. While integral games have been considered in the literature before, no polynomial time algorithm computing an equilibrium was known. Also for this class, we devise the first polynomial time algorithm and use it as a building block for our main algorithm. We then develop a polynomial time computable transformation mapping a multimarket Cournot competition game with firm-specific affine price functions and quadratic costs to an associated atomic splittable congestion game as described above. The transformation preserves equilibria in either games and, thus, leads -- via our first algorithm -- to a polynomial time algorithm computing Cournot equilibria. Finally, our analysis for integrally-splittable games implies new bounds on the difference between real and integral Cournot equilibria. The bounds can be seen as a generalization of the recent bounds for single market oligopolies obtained by Todd [2016].Comment: This version contains some typo corrections onl

Discrete hotelling pure location games: potentials and equilibria

We study two-player one-dimensional discrete Hotelling pure location games assuming that demand f(d) as a function of distance d is constant or strictly decreasing. We show that this game admits a best-response potential. This result holds in particular for f(d) = wd with 0 < w ≤ 1. For this case special attention will be given to the structure of the equilibrium set and a conjecture about the increasingness of best-response correspondences will be made

Equilibrium Computation in Atomic Splittable Routing Games

We present polynomial-time algorithms as well as hardness results for equilibrium computation in atomic splittable routing games, for the case of general convex cost functions. These games model traffic in freight transportation, market oligopolies, data networks, and various other applications. An atomic splittable routing game is played on a network where the edges have traffic-dependent cost functions, and player strategies correspond to flows in the network. A player can thus split its traffic arbitrarily among different paths. While many properties of equilibria in these games have been studied, efficient algorithms for equilibrium computation are known for only two cases: if cost functions are affine, or if players are symmetric. Neither of these conditions is met in most practical applications. We present two algorithms for routing games with general convex cost functions on parallel links. The first algorithm is exponential in the number of players, while the second is exponential in the number of edges; thus if either of these is small, we get a polynomial-time algorithm. These are the first algorithms for these games with convex cost functions. Lastly, we show that in general networks, given input C, it is NP-hard to decide if there exists an equilibrium where every player has cost at most C

Discrete Midpoint Convexity

For a function defined on a convex set in a Euclidean space, midpoint convexity is the property requiring that the value of the function at the midpoint of any line segment is not greater than the average of its values at the endpoints of the line segment. Midpoint convexity is a well-known characterization of ordinary convexity under very mild assumptions. For a function defined on the integer lattice, we consider the analogous notion of discrete midpoint convexity, a discrete version of midpoint convexity where the value of the function at the (possibly noninteger) midpoint is replaced by the average of the function values at the integer round-up and round-down of the midpoint. It is known that discrete midpoint convexity on all line segments with integer endpoints characterizes L$^{\natural}$-convexity, and that it characterizes submodularity if we restrict the endpoints of the line segments to be at $\ell_\infty$-distance one. By considering discrete midpoint convexity for all pairs at $\ell_\infty$-distance equal to two or not smaller than two, we identify new classes of discrete convex functions, called local and global discrete midpoint convex functions, which are strictly between the classes of L$^{\natural}$-convex and integrally convex functions, and are shown to be stable under scaling and addition. Furthermore, a proximity theorem, with the same small proximity bound as that for L$^{\natural}$-convex functions, is established for discrete midpoint convex functions. Relevant examples of classes of local and global discrete midpoint convex functions are provided.Comment: 39 pages, 6 figures, to appear in Mathematics of Operations Researc

Recent Progress on Integrally Convex Functions

Integrally convex functions constitute a fundamental function class in discrete convex analysis, including M-convex functions, L-convex functions, and many others. This paper aims at a rather comprehensive survey of recent results on integrally convex functions with some new technical results. Topics covered in this paper include characterizations of integral convex sets and functions, operations on integral convex sets and functions, optimality criteria for minimization with a proximity-scaling algorithm, integral biconjugacy, and the discrete Fenchel duality. While the theory of M-convex and L-convex functions has been built upon fundamental results on matroids and submodular functions, developing the theory of integrally convex functions requires more general and basic tools such as the Fourier-Motzkin elimination.Comment: 50 page

Economics of Conflict and Terrorism

This book contributes to the literature on conflict and terrorism through a selection of articles that deal with theoretical, methodological and empirical issues related to the topic. The papers study important problems, are original in their approach and innovative in the techniques used. This will be useful for researchers in the fields of game theory, economics and political sciences