3,591 research outputs found

    Joint bidding in infrastructure procurement

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    To utilize public resources efficiently, it is required to take full advantage of competition in public procurement auctions. Joint bidding practices are one of the possible ways of facilitating auction competition. In theory, there are pros and cons. It may enable firms to pool their financial and experiential resources and remove barriers to entry. On the other hand, it may reduce the degree of competition and can be used as a cover for collusive behavior. The paper empirically addresses whether joint bidding is pro- or anti-competitive in Official Development Assistance procurement auctions for infrastructure projects. It reveals the possible risk of relying too much on a foreign bidding coalition and may suggest the necessity of overseeing it. The data reveal no strong evidence that joint bidding practices are compatible with competition policy, except for a few cases. In road procurements, coalitional bidding involving both local and foreign firms has been found pro-competitive. In the water and sewage sector, local joint bidding may be useful to draw out better offers from potential contractors. Joint bidding composed of only foreign companies is mostly considered anti-competitive.Investment and Investment Climate,ICT Policy and Strategies,Markets and Market Access,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Access to Markets

    Learning optimization models in the presence of unknown relations

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    In a sequential auction with multiple bidding agents, it is highly challenging to determine the ordering of the items to sell in order to maximize the revenue due to the fact that the autonomy and private information of the agents heavily influence the outcome of the auction. The main contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we demonstrate how to apply machine learning techniques to solve the optimal ordering problem in sequential auctions. We learn regression models from historical auctions, which are subsequently used to predict the expected value of orderings for new auctions. Given the learned models, we propose two types of optimization methods: a black-box best-first search approach, and a novel white-box approach that maps learned models to integer linear programs (ILP) which can then be solved by any ILP-solver. Although the studied auction design problem is hard, our proposed optimization methods obtain good orderings with high revenues. Our second main contribution is the insight that the internal structure of regression models can be efficiently evaluated inside an ILP solver for optimization purposes. To this end, we provide efficient encodings of regression trees and linear regression models as ILP constraints. This new way of using learned models for optimization is promising. As the experimental results show, it significantly outperforms the black-box best-first search in nearly all settings.Comment: 37 pages. Working pape

    Supplier Choice: Market Selection under Uncertainty.

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    Suppliers and Manufacturers generally have some say in which subset of all possible demand they will meet. In some cases that choice is implicit through pricing decisions and feature selection. Other times it is made explicitly by choosing only specific regions to stock a product in. This thesis includes models using both approaches and incorporates random demands. We present several methods for choosing a subset of all candidate customers given uncertain demands. In this thesis we consider four models of demand selection. The first two research problems consider market selection, which has been studied in the literature. The Selective Newsvendor Problem (SNP) looks at a decision maker choosing a subset of candidate markets to serve, and then receiving revenues and paying newsvendor-type costs based on the selected collection. In this thesis we consider a generalization with normally distributed demands which includes a multi-period problem as a special case and develop both exact and heuristic algorithms to solve it. When demands are not normally distributed, the problem is considerably more complex and is in general NP-hard. We develop an approximation algorithm using sample average approximation and a rounding approach to efficiently solve the problem. In addition to the work on market selection, we propose two other models for demand selection. We study auctions as a tool for a supplier with a fixed capacity to allocate the limited supply to retailers with newsvendor-type costs. Finally, we present a model for a supplier who must ensure demand is met in all markets, but has the option to work with subsidiary suppliers to meet that demand.PhDIndustrial and Operations EngineeringUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/120864/1/zstrinka_1.pd

    Combinatorial Auction-based Mechanisms for Composite Web Service Selection

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    Composite service selection presents the opportunity for the rapid development of complex applications using existing web services. It refers to the problem of selecting a set of web services from a large pool of available candidates to logically compose them to achieve value-added composite services. The aim of service selection is to choose the best set of services based on the functional and non-functional (quality related) requirements of a composite service requester. The current service selection approaches mostly assume that web services are offered as single independent entities; there is no possibility for bundling. Moreover, the current research has mainly focused on solving the problem for a single composite service. There is a limited research to date on how the presence of multiple requests for composite services affects the performance of service selection approaches. Addressing these two aspects can significantly enhance the application of composite service selection approaches in the real-world. We develop new approaches for the composite web service selection problem by addressing both the bundling and multiple requests issues. In particular, we propose two mechanisms based on combinatorial auction models, where the provisioning of multiple services are auctioned simultaneously and service providers can bid to offer combinations of web services. We mapped these mechanisms to Integer Linear Programing models and conducted extensive simulations to evaluate them. The results of our experimentation show that bundling can lead to cost reductions compared to when services are offered independently. Moreover, the simultaneous consideration of a set of requests enhances the success rate of the mechanism in allocating services to requests. By considering all composite service requests at the same time, the mechanism achieves more homogenous prices which can be a determining factor for the service requester in choosing the best composite service selection mechanism to deploy

    Inefficiencies in Digital Advertising Markets

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    Digital advertising markets are growing and attracting increased scrutiny. This article explores four market inefficiencies that remain poorly understood: ad effect measurement, frictions between and within advertising channel members, ad blocking, and ad fraud. Although these topics are not unique to digital advertising, each manifests in unique ways in markets for digital ads. The authors identify relevant findings in the academic literature, recent developments in practice, and promising topics for future research

    Parallelisation and application of AD3 as a method for solving large scale combinatorial auctions

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    Auctions, and combinatorial auctions (CAs), have been successfully employed to solve coordination problems in a wide range of application domains. However, the scale of CAs that can be optimally solved is small because of the complexity of the winner determination problem (WDP), namely of finding the bids that maximise the auctioneer’s revenue. A way of approximating the solution of a WDP is to solve its linear programming relaxation. The recently proposed Alternate Direction Dual Decomposition algorithm (AD3) has been shown to ef- ficiently solve large-scale LP relaxations. Hence, in this paper we show how to encode the WDP so that it can be approximated by means of AD3. Moreover, we present PAR-AD3, the first parallel implementation of AD3. PAR-AD3 shows to be up to 12.4 times faster than CPLEX in a single-thread execution, and up to 23 times faster than parallel CPLEX in an 8-core architecture. Therefore PAR- AD3 becomes the algorithm of choice to solve large-scale WDP LP relaxations for hard instances. Furthermore, PAR-AD3 has potential when considering large- scale coordination problems that must be solved as optimisation problems.Research supported by MICINN projects TIN2011-28689-C02-01, TIN2013-45732-C4-4-P and TIN2012-38876-C02-01Peer reviewe

    The bid construction problem for truckload transportation services procurement in combinatorial auctions : new formulations and solution methods

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    De nos jours, l'évolution du commerce électronique ainsi que des niveaux de la consommation requièrent des acteurs de la chaine logistique et en particulier les transporteurs de gérer efficacement leurs opérations. Afin de rester concurrentiels et maximiser leurs profits, ils doivent optimiser leurs opérations de transport. Dans cette thèse de doctorat, nous nous focalisons sur les enchères combinatoires en tant que mécanisme de négociation pour les marchés d'approvisionnement des services de transport routier par camions permettant à un expéditeur d'externaliser ses opérations de transport et aux transporteurs d'acquérir des contrats de transport. Les mises combinatoires permettent à un transporteur participant à l'enchère d'exprimer ses intérêts pour une combinaison de contrats mis à l'enchère dans une même mise. Si la mise gagne, tous les contrats qui la forment seront alloués au transporteur au tarif exigé. Les défis majeurs pour le transporteur sont de déterminer les contrats de transport sur lesquels miser, les regrouper dans plusieurs mises combinatoires, s'il y a lieu, et décider des prix à soumettre pour chaque mise générée. Ces défis décisionnels définissent le problème de construction de mises combinatoires (BCP pour Bid Construction Problem). Chaque transporteur doit résoudre le BCP tout en respectant ses engagements préexistants et ses capacités de transport et en tenant compte des offres des compétiteurs, ce qui rend le problème difficile à résoudre. Dans la pratique, la majorité des transporteurs se basent sur leur connaissance du marché et leur historique pour fixer leurs prix des mises. Dans la littérature, la majorité des travaux sur le BCP considèrent des modèles déterministes où les paramètres sont connus et se limitent à un contexte de flotte homogène. En plus, nous notons qu'un seul travail à considérer une variante stochastique du BCP. Dans cette thèse de doctorat, nous visons à faire avancer les connaissances dans ce domaine en introduisant de nouvelles formulations et méthodes de résolution pour le BCP Le premier chapitre de cette thèse introduit une nouvelle variante du BCP avec une flotte hétérogène. En partant d'une comparaison des similitudes et des différences entre le BCP et les problèmes classiques de de tournées de véhicules, nous proposons une nouvelle formulation basée sur les arcs avec de nouvelles contraintes de bris de symétrie pour accélérer la résolution. Ensuite, nous proposons une approche heuristique et une autre exacte pour résoudre ce problème. L'heuristique développée est une recherche adaptative à grands voisinages (ALNS pour Adaptive Large Neighborhood Search) et se base sur le principe de destruction puis réparation de la solution à l'aide d'opérateurs conçus spécifiquement pour le BCP traité. La méthode exacte utilise la meilleure solution heuristique pour résoudre notre modèle mathématique avec le solveur CPLEX. Les résultats obtenus montrent la pertinence de nos méthodes en termes de qualités des solutions et des temps de calculs et ce pour des instances de grande taille. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous nous attaquons à un cas particulier du BCP où le transporteur n'a pas d'engagements existants et vise à déterminer un ensemble de contrats mis à l'enchère profitables à miser dessus. Cette problématique correspond à un problème de tournées de véhicules avec profits (TOP pour Team Orienteering Problem). Nous proposons pour le TOP une heuristique ALNS hybride avec de nouveaux opérateurs ainsi que de nouvelles fonctionnalités tenant compte de la nature du problème. Ensuite, nous comparons les performances de notre méthode avec toutes les méthodes déjà publiées dans la littérature traitant du TOP. Les résultats montrent que notre méthode surpasse généralement toutes les approches existantes en termes de qualité des solutions et/ou temps de calculs quand elle est testée sur toutes les instances de la littérature. Notre méthode améliore la solution d'une instance de grande taille, ce qui surligne sa performance. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous nous focalisons sur l'incertitude associée aux prix de cessions des contrats mis à l'enchère et sur les offres des transporteurs concurrents. Il n'existe qu'un seul article qui traite de l'incertitude dans le BCP cependant il ne permet pas de générer des mises multiples. Ainsi, nous proposons une nouvelle formulation pour le BCP avec des prix stochastiques permettant de générer des mises combinatoires et disjointes. Nous présentons deux méthodes pour résoudre ce problème. La première méthode est hybride et à deux étapes. Dans un premier temps, elle résout un problème de sélection pour déterminer un ensemble de contrats profitables. Dans un second temps, elle résout simultanément un problème de sélection de contrats et de détermination de prix des mises (CSPP pour Contracts Selection and Pricing Problem) en ne considérant que les contrats sélectionnés dans la première étape. Notre méthode exacte résout, avec l'algorithme de branch-and-cut, le CSPP sans présélectionner des contrats. Les résultats expérimentaux et de simulations que nous rapportons soulignent la performance de nos deux méthodes et évaluent l'impact de certains paramètres sur le profit réel du transporteur. Dans le quatrième chapitre, nous nous focalisons sur l'incertitude liée au succès des mises et à la non-matérialisation des contrats. Généralement, le transporteur souhaite avoir la garantie que si certaines des mises ne sont pas gagnées ou un contrat ne se matérialise pas, il n'encourra pas de perte en servant le sous-ensemble de contrats gagnés. Dans cette recherche, nous adressons le BCP avec prix stochastiques et développons une méthode exacte qui garantit un profit non négatif pour le transporteur peu importe le résultat des enchères. Nos simulations des solutions optimales démontrent, qu'en moyenne, notre approche permet au transporteur d'augmenter son profit en plus de garantir qu'il reste non-négatif peu importe les mises gagnées ou la matérialisation des contrats suivant l'enchère.Nowadays, the evolution of e-commerce and consumption levels require supply chain actors, in particular carriers, to efficiently manage their operations. In order to remain competitive and to maximize their profits, they must optimize their transport operations. In this doctoral thesis, we focus on Combinatorial Auctions (CA) as a negotiation mechanism for truckload (TL) transportation services procurement allowing a shipper to outsource its transportation operations and for a carrier to serve new transportation contracts. Combinatorial bids offer a carrier the possibility to express his valuation for a combination of contracts simultaneously. If the bid is successful, all the contracts forming it will be allocated to the carrier at the submitted price. The major challenges for a carrier are to select the transportation contracts to bid on, formulate combinatorial bids and associated prices. These decision-making challenges define the Bid Construction Problem (BCP). Each carrier must solve a BCP while respecting its pre-existing commitments and transportation capacity and considering unknown competitors' offers, which makes the problem difficult to solve. In practice, the majority of carriers rely on their historical data and market knowledge to set their prices. In the literature, the majority of works on the BCP propose deterministic models with known parameters and are limited to the problem with a homogeneous fleet. In addition, we found a single work addressing a stochastic BCP. In this thesis, we aim to advance knowledge in this field by introducing new formulations and solution methods for the BCP. The first chapter of this thesis introduces the BCP with a heterogeneous fleet. Starting from a comparison between the BCP and classical Vehicle Routing Problems (VRPs), we propose a new arc-based formulation with new symmetry-breaking constraints for the BCP. Next, we propose exact and heuristic approaches to solve this problem. Our Adaptive Large Neighborhood Search (ALNS) heuristic is based on a destroy-repair principle using operators designed for this problem. Our exact method starts from the heuristic solution and solves our mathematical model with CPLEX. The results we obtained revealed the relevance of our methods in terms of solutions quality and computational times for large instances with up to 500 contracts and 50 vehicles. In the second chapter, we tackle a particular case of the BCP where the carrier has no pre-existing commitments and aims to select a set of profitable auctioned contracts to bid on. This problem corresponds to a Team Orienteering Problem (TOP). We propose a hybrid ALNS heuristic for the TOP with new operators as well as new features taking into account the nature of the problem. Then, we compare the performance of our algorithm against the best solutions from the literature. The results show that our method generally outperforms all the existing ones in terms of solutions quality and/or computational times on benchmark instances. Our method improves one large instance solution, which highlights its performance. In the third chapter, we focus on the uncertainty associated with the auctioned contracts clearing prices and competing carriers offers. Only one article dealing with uncertainty in the BCP existed but it does not allow to generate multiple bids. Thus, we propose a new formulation for the BCP with stochastic prices allowing to generate non-overlapping combinatorial bids. We present two methods to solve this problem. The first one is a two-step hybrid heuristic. First, it solves a Contracts Selection Problem to determine a set of profitable contracts to bid on. Secondly, it simultaneously solves a Contracts Selection and Pricing Problem (CSPP) by considering only the set of auctioned contracts selected in the first stage. Our exact method solves a CSPP by branch-and-cut without pre-selecting contracts. The experimental and simulation results underline the performance of our two methods and evaluate the impact of certain parameters on the carrier's real profit. In the fourth chapter, we focus on the uncertainty associated with bids success and contracts non-materialization. Generally, the carrier seeks to be assured that if some of the submitted bids are not won or a contract does not materialize, it will not incur a loss by serving the remaining contracts. In this research, we address the BCP with stochastic prices and develop an exact method that ensures a non-negative profit for the carrier regardless of the auction outcomes and contracts materialization. Our simulations of the optimal solutions show that, on average, our approach increases the carrier's profit in addition to guaranteeing its non-negativity regardless of the bids won or the contracts materialization
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