Searching for equilibrium positions in a game of political competition with restrictions

This paper considers a problem of political economy in which a Nash equilibrium study is performed in a proposed game with restrictions where the two major parties in a country vary their position within a politically flexible framework to increase their number of voters. The model as presented fits the reality of many countries. Moreover, it avoids the uniqueness of equilibrium positions. The problem is stated and solved from a geometric point of view

Modelling Opinion Formation with Physics Tools: Call for Closer Link with Reality

The growing field of studies of opinion formation using physical formalisms and computer simulation based tools suffers from relative lack of connection to the 'real world' societal behaviour. Such sociophysics research should aim at explaining observations or at proposing new ones. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, as many works concentrate more on the models themselves than on the social phenomena. Moreover, the simplifications proposed in simulations often sacrifice realism on the altar of computability. There are several ways to improve the value of the research, the most important by promoting truly multidisciplinary cooperation between physicists aiming to describe social phenomena and sociologists studying the phenomena in the field. In the specific case of modelling of opinion formation there are a few technical ideas which might bring the computer models much closer to reality, and therefore to improve the predictive value of the sociophysics approach.Methodology, Agent Based Social Simulation, Qualitative Analysis; Evidence; Conditions of Application

Parliamentary roll-call voting as a complex dynamical system:The case of Chile

A method is proposed to study the temporal variability of legislative roll-call votes in a parliament from the perspective of complex dynamical systems. We studied the Chilean Chamber of Deputies’ by analyzing the agreement ratio and the voting outcome of each vote over the last 19 years with a Recurrence Quantification Analysis and an entropy analysis (Sample Entropy). Two significant changes in the temporal variability were found: one in 2014, where the voting outcome became more recurrent and with less entropy, and another in 2018, where the agreement ratio became less recurrent and with higher entropy. These changes may be directly related to major changes in the Chilean electoral system and the composition of the Chamber of Deputies, given that these changes occurred just after the first parliamentary elections with non-compulsory voting (2013 elections) and the first elections with a proportional system in conjunction with an increase in the number of deputies (2017 elections) were held.</p

Search algorithm to find optimum strategies to shape political action with subjective assessment

This paper introduces a problem related to decision making and the shaping of political strategies in the course of one term of office, in which the government and the opposition shape their proposals for action on two issues that are relevant for the citizens. A variable component is considered regarding both the relevance of the issues to be dealt with and the strategies that the parties are presumed to adopt. The aim of this study is to find the optimum strategies for the two majority parties of a country, while allowing them to vary their proposals to a certain degree. In addition, the process is dynamic because the proposals are intended to be modified taking into account the other party’s foreseen action. The contribution of this article lies in this approach, as well as in its taking into account variable components. The problem is dealt with from a geometric point of view, and a search algorithm to find optimum strategies is developed

Essays on modeling and analysis of dynamic sociotechnical systems

A sociotechnical system is a collection of humans and algorithms that interact under the partial supervision of a decentralized controller. These systems often display in- tricate dynamics and can be characterized by their unique emergent behavior. In this work, we describe, analyze, and model aspects of three distinct classes of sociotech- nical systems: financial markets, social media platforms, and elections. Though our work is diverse in subject matter content, it is unified though the study of evolution- and adaptation-driven change in social systems and the development of methods used to infer this change. We first analyze evolutionary financial market microstructure dynamics in the context of an agent-based model (ABM). The ABM’s matching engine implements a frequent batch auction, a recently-developed type of price-discovery mechanism. We subject simple agents to evolutionary pressure using a variety of selection mech- anisms, demonstrating that quantile-based selection mechanisms are associated with lower market-wide volatility. We then evolve deep neural networks in the ABM and demonstrate that elite individuals are profitable in backtesting on real foreign ex- change data, even though their fitness had never been evaluated on any real financial data during evolution. We then turn to the extraction of multi-timescale functional signals from large panels of timeseries generated by sociotechnical systems. We introduce the discrete shocklet transform (DST) and associated similarity search algorithm, the shocklet transform and ranking (STAR) algorithm, to accomplish this task. We empirically demonstrate the STAR algorithm’s invariance to quantitative functional parameteri- zation and provide use case examples. The STAR algorithm compares favorably with Twitter’s anomaly detection algorithm on a feature extraction task. We close by using STAR to automatically construct a narrative timeline of societally-significant events using a panel of Twitter word usage timeseries. Finally, we model strategic interactions between the foreign intelligence service (Red team) of a country that is attempting to interfere with an election occurring in another country, and the domestic intelligence service of the country in which the election is taking place (Blue team). We derive subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium strategies for both Red and Blue and demonstrate the emergence of arms race inter- ference dynamics when either player has “all-or-nothing” attitudes about the result of the interference episode. We then confront our model with data from the 2016 U.S. presidential election contest, in which Russian military intelligence interfered. We demonstrate that our model captures the qualitative dynamics of this interference for most of the time under stud

Modelos Geométricos de Competición política

Se propone un modelo bidimensional de competición política en el que se utilizan técnicas geométricas para la búsqueda y determinación de las posiciones de equilibrio. Con la finalidad de adaptar lo más posible el problema a la realidad, se asume que la distribución de los tipos de votantes no es uniforme. Esta situación queda representada por la asignación de pesos a cada una de las posiciones de los votantes en el plano (se asume un número finito de ellos). Tanto en el caso en que todos los tipos de votantes están equidistribuidos, como el caso general, se ha probado que, excepto en la situación en que todos los votantes estén alineados, el equilibrio si existe, se alcanza sólo cuando los dos partidos ofrecen una misma política. Para eliminar esa unicidad en la posición de equilibrio se ha debilitado la definición del equilibrio clásico, proponiendo un “equilibrio débil”. Como resultado de ello aparece una región de equilibrio. En esta región, los partidos pueden moverse en una situación “casi” de equilibrio que no les obliga a tener que adoptar una política parecida

Matemáticas y elecciones

En este artículo se aplican técnicas de la Geometría Computacional a la resolución de problemas de competición política bipartidista

Implementación de un algoritmo de búsqueda de posiciones de equilibrio ponderado

En esta ponencia se presenta un algoritmo que determina las posiciones de equilibrio en un juego de competición política entre dos partidos representados en el plano de políticas por dos puntos. Para modelar una situación que se ajuste lo más posible a la realidad política de los diferentes países, se considera que los votantes están distribuidos en tipos posicionados en el plano por puntos que representan sus preferencias políticas y que dichos tipos no están equidistribuidos (se les asigna un peso). El estudio teórico de la existencia y unicidad de posiciones de equilibrio en el sentido clásico de Nash se hace aplicando herramientas geométricas como son los cierres convexos. El algoritmo de búsqueda de dichas posiciones de equilibrio cuando existen, se implementa en un caso práctico de la política en España, basado en el estudio 2742 (BARÓMETRO NOVIEMBRE 2007) realizado por el CIS

Voice and silence in public debate: Modelling and observing collective opinion expression online

This thesis investigates how group-level differences in willingness of opinion expression shape the extent to which certain standpoints are visible in public debate online. Against the backdrop of facilitated communication and connection to like-minded others through digital technologies, models and methods are developed and case studies are carried out – by and large from a network perspective. To this end, we first propose a model of opinion dynamics that examines social- structural conditions for public opinion expression or even predominance of different groups. The model focuses not on opinion change, but on the decision of individuals whether to express their opinion publicly or not. Groups of agents with different, fixed opinions interact with each other, changing the willingness to express their opinion according to the feedback they receive from others. We formulate the model as a multi-group game, and subsequently provide a dynamical systems perspective by introducing reinforcement learning dynamics. We show that a minority can dominate public discourse if its internal connections are sufficiently dense. Moreover, increased costs for opinion expression can drive even internally well-connected groups into silence. We then focus on how interaction networks can be used to infer political and social positions. For this purpose, we develop a new type of force-directed network layout algorithm. While being widely used, a rigorous interpretation of the outcomes of existing force-directed algorithms has not been provided yet. We argue that interpretability can be delivered by latent space approaches, which have the goal of embedding a network in an underlying social space. On the basis of such a latent space model, we derive a force-directed layout algorithm that can not only be used for the spatialisation of generic network data – exemplified by Twitter follower and retweet networks, as well as Facebook friendship networks – but also for the visualization of surveys. Comparison to existing layout algorithms (which are not grounded in an interpretable model) reveals that node groups are placed in similar configurations, while said algorithms show a stronger intra-cluster separation of nodes, as well as a tendency to separate clusters more strongly in retweet networks. In two case studies, we observe actual public debate on the social media platform Twitter – topics are the Saxon state elections 2019, and violent riots in the city of Leipzig on New Year’s Eve in the same year. We show that through the interplay of retweet and reply networks, it is possible to identify differences in willingness of opinion expression on the platform between opinion groups. We find that for both events, propensities to get involved in debate are asymmetric. Users retweeting far-right parties and politicians are significantly more active, making their positions disproportionately visible. Said users also act significantly more confrontational in the sense that they reply mostly to users from different groups, while the contrary is not the case. The findings underline that naive reliance on what others express online can be collectively dangerous, especially in an era in which social media shapes public discourse to an unprecedented extent

Electoral and welfare consequences of political manipulation of the economy

This paper examines the long-term electoral and welfare consequences of repeated strategies whereby a political office-holder induces cycles in economic variables to maximize his chances of re-election. Unlike other studies of political business cycles, we focus on questions of the desirability of these cyclical patterns and on the long-run properties of these political economic models. Noting that the welfare costs of vote maximizing in a single term extend beyond that term, we examine in detail the properties of the `long-run equilibrium path' to which such cycles converge. If the economy starts above this path, vote maximizing can lead to increased social welfare and vote margins. However, if the economy starts below this path, vote-maximizing in the present can cause reduced votes and electocal defeat in subsequent terms. This possibility should lead a far-sighted, enlightened politician or political party to eschew vote-maximizing tactics and the political business cycles which accompany them and thus canhelp explain why empirical studies have not found convincing evidence of the existence of such cycles. This paper also quantifies the dependence of this long-run equilibrium path on the important political and economic parameters of the model.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/25648/1/0000200.pd