113,568 research outputs found
Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology: response to Vaesen
In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515â529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963â970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245â252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesenâs (Erkenntnis 78:963â970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails
Kann etwas mit absoluter Gewissheit erkannt werden? - Einige Gedanken zur »Urfrage« der Philosophie
FĂŒr viele Vertreter der modernen Philosophie ist entgegen der vorphilosophischen »Alltagserfahrung« die FĂ€higkeit des Menschen, etwas mit Gewissheit zu erkennen, mehr als fragwĂŒrdig geworden. An die Stelle des schauenden Empfangens, des geistigen Blickes auf das objektive Wesen der Erkenntnis, der das Wesen der Erkenntnis in seinem Sosein offenbaren wĂŒrde, treten zunehmend »Denkkonstrukte«, philosophische Systeme, die versuchen, Wesen der Erkenntnis systemkonform »neu« zu verstehen und zu begrĂŒnden. \ud
Ist verkannt worden, was Erkenntnis ĂŒberhaupt ist?ÂŹ â Wenn also das objektive Wesen der Erkenntnis verkannt wird, besteht die Gefahr, dass der Mensch sich in das »bitterste« GefĂ€ngnis, aus dem es fast kein Entrinnen mehr gibt, in den idealistischen Immanentismus begibt, der letztendlich in den Solipsismus fĂŒhrt... \u
A note on Morato on modality and explanation
This brief note critically assesses the central arguments in Moratoâs (Erkenntnis 79:327â349, 2014) recent contribution to the growing literature on Blackburnâs dilemma about necessity. In particular, I demonstrate that (i) neither of Moratoâs two novel reconstructions of the dilemmaâs contingency horn succeed, since both turn on false premises; and, (ii) Morato fails to adequately motivate his own response to these reconstructions. The upshot is that Morato has set himself a pair of flawed problems, then offered a flawed solution
Die Erkenntnis der Liebe
Mit der Frage nach der Erkenntnis der Liebe möchte ich mich der verbreiteten, einfachen GegenĂŒberstellung von dem Wahn der Leidenschaften einerseits und der nĂŒchternen Verstandeserkenntnis andererseits widersetzen. Ich trete fĂŒr ein phĂ€nomenologisch angeleitetes VerstĂ€ndnis der liebenden Erkenntnis als Erkenntnis des Geliebten in seiner haecceitas ein. Der liebende Blick schaut meiner Ansicht nach den Geliebten in seinen Eigenschaften als diese besondere Person, die ihre Eigenschaften hat. Im RĂŒckgriff auf Ăberlegungen der Dialogphilosophie trete ich dafĂŒr ein, dass das Liebesgeschehen selbst den Erkenntnisstatus der liebenden Schau begrĂŒndet. Dabei ist die Liebe als dialogisch verfasste Gegenwart der Begegnung zu begreifen, die den Liebenden die Möglichkeit eröffnet, fĂŒr einander als die Personen hervorzutreten, die ihre Eigenschaften haben, und einander damit zugleich als diese besonderen Personen zu erkennen
Modellieren im Mathematikunterricht
Das Modellieren steht im Zentrum des realitĂ€tsbezogenen Mathematikunterrichts. Modellieren ist ein Instrument zur Erkenntnis und zur Gestaltung der Welt, das â so können wir von der Philosophie lernen â konstitutiv fĂŒr fast jede Erkenntnis und jedes Handeln ist, also sehr weit ĂŒber den Mathematikunterricht hinaus Bedeutung hat. Zudem ist es kein Kreis, sondern ein offener Prozess, der â hoffentlich â zu besserem VerstĂ€ndnis und zu vermehrten Handlungsmöglichkeiten fĂŒhrt
Whence philosophy of biology?
A consensus exists among contemporary philosophers of biology about the history of their field. According to the received view, mainstream philosophy of science in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s focused on physics and general epistemology, neglecting analyses of the âspecial sciencesâ, including biology. The subdiscipline of philosophy of biology emerged (and could only have emerged) after the decline of logical positivism in the 1960s and 70s. In this paper, I present bibliometric data from four major philosophy of science journals (Erkenntnis, Philosophy of Science, Synthese, and the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science), covering 1930-1959, which challenge this view
It Takes More than Moore to Answer Existence-Questions
© 2019 Springer Nature. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Erkenntnis. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00107-4Several recent discussions of metaphysics disavow existence-questions, claiming that they are metaphysically uninteresting because trivially settled in the affirmative by Moorean facts. This is often given as a reason to focus metaphysical debate instead on questions of grounding. I argue that the strategy employed to undermine existence-questions fails against its usual target: Quineanism. The Quinean can protest that the formulation given of their position is a straw man: properly understood, as a project of explication, Quinean metaphysics does not counsel us to choose between obvious ordinary-language claims and absurd revisionist claims, even if appeal to Moorean facts is permitted.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio
Imprecise Probability and Chance
Understanding probabilities as something other than point values (e.g., as intervals) has often been motivated by the need to find more realistic models for degree of belief, and in particular the idea that degree of belief should have an objective basis in âstatistical knowledge of the world.â I offer here another motivation growing out of efforts to understand how chance evolves as a function of time. If the world is âchancyâ in that there are non-trivial, objective, physical probabilities at the macro-level, then the chance of an event e that happens at a given time is e goes to one continuously or not is left open. Discontinuities in such chance trajectories can have surprising and troubling consequences for probabilistic analyses of causation and accounts of how events occur in time. This, coupled with the compelling evidence for quantum discontinuities in chanceâs evolution, gives rise to a â(dis)continuity bindâ with respect to chance probability trajectories. I argue that a viable option for circumventing the (dis)continuity bind is to understand the probabilities âimprecisely,â that is, as intervals rather than point values. I then develop and motivate an alternative kind of continuity appropriate for interval-valued chance probability trajectories
Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure
Carter and Pritchard (2016) and Pritchard (2010, 2012, 2016) have tried to reconcile the intuition that perceptual knowledge requires only limited discriminatory abilities with the closure principle. To this end, they have introduced two theoretical innovations: a contrast between two ways of introducing error-possibilities and a distinction between discriminating and favoring evidence. I argue that their solution faces the âsufficiency problemâ: it is unclear whether the evidence that is normally available to adult humans is sufficient to retain knowledge of the entailing proposition and come to know the entailed proposition. I submit that, on either infallibilist or fallibilist views of evidence, Carter and Pritchard have set the bar for deductive knowledge too low. At the end, I offer an alternative solution. I suggest that the knowledge-retention condition of the closure principle is not satisfied in zebra-like scenarios
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