141 research outputs found
Quantum Computationally Predicate-Binding Commitments with Application in Quantum Zero-Knowledge Arguments for NP
A quantum bit commitment scheme is to realize bit (rather than qubit) commitment by exploiting quantum communication and quantum computation. In this work, we study the binding property of the quantum string commitment scheme obtained by composing a generic quantum perfectly(resp. statistically)-hiding computationally-binding bit commitment scheme (which can be realized based on quantum-secure one-way permutations(resp. functions)) in parallel. We show that the resulting scheme satisfies a stronger quantum computational binding property, which we will call predicate-binding, than the trivial honest-binding. Intuitively and very roughly, the predicate-binding property guarantees that given any inconsistent predicate pair over a set of strings (i.e. no strings in this set can satisfy both predicates), if a (claimed) quantum commitment can be opened so that the revealed string satisfies one predicate with certainty, then the same commitment cannot be opened so that the revealed string satisfies the other predicate (except for a negligible probability).
As an application, we plug a generic quantum perfectly(resp. statistically)-hiding computationally-binding bit commitment scheme in Blum\u27s zero-knowledge protocol for the NP-complete language Hamiltonian Cycle. The quantum computational soundness of the resulting protocol will follow immediately from the quantum computational predicate-binding property of commitments. Combined with the perfect(resp. statistical) zero-knowledge property which can be similarly established as in previous work, this gives rise to the first quantum perfect(resp. statistical) zero-knowledge argument system (with soundness error 1/2) for all NP languages based solely on quantum-secure one-way permutations(resp. functions)
A Study of Separations in Cryptography: New Results and New Models
For more than 20 years, black-box impossibility results have been used to argue the infeasibility of constructing certain cryptographic primitives (e.g., key agreement) from others (e.g., one-way functions). In this dissertation we further extend the frontier of this field by demonstrating several new impossibility results as well as a new framework for studying a more general class of constructions.
Our first two results demonstrate impossibility of black-box constructions of two commonly used cryptographic primitives. In our first result we study the feasibility of black-box constructions of predicate encryption schemes from standard assumptions and demonstrate strong limitations on the types of schemes that can be constructed. In our second result we study black-box constructions of constant-round zero-knowledge proofs from one-way permutations and show that, under commonly believed complexity assumptions, no such constructions exist.
A widely recognized limitation of black-box impossibility results, however, is that they say nothing about the usefulness of (known) non-black-box techniques. This state of affairs is unsatisfying as we would at least like to rule out constructions using the set of techniques we have at our disposal. With this motivation in mind, in the final result of this dissertation we propose a new framework for black-box constructions with a non-black-box flavor, specifically, those that rely on zero-knowledge proofs relative to some oracle. Our framework is powerful enough to capture a large class of known constructions, however we show that the original black-box separation of key agreement from one-way functions still holds even in this non-black-box setting that allows for zero-knowledge proofs
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Unconditional Relationships within Zero Knowledge
Zero-knowledge protocols enable one party, called a prover, to "convince" another party, called a verifier, the validity of a mathematical statement such that the verifier "learns nothing" other than the fact that the proven statement is true. The different ways of formulating the terms "convince" and "learns nothing" gives rise to four classes of languages having zero-knowledge protocols, which are: statistical zero-knowledge proof systems, computational zero-knowledge proof systems, statistical zero-knowledge argument systems, and computational zero-knowledge argument systems.
We establish complexity-theoretic characterization of the classes of languages in NP having zero-knowledge argument systems. Using these characterizations, we show that for languages in NP:
-- Instance-dependent commitment schemes are necessary and sufficient for zero-knowledge protocols. Instance-dependent commitment schemes for a given language are commitment schemes that can depend on the instance of the language, and where the hiding and binding properties are required to hold only on the YES and NO instances of the language, respectively.
-- Computational zero knowledge and computational soundness (a property held by argument systems) are symmetric properties. Namely, we show that the class of languages in NP intersect co-NP having zero-knowledge arguments is closed under complement, and that a language in NP has a statistical zero-knowledge **argument** system if and only if its complement has a **computational** zero-knowledge proof system.
-- A method of transforming any zero-knowledge protocol that is secure only against an honest verifier that follows the prescribed protocol into one that is secure against malicious verifiers. In addition, our transformation gives us protocols with desirable properties like having public coins, being black-box simulatable, and having an efficient prover.
The novelty of our results above is that they are **unconditional**, meaning that they do not rely on any unproven complexity assumptions such as the existence of one-way functions. Moreover, in establishing our complexity-theoretic characterizations, we give the first construction of statistical zero-knowledge argument systems for NP based on any one-way function
Batch Proofs are Statistically Hiding
Batch proofs are proof systems that convince a verifier that , for some language , with communication that is much shorter than sending the witnesses. In the case of statistical soundness (where the cheating prover is unbounded but the honest prover is efficient given the witnesses), interactive batch proofs are known for , the class of unique witness languages. In the case of computational soundness (a.k.a. arguments, where both honest and dishonest provers are efficient), non-interactive solutions are now known for all of , assuming standard cryptographic assumptions. We study the necessary conditions for the existence of batch proofs in these two settings. Our main results are as follows.
1. Statistical Soundness: the existence of a statistically-sound batch proof for implies that has a statistically witness indistinguishable () proof, with inverse polynomial error, and a non-uniform honest prover. The implication is unconditional for obtaining honest-verifier or for obtaining full-fledged from public-coin protocols, whereas for private-coin protocols full-fledged is obtained assuming one-way functions.
This poses a barrier for achieving batch proofs beyond (where witness indistinguishability is trivial). In particular, assuming that does not have proofs, batch proofs for all of do not exist.
2. Computational Soundness: the existence of batch arguments (s) for , together with one-way functions, implies the existence of statistical zero-knowledge () arguments for with roughly the same number of rounds, an inverse polynomial zero-knowledge error, and non-uniform honest prover.
Thus, constant-round interactive s from one-way functions would yield constant-round arguments from one-way functions. This would be surprising as arguments are currently only known assuming constant-round statistically-hiding commitments (which in turn are unlikely to follow from one-way functions).
3. Non-interactive: the existence of non-interactive s for and one-way functions, implies non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge arguments () for , with negligible soundness error, inverse polynomial zero-knowledge error, and non-uniform honest prover. Assuming also lossy public-key encryption, the statistical zero-knowledge error can be made negligible and the honest prover can be made uniform.
All of our results stem from a common framework showing how to transform a batch protocol for a language into an protocol for
Public-Coin Zero-Knowledge Arguments with (almost) Minimal Time and Space Overheads
Zero-knowledge protocols enable the truth of a mathematical statement to be certified by a verifier without revealing any other information. Such protocols are a cornerstone of modern cryptography and recently are becoming more and more practical. However, a major bottleneck in deployment is the efficiency of the prover and, in particular, the space-efficiency of the protocol.
For every relation that can be verified in time and space , we construct a public-coin zero-knowledge argument in which the prover runs in time and space . Our proofs have length and the verifier runs in time (and space ). Our scheme is in the random oracle model and relies on the hardness of discrete log in prime-order groups.
Our main technical contribution is a new space efficient polynomial commitment scheme for multi-linear polynomials. Recall that in such a scheme, a sender commits to a given multi-linear polynomial so that later on it can prove to a receiver statements of the form . In our scheme, which builds on the commitment schemes of Bootle et al. (Eurocrypt 2016) and Bünz et al. (S&P 2018), we assume that the sender is given multi-pass streaming access to the evaluations of on the Boolean hypercube and w show how to implement both the sender and receiver in roughly time and space and with communication complexity roughly
Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs and their Applications
A zero-knowledge proof is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that enables the verification of statements without revealing unnecessary information. Zero-knowledge proofs are a key component of many cryptographic protocols and, often, one of their main efficiency bottlenecks. In recent years there have been great advances in improving the efficiency of zero-knowledge proofs, bring them closer to wide deployability. In this thesis we make another step towards the construction of computationally-efficient zero-knowledge proofs. Specifically, we construct efficient zero-knowledge proofs for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits for which the computational cost of the prover is only a constant factor more expensive than direct evaluation of the circuit. We also construct efficient zero-knowledge proofs to check the correct execution of (Tiny)RAM programs. In this case the computational cost for the prover is a superconstant factor larger than executing the program directly. Our proofs also support efficient verification and small proof sizes. For security, they rely on symmetric primitives and could potentially withstand attacks from quantum computers. On a different research direction, we look at group signatures, a fundamental primitive which relies on zero-knowledge proofs. A group signature enables users to sign anonymously on behalf of a group of users. In case of dispute a Manager can identify the author of a signature and potentially banish the user from the group. In this thesis we address the fundamental question of defining the security of fully dynamic group signatures, for which the users can join and leave at any time. Differently from other restricted settings, this case has been largely overlooked in the past. Our security model is general, does not implicitly assume existing design paradigms and captures the security of existing models for more restricted settings
Black-Box Computational Zero-Knowledge Proofs, Revisited: The Simulation-Extraction Paradigm
The concept of zero-knowledge proofs has been around for about 25 years. It has been redefined over and over to suit the special security requirements of protocols and systems. Common among all definitions is the requirement of the existence of some efficient ``device\u27\u27 simulating the view of the verifier (or the transcript of the protocol), such that the simulation is indistinguishable from the reality. The definitions differ in many respects, including the type and power of the devices, the order of quantifiers, the type of indistinguishability, and so on.
In this paper, we will scrutinize the definition of ``black-box computational\u27\u27 zero-knowledge, in which there exists one simulator \emph{for all} verifiers, the simulator has black-box access to the verifier, and the quality of simulation is such that the real and simulated views cannot be distinguished by polynomial tests (\emph{computational} indistinguishability).
Working in a theoretical model (the Random-Oracle Model), we show that the indistinguishability requirement is stated in a \emph{conceptually} inappropriate way: Present definitions allow the knowledge of the \emph{verifier} and \emph{distinguisher} to be independent, while the two entities are essentially coupled. Therefore, our main take on the problem will be \emph{conceptual} and \emph{semantic}, rather than \emph{literal}. We formalize the concept by introducing a ``knowledge extractor\u27\u27 into the model, which tries to extract the extra knowledge hard-coded into the distinguisher (if any), and then helps the simulator to construct the view of the verifier. The new paradigm is termed \emph{Simulation-Extraction Paradigm}, as opposed to the previous \emph{Simulation Paradigm}. We also provide an important application of the new formalization: Using the simulation-extraction paradigm, we construct one-round (i.e. two-move) zero-knowledge protocols of proving ``the computational ability to invert some trapdoor permutation\u27\u27 in the Random-Oracle Model. It is shown that the protocol cannot be proven zero-knowledge in the classical Simulation Paradigm. The proof of the zero-knowledge property in the new paradigm is interesting in that it does not require knowing the internal structure of the trapdoor permutation, or a polynomial-time reduction from it to another (e.g. an -complete) problem
Zero-Knowledge Proofs on Secret-Shared Data via Fully Linear PCPs
We introduce and study the notion of fully linear probabilistically checkable proof systems. In such a proof system, the verifier can make a small number of linear queries that apply jointly to the input and a proof vector.
Our new type of proof system is motivated by applications in which the input statement is not fully available to any single verifier, but can still be efficiently accessed via linear queries. This situation arises in scenarios where the input is partitioned or secret-shared between two or more parties, or alternatively is encoded using an additively homomorphic encryption or commitment scheme. This setting appears in the context of secure messaging platforms, verifiable outsourced computation, PIR writing, private computation of aggregate statistics, and secure multiparty computation (MPC). In all these applications, there is a need for fully linear proof systems with short proofs.
While several efficient constructions of fully linear proof systems are implicit in the interactive proofs literature, many questions about their complexity are open. We present several new constructions of fully linear zero-knowledge proof systems with sublinear proof size for simple or structured languages. For example, in the non-interactive setting of fully linear PCPs, we show how to prove that an input vector satisfies a single degree-2 equation with a proof of size and linear queries, which we show to be optimal. More generally, for
languages that can be recognized by systems of constant-degree equations, we can reduce the proof size to at the cost of rounds of interaction.
We use our new proof systems to construct new short zero-knowledge proofs on distributed and secret-shared data. These proofs can be used to improve the performance of many of the example systems mentioned above.
Finally, we observe that zero-knowledge proofs on distributed data provide a general-purpose tool for protecting protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC) against malicious parties. Applying our short fully linear PCPs to natural MPC protocols in the honest-majority setting, we can achieve unconditional protection against malicious parties with sublinear additive communication cost. We use this to improve the communication complexity of recent honest-majority MPC protocols. For instance, using any pseudorandom generator, we obtain a 3-party protocol for Boolean circuits in which the amortized communication cost is only one bit per AND gate per party (compared to 7 bits in the best previous protocol), matching the best known protocols for semi-honest adversaries
Post-Quantum Zero Knowledge, Revisited (or: How to do Quantum Rewinding Undetectably)
When do classical zero-knowledge protocols remain secure against quantum attacks? In this work, we develop the techniques, tools, and abstractions necessary to answer this question for foundational protocols:
1) We prove that the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson protocol for graph non-isomorphism and the Feige-Shamir protocol for NP remain zero-knowledge against quantum adversaries. At the heart of our proof is a new quantum rewinding technique that enables extracting information from multiple invocations of a quantum adversary without disturbing its state.
2) We prove that the Goldreich-Kahan protocol for NP is post-quantum zero knowledge using a simulator that can be seen as a natural quantum extension of the classical simulator.
Our results achieve negligible simulation error, appearing to contradict a recent impossibility result due to Chia-Chung-Liu-Yamakawa (FOCS 2021). This brings us to our final contribution:
3) We introduce coherent-runtime expected quantum polynomial time, a simulation notion that (1) precisely captures all of our zero-knowledge simulators, (2) cannot break any polynomial hardness assumptions, (3) implies strict polynomial-time epsilon-simulation and (4) is not subject to the CCLY impossibility. In light of our positive results and the CCLY negative results, we propose coherent-runtime simulation to be the appropriate quantum analogue of classical expected polynomial-time simulation
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