Equilibria, Fixed Points, and Complexity Classes

Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games (stochastic and other games); stable configurations of neural networks; analysing basic stochastic models for evolution like branching processes and for language like stochastic context-free grammars; and models that incorporate the basic primitives of probability and recursion like recursive Markov chains. It is not known whether these problems can be solved in polynomial time. There are certain common computational principles underlying different types of equilibria, which are captured by the complexity classes PLS, PPAD, and FIXP. Representative complete problems for these classes are respectively, pure Nash equilibria in games where they are guaranteed to exist, (mixed) Nash equilibria in 2-player normal form games, and (mixed) Nash equilibria in normal form games with 3 (or more) players. This paper reviews the underlying computational principles and the corresponding classes

A Geometric Approach to Combinatorial Fixed-Point Theorems

We develop a geometric framework that unifies several different combinatorial fixed-point theorems related to Tucker's lemma and Sperner's lemma, showing them to be different geometric manifestations of the same topological phenomena. In doing so, we obtain (1) new Tucker-like and Sperner-like fixed-point theorems involving an exponential-sized label set; (2) a generalization of Fan's parity proof of Tucker's Lemma to a much broader class of label sets; and (3) direct proofs of several Sperner-like lemmas from Tucker's lemma via explicit geometric embeddings, without the need for topological fixed-point theorems. Our work naturally suggests several interesting open questions for future research.Comment: 10 pages; an extended abstract appeared at Eurocomb 201

A Low-Complexity Approach to Distributed Cooperative Caching with Geographic Constraints

We consider caching in cellular networks in which each base station is equipped with a cache that can store a limited number of files. The popularity of the files is known and the goal is to place files in the caches such that the probability that a user at an arbitrary location in the plane will find the file that she requires in one of the covering caches is maximized. We develop distributed asynchronous algorithms for deciding which contents to store in which cache. Such cooperative algorithms require communication only between caches with overlapping coverage areas and can operate in asynchronous manner. The development of the algorithms is principally based on an observation that the problem can be viewed as a potential game. Our basic algorithm is derived from the best response dynamics. We demonstrate that the complexity of each best response step is independent of the number of files, linear in the cache capacity and linear in the maximum number of base stations that cover a certain area. Then, we show that the overall algorithm complexity for a discrete cache placement is polynomial in both network size and catalog size. In practical examples, the algorithm converges in just a few iterations. Also, in most cases of interest, the basic algorithm finds the best Nash equilibrium corresponding to the global optimum. We provide two extensions of our basic algorithm based on stochastic and deterministic simulated annealing which find the global optimum. Finally, we demonstrate the hit probability evolution on real and synthetic networks numerically and show that our distributed caching algorithm performs significantly better than storing the most popular content, probabilistic content placement policy and Multi-LRU caching policies.Comment: 24 pages, 9 figures, presented at SIGMETRICS'1

Clearing Financial Networks with Derivatives: From Intractability to Algorithms

Financial networks raise a significant computational challenge in identifying insolvent firms and evaluating their exposure to systemic risk. This task, known as the clearing problem, is computationally tractable when dealing with simple debt contracts. However under the presence of certain derivatives called credit default swaps (CDSes) the clearing problem is $\textsf{FIXP}$-complete. Existing techniques only show $\textsf{PPAD}$-hardness for finding an $\epsilon$-solution for the clearing problem with CDSes within an unspecified small range for $\epsilon$. We present significant progress in both facets of the clearing problem: (i) intractability of approximate solutions; (ii) algorithms and heuristics for computable solutions. Leveraging $\textsf{Pure-Circuit}$ (FOCS'22), we provide the first explicit inapproximability bound for the clearing problem involving CDSes. Our primal contribution is a reduction from $\textsf{Pure-Circuit}$ which establishes that finding approximate solutions is $\textsf{PPAD}$-hard within a range of roughly 5%. To alleviate the complexity of the clearing problem, we identify two meaningful restrictions of the class of financial networks motivated by regulations: (i) the presence of a central clearing authority; and (ii) the restriction to covered CDSes. We provide the following results: (i.) The $\textsf{PPAD}$-hardness of approximation persists when central clearing authorities are introduced; (ii.) An optimisation-based method for solving the clearing problem with central clearing authorities; (iii.) A polynomial-time algorithm when the two restrictions hold simultaneously

Nash equilibria, gale strings, and perfect matchings

This thesis concerns the problem 2-NASH of finding a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, for the special class of so-called “hard-to-solve” bimatrix games. The term “hardto-solve” relates to the exponential running time of the famous and often used Lemke– Howson algorithm for this class of games. The games are constructed with the help of dual cyclic polytopes, where the algorithm can be expressed combinatorially via labeled bitstrings defined by the “Gale evenness condition” that characterise the vertices of these polytopes. We define the combinatorial problem “Another completely labeled Gale string” whose solutions define the Nash equilibria of any game defined by cyclic polytopes, including the games where the Lemke–Howson algorithm takes exponential time. We show that “Another completely labeled Gale string” is solvable in polynomial time by a reduction to the “Perfect matching” problem in Euler graphs. We adapt the Lemke–Howson algorithm to pivot from one perfect matching to another and show that again for a certain class of graphs this leads to exponential behaviour. Furthermore, we prove that completely labeled Gale strings and perfect matchings in Euler graphs come in pairs and that the Lemke–Howson algorithm connects two strings or matchings of opposite signs. The equivalence between Nash Equilibria of bimatrix games derived from cyclic polytopes, completely labeled Gale strings, and perfect matchings in Euler Graphs implies that counting Nash equilibria is #P-complete. Although one Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, we have not succeeded in finding an algorithm that computes a Nash equilibrium of opposite sign. However, we solve this problem for certain special cases, for example planar graphs. We illustrate the difficulties concerning a general polynomial-time algorithm for this problem by means of negative results that demonstrate why a number of approaches towards such an algorithm are unlikely to be successful

Recent Advances in Cellular D2D Communications

Device-to-device (D2D) communications have attracted a great deal of attention from researchers in recent years. It is a promising technique for offloading local traffic from cellular base stations by allowing local devices, in physical proximity, to communicate directly with each other. Furthermore, through relaying, D2D is also a promising approach to enhancing service coverage at cell edges or in black spots. However, there are many challenges to realizing the full benefits of D2D. For one, minimizing the interference between legacy cellular and D2D users operating in underlay mode is still an active research issue. With the 5th generation (5G) communication systems expected to be the main data carrier for the Internet-of-Things (IoT) paradigm, the potential role of D2D and its scalability to support massive IoT devices and their machine-centric (as opposed to human-centric) communications need to be investigated. New challenges have also arisen from new enabling technologies for D2D communications, such as non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) and blockchain technologies, which call for new solutions to be proposed. This edited book presents a collection of ten chapters, including one review and nine original research works on addressing many of the aforementioned challenges and beyond