378 research outputs found
Cryptographic Analysis of Secure Messaging Protocols
Instant messaging applications promise their users a secure and private way to communicate. The validity of these promises rests on the design of the underlying protocol, the cryptographic primitives used and the quality of the implementation. Though secure messaging designs exist in the literature, for various reasons developers of messaging applications often opt to design their own protocols, creating a gap between cryptography as understood by academic research and cryptography as implemented in practice. This thesis contributes to bridging this gap by approaching it from both sides: by looking for flaws in the protocols underlying real-world messaging applications, as well as by performing a rigorous analysis of their security guarantees in a provable security model.Secure messaging can provide a host of different, sometimes conflicting, security and privacy guarantees. It is thus important to judge applications based on the concrete security expectations of their users. This is particularly significant for higher-risk users such as activists or civil rights protesters. To position our work, we first studied the security practices of protesters in the context of the 2019 Anti-ELAB protests in Hong Kong using in-depth, semi-structured interviews with participants of these protests. We report how they organised on different chat platforms based on their perceived security, and how they developed tactics and strategies to enable pseudonymity and detect compromise.Then, we analysed two messaging applications relevant in the protest context: Bridgefy and Telegram. Bridgefy is a mobile mesh messaging application, allowing users in relative proximity to communicate without the Internet. It was being promoted as a secure communication tool for use in areas experiencing large-scale protests. We showed that Bridgefy permitted its users to be tracked, offered no authenticity, no effective confidentiality protections and lacked resilience against adversarially crafted messages. We verified these vulnerabilities by demonstrating a series of practical attacks.Telegram is a messaging platform with over 500 million users, yet prior to this work its bespoke protocol, MTProto, had received little attention from the cryptographic community. We provided the first comprehensive study of the MTProto symmetric channel as implemented in cloud chats. We gave both positive and negative results. First, we found two attacks on the existing protocol, and two attacks on its implementation in official clients which exploit timing side channels and uncover a vulnerability in the key exchange protocol. Second, we proved that a fixed version of the symmetric MTProto protocol achieves security in a suitable bidirectional secure channel model, albeit under unstudied assumptions. Our model itself advances the state-of-the-art for secure channels
A survey of secure middleware for the Internet of Things
The rapid growth of small Internet connected devices, known as the Internet of Things (IoT), is creating a new set of challenges to create secure, private infrastructures. This paper reviews the current literature on the challenges and approaches to security and privacy in the Internet of Things, with a strong focus on how these aspects are handled in IoT middleware. We focus on IoT middleware because many systems are built from existing middleware and these inherit the underlying security properties of the middleware framework. The paper is composed of three main sections. Firstly, we propose a matrix of security and privacy threats for IoT. This matrix is used as the basis of a widespread literature review aimed at identifying requirements on IoT platforms and middleware. Secondly, we present a structured literature review of the available middleware and how security is handled in these middleware approaches. We utilise the requirements from the first phase to evaluate. Finally, we draw a set of conclusions and identify further work in this area
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A CleanRoom approach to bring your own apps
Today, on mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets, hundreds of thousands of software apps provide useful services to users. Users use these apps to search and browse the web, perform financial transactions, emailing, among other functions. Besides, these apps use cloud services which gives the users the flexibility to access them from anywhere and from any device. Because of the rich functionality of these apps and ease of use of mobile devices, users (employees) often want to use their devices and preferred apps at their workplace. However, these apps not only pose risk to user's private data but also to enterprise data, when users use them within an enterprise network. For one thing, these apps come from hundreds and thousands of different app publishers, where all of them may not be trustworthy. Second, apps often need user's private data such as location, contact list, photos among others and use remote cloud to carry out their operations. In the process apps may leak a user's private or enterprise confidential data to a third party. Current practices to prevent such leaks through user enabled app permissions fall short because often user does not understand these permissions. Besides, even if a company's "Bring Your Own Device" (BYOD) policies mitigate the risk of device compromise with enterprise-approved password policies, remote wipe capabilities, and OS security upgrade policies, the apps on those devices pose their own risks. This thesis presents CleanRoom, a new app platform that prevents apps from leaking the data entrusted to them. It does not rely on users to make good decisions about Privacy, and enables enterprises to allow its employees to use their own devices and bring their preferred apps to work.Computer Science
Examining the issues & challenges of email & e-communications. 2nd Northumbria Witness Seminar Conference, 24-25 Oct 2007 Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne.
These proceedings capture the content of the second Witness Seminar hosted by Northumbria University’s School of Computing, Engineering and Information Sciences. It followed the success of the first witness seminar in terms of its format and style but differed in that it focused on one topic - managing email and other electronic communications technologies from a records perspective. As before the witnesses were invited to share their views and opinions on a specific aspect taking as their starting point a pertinent published article(s). Three seminars explored the business, people and technology perspectives of email and e-communications, asking the following questions: What are the records management implications and challenges of doing business electronically? Are people the problem and the solution? Is technology the problem or panacea? The final seminar, 'Futurewatch', focused on moving forward, exploring new ways of working, potential new technologies and what records professionals and others need to keep on their radar screens
Decentralization in messaging applications with support for contactless interaction
Peer-to-peer communication has increasingly been gaining prevalence in people’s daily lives, with its widespread adoption being catalysed by technological advances. Although there have been strides for the inclusion of disabled individuals to ease communication between peers, people who suffer arm/hand impairments have little to no support in regular mainstream applications to efficiently communicate with other individuals. Additionally, as centralized systems have come into scrutiny regarding privacy and security, the development of alternative, decentralized solutions have increased, a movement pioneered by Bitcoin that culminated in the blockchain technology and its variants. Aiming towards expanding inclusivity in the messaging applications panorama, this project showcases an alternative on contactless human-computer interaction with support for disabled individuals with focus on the decentralized backend counterpart. Users of the application partake in a decentralized network based on a distributed hash table that is designed for secure communication (granted by a custom cryptographic messaging protocol) and exchange of data between peers. Such system is both resilient to tampering attacks and central points of failure (akin to blockchains), as well as having no long-term restrictions regarding scalability prospects, something that is a recurring issue in blockchain-based platforms. The conducted experiments showcase a level of performance similar to mainstream centralized approaches, outperforming blockchain-based decentralized applications on the delay between sending and receiving messages.A comunicação ponto-a-ponto tem cada vez mais ganhado prevalência na vida contemporânea de pessoas, tendo a sua adoção sido catalisada pelos avanços tecnológicos. Embora tenham havido desenvolvimentos relativamente à inclusão de indivíduos com deficiência para facilitar a comunicação entre pessoas, as que sofrem imparidades no braço/mão têm um suporte escasso em aplicações convencionais para comunicar de forma eficiente com outros sujeitos. Adicionalmente, à medida que sistemas centralizados têm atraído ceticismo relativamente à sua privacidade e segurança, o desenvolvimento de soluções descentralizadas e alternativas têm aumentado, um movimento iniciado pela Bitcoin que culminou na tecnologia de blockchain e as suas variantes. Tendo como objectivo expandir a inclusão no panorama de aplicações de messaging, este projeto pretende demonstrar uma alternativa na interação humano-computador sem contacto direto físico e com suporte para indivíduos com deficiência, com foco no componente backend decentralizado. Utilizadores da aplicação são inseridos num sistema decentralizado baseado numa hash table distribuída que foi desenhado para comunicação segura (providenciado por um protocolo de messaging criptográfico customizado) e para troca de dados entre utilizadores. Tal sistema é tanto resiliente a ataques de adulteração de dados como também a pontos centrais de falha (presente em blockains), não tendo adicionalmente restrições ao nível de escabilidade a longo-prazo, algo que é um problem recorrente em plataformas baseadas em blockchain. As avaliações e experiências realizadas neste projeto demonstram um nível de performance semelhante a abordagens centralizadas convencionais, tendo uma melhor prestação que aplicações descentralizadas baseadas em blockchain no que toca à diferença no tempo entre enviar e receber mensagens
Towards secure computation for people
My research investigates three questions: How do we customize protocols and implementations to account for the unique requirement of each setting and its target community, what are necessary steps that we can take to transition secure computation tools into practice, and how can we promote their adoption for users at large? In this dissertation I present several of my works that address these three questions with a particular focus on one of them.
First my work on "Hecate: Abuse Reporting in Secure Messengers with Sealed Sender" designs a customized protocol to protect people from abuse and surveillance in online end to end encrypted messaging. Our key insight is to add pre-processing to asymmetric message franking, where the moderating entity can generate batches of tokens per user during off-peak hours that can later be deposited when reporting abuse.
This thesis then demonstrates that by carefully tailoring our cryptographic protocols for real world use cases, we can achieve orders of magnitude improvements over prior works with minimal assumptions over the resources available to people.
Second, my work on "Batched Differentially Private Information Retrieval" contributes a novel Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol called DP-PIR that is designed to provide high throughput at high query rates. It does so by pushing all public key operations into an offline stage, batching queries from multiple clients via techniques similar to mixnets, and maintain differential privacy guarantees over the access patterns of the database.
Finally, I provide three case studies showing that we cannot hope to further the adoption of cryptographic tools in practice without collaborating with the very people we are trying to protect. I discuss a pilot deployment of secure multi-party computation (MPC) that I have done with the Department of Education, deployments of MPC I have done for the Boston Women’s Workforce Council and the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, and ongoing work in developing tool chain support for MPC via an automated resource estimation tool called Carousels
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