The Contagion Effects of Repeated Activation in Social Networks

Demonstrations, protests, riots, and shifts in public opinion respond to the coordinating potential of communication networks. Digital technologies have turned interpersonal networks into massive, pervasive structures that constantly pulsate with information. Here, we propose a model that aims to analyze the contagion dynamics that emerge in networks when repeated activation is allowed, that is, when actors can engage recurrently in a collective effort. We analyze how the structure of communication networks impacts on the ability to coordinate actors, and we identify the conditions under which large-scale coordination is more likely to emerge.Comment: Submitted for publicatio

Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas

The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the most profitable strategy within the interaction range. Such conformity might be due to herding instincts or crowd behavior in humans and social animals. In a heterogeneous population where individuals differ in their degree, collective influence, or other traits, an unanswered question remains who should conform. Selecting conformists randomly is the simplest choice, but it is neither a realistic nor the optimal one. We show that, regardless of the source of heterogeneity and game parametrization, socially the most favorable outcomes emerge if the masses conform. On the other hand, forcing leaders to conform significantly hinders the constructive interplay between heterogeneity and coordination, leading to evolutionary outcomes that are worse still than if conformists were chosen randomly. We conclude that leaders must be able to create a following for network reciprocity to be optimally augmented by conformity. In the opposite case, when leaders are castrated and made to follow, the failure of coordination impairs the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Reports [related work available at arXiv:1412.4113

Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games

Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines how payoffs on both networks jointly influence the success of players in each individual network. We show that an unbiased coupling allows the spontaneous emergence of interdependent network reciprocity, which is capable to maintain healthy levels of public cooperation even in extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however, requires simultaneous formation of correlated cooperator clusters on both networks. If this does not emerge or if the coordination process is disturbed, network reciprocity fails, resulting in the total collapse of cooperation. Network interdependence can thus be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, but only if the coordination between the interdependent networks is not disturbe

Evolution of Coordination in Social Networks: A Numerical Study

Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social behavior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local network effects may promote selection of efficient equilibria in both pure and general coordination games and may explain social polarization. These results are put into perspective with respect to known theoretical results. The main insight we obtain is that clustering, and especially community structure in social networks has a positive role in promoting socially efficient outcomes.Comment: preprint submitted to IJMP

Emergence of communities and diversity in social networks

Communities are common in complex networks and play a significant role in the functioning of social, biological, economic, and technological systems. Despite widespread interest in detecting community structures in complex networks and exploring the effect of communities on collective dynamics, a deep understanding of the emergence and prevalence of communities in social networks is still lacking. Addressing this fundamental problem is of paramount importance in understanding, predicting, and controlling a variety of collective behaviors in society. An elusive question is how communities with common internal properties arise in social networks with great individual diversity. Here, we answer this question using the ultimatum game, which has been a paradigm for characterizing altruism and fairness. We experimentally show that stable local communities with different internal agreements emerge spontaneously and induce social diversity into networks, which is in sharp contrast to populations with random interactions. Diverse communities and social norms come from the interaction between responders with inherent heterogeneous demands and rational proposers via local connections, where the former eventually become the community leaders. This result indicates that networks are significant in the emergence and stabilization of communities and social diversity. Our experimental results also provide valuable information about strategies for developing network models and theories of evolutionary games and social dynamics.This work was supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China under Grants 61573064, 71631002, 71401037, and 11301032; the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities and Beijing Nova Programme; and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (Individual Discovery Grant). The Boston University work was supported by NSF Grants PHY-1505000, CMMI-1125290, and CHE- 1213217, and by Defense Threat Reduction Agency Grant HDTRA1-14-1-0017, and Department of Energy Contract DE-AC07-05Id14517. (61573064 - National Nature Science Foundation of China; 71631002 - National Nature Science Foundation of China; 71401037 - National Nature Science Foundation of China; 11301032 - National Nature Science Foundation of China; Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities and Beijing Nova Programme; Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (Individual Discovery Grant); PHY-1505000 - NSF; CMMI-1125290 - NSF; CHE-1213217 - NSF; HDTRA1-14-1-0017 - Defense Threat Reduction Agency; DE-AC07-05Id14517 - Department of Energy)Published versio

Networks in the shadow of markets and hierarchies : calling the shots in the visual effects industry

The nature and organisation of creative industries and creative work has increasingly been at the centre of academic and policy debates in recent years. The differentiation of this field, economically and spatially, has been tied to more general arguments about the trend towards new trust-based, network forms of organization and economic coordination. In the first part of this paper, we set out, unpack and then critique the conceptual and empirical foundations of such claims. In the main section of the paper, we draw on research into a particular creative sector of the economy - the visual effects component of the film industry - a relatively new though increasingly important global production network. By focusing both on firms and their workers, and drawing on concepts derived from global value chain, labour process and institutional analysis, we aim to offer a more realistic and grounded analysis of creative work within creative industries. The analysis begins with an attempt to explain the power dynamics and patterns of competition and collaboration in inter-firm relations within the Hollywood studio-dominated value chain, before moving to a detailed examination of how the organisation of work and reemployment relations are central to the capturing of value. On the basis of that evidence, we conclude that trust-based networks and collaborative communities play some part in accessing and acquiring leverage in the value chain, but do not explain the core mechanisms of resource allocation, coordination and work organisation

Complex networks analysis in socioeconomic models

This chapter aims at reviewing complex networks models and methods that were either developed for or applied to socioeconomic issues, and pertinent to the theme of New Economic Geography. After an introduction to the foundations of the field of complex networks, the present summary adds insights on the statistical mechanical approach, and on the most relevant computational aspects for the treatment of these systems. As the most frequently used model for interacting agent-based systems, a brief description of the statistical mechanics of the classical Ising model on regular lattices, together with recent extensions of the same model on small-world Watts-Strogatz and scale-free Albert-Barabasi complex networks is included. Other sections of the chapter are devoted to applications of complex networks to economics, finance, spreading of innovations, and regional trade and developments. The chapter also reviews results involving applications of complex networks to other relevant socioeconomic issues, including results for opinion and citation networks. Finally, some avenues for future research are introduced before summarizing the main conclusions of the chapter.Comment: 39 pages, 185 references, (not final version of) a chapter prepared for Complexity and Geographical Economics - Topics and Tools, P. Commendatore, S.S. Kayam and I. Kubin Eds. (Springer, to be published