8,269 research outputs found
Smooth Inequalities and Equilibrium Inefficiency in Scheduling Games
We study coordination mechanisms for Scheduling Games (with unrelated
machines). In these games, each job represents a player, who needs to choose a
machine for its execution, and intends to complete earliest possible. Our goal
is to design scheduling policies that always admit a pure Nash equilibrium and
guarantee a small price of anarchy for the l_k-norm social cost --- the
objective balances overall quality of service and fairness. We consider
policies with different amount of knowledge about jobs: non-clairvoyant,
strongly-local and local. The analysis relies on the smooth argument together
with adequate inequalities, called smooth inequalities. With this unified
framework, we are able to prove the following results.
First, we study the inefficiency in l_k-norm social costs of a strongly-local
policy SPT and a non-clairvoyant policy EQUI. We show that the price of anarchy
of policy SPT is O(k). We also prove a lower bound of Omega(k/log k) for all
deterministic, non-preemptive, strongly-local and non-waiting policies
(non-waiting policies produce schedules without idle times). These results
ensure that SPT is close to optimal with respect to the class of l_k-norm
social costs. Moreover, we prove that the non-clairvoyant policy EQUI has price
of anarchy O(2^k).
Second, we consider the makespan (l_infty-norm) social cost by making
connection within the l_k-norm functions. We revisit some local policies and
provide simpler, unified proofs from the framework's point of view. With the
highlight of the approach, we derive a local policy Balance. This policy
guarantees a price of anarchy of O(log m), which makes it the currently best
known policy among the anonymous local policies that always admit a pure Nash
equilibrium.Comment: 25 pages, 1 figur
Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games
In a scheduling game, each player owns a job and chooses a machine to execute
it. While the social cost is the maximal load over all machines (makespan), the
cost (disutility) of each player is the completion time of its own job. In the
game, players may follow selfish strategies to optimize their cost and
therefore their behaviors do not necessarily lead the game to an equilibrium.
Even in the case there is an equilibrium, its makespan might be much larger
than the social optimum, and this inefficiency is measured by the price of
anarchy -- the worst ratio between the makespan of an equilibrium and the
optimum. Coordination mechanisms aim to reduce the price of anarchy by
designing scheduling policies that specify how jobs assigned to a same machine
are to be scheduled. Typically these policies define the schedule according to
the processing times as announced by the jobs. One could wonder if there are
policies that do not require this knowledge, and still provide a good price of
anarchy. This would make the processing times be private information and avoid
the problem of truthfulness. In this paper we study these so-called
non-clairvoyant policies. In particular, we study the RANDOM policy that
schedules the jobs in a random order without preemption, and the EQUI policy
that schedules the jobs in parallel using time-multiplexing, assigning each job
an equal fraction of CPU time
SELFISHMIGRATE: A Scalable Algorithm for Non-clairvoyantly Scheduling Heterogeneous Processors
We consider the classical problem of minimizing the total weighted flow-time
for unrelated machines in the online \emph{non-clairvoyant} setting. In this
problem, a set of jobs arrive over time to be scheduled on a set of
machines. Each job has processing length , weight , and is
processed at a rate of when scheduled on machine . The online
scheduler knows the values of and upon arrival of the job,
but is not aware of the quantity . We present the {\em first} online
algorithm that is {\em scalable} ((1+\eps)-speed
-competitive for any constant \eps > 0) for the
total weighted flow-time objective. No non-trivial results were known for this
setting, except for the most basic case of identical machines. Our result
resolves a major open problem in online scheduling theory. Moreover, we also
show that no job needs more than a logarithmic number of migrations. We further
extend our result and give a scalable algorithm for the objective of minimizing
total weighted flow-time plus energy cost for the case of unrelated machines
and obtain a scalable algorithm. The key algorithmic idea is to let jobs
migrate selfishly until they converge to an equilibrium. Towards this end, we
define a game where each job's utility which is closely tied to the
instantaneous increase in the objective the job is responsible for, and each
machine declares a policy that assigns priorities to jobs based on when they
migrate to it, and the execution speeds. This has a spirit similar to
coordination mechanisms that attempt to achieve near optimum welfare in the
presence of selfish agents (jobs). To the best our knowledge, this is the first
work that demonstrates the usefulness of ideas from coordination mechanisms and
Nash equilibria for designing and analyzing online algorithms
Improving the Price of Anarchy for Selfish Routing via Coordination Mechanisms
We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency
functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value
4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel
links, known as Pigou's network. We improve upon the value 4/3 by means of
Coordination Mechanisms.
We increase the latency functions of the edges in the network, i.e., if
is the latency function of an edge , we replace it by
with for all . Then an
adversary fixes a demand rate as input. The engineered Price of Anarchy of the
mechanism is defined as the worst-case ratio of the Nash social cost in the
modified network over the optimal social cost in the original network.
Formally, if \CM(r) denotes the cost of the worst Nash flow in the modified
network for rate and \Copt(r) denotes the cost of the optimal flow in the
original network for the same rate then [\ePoA = \max_{r \ge 0}
\frac{\CM(r)}{\Copt(r)}.]
We first exhibit a simple coordination mechanism that achieves for any
network of parallel links an engineered Price of Anarchy strictly less than
4/3. For the case of two parallel links our basic mechanism gives 5/4 = 1.25.
Then, for the case of two parallel links, we describe an optimal mechanism; its
engineered Price of Anarchy lies between 1.191 and 1.192.Comment: 17 pages, 2 figures, preliminary version appeared at ESA 201
Mechanism design for decentralized online machine scheduling
Traditional optimization models assume a central decision maker who optimizes a global system performance measure. However, problem data is often distributed among several agents, and agents take autonomous decisions. This gives incentives for strategic behavior of agents, possibly leading to sub-optimal system performance. Furthermore, in dynamic environments, machines are locally dispersed and administratively independent. Examples are found both in business and engineering applications. We investigate such issues for a parallel machine scheduling model where jobs arrive online over time. Instead of centrally assigning jobs to machines, each machine implements a local sequencing rule and jobs decide for machines themselves. In this context, we introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the classical dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. Our main result is a polynomial time, online mechanism that |assuming rational behavior of jobs| results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive with respect to the maximal social welfare. This is only lightly worse than state-of-the-art algorithms with central coordination
Greed Works -- Online Algorithms For Unrelated Machine Stochastic Scheduling
This paper establishes performance guarantees for online algorithms that
schedule stochastic, nonpreemptive jobs on unrelated machines to minimize the
expected total weighted completion time. Prior work on unrelated machine
scheduling with stochastic jobs was restricted to the offline case, and
required linear or convex programming relaxations for the assignment of jobs to
machines. The algorithms introduced in this paper are purely combinatorial. The
performance bounds are of the same order of magnitude as those of earlier work,
and depend linearly on an upper bound on the squared coefficient of variation
of the jobs' processing times. Specifically for deterministic processing times,
without and with release times, the competitive ratios are 4 and 7.216,
respectively. As to the technical contribution, the paper shows how dual
fitting techniques can be used for stochastic and nonpreemptive scheduling
problems.Comment: Preliminary version appeared in IPCO 201
Evaluation of Non-Parametric Selection Mechanisms in Evolutionary Computation: A Case Study for the Machine Scheduling Problem
Evolutionary Algorithms have been extensively used for solving stochastic, robust, and dynamic optimization problems of a high complexity. Selection mechanisms play a very important role in design of Evolutionary Algorithms, as they allow identifying the parent chromosomes, that will be used for producing the offspring, and the offspring chromosomes, that will survive in the given generation and move on to the next generation. Selection mechanisms, reported in the literature, can be classified in two groups: (1) parametric selection mechanisms, and (2) non-parametric selection mechanisms. Unlike parametric selection mechanisms, non-parametric selection mechanisms do not have any parameters that have to be set, which significantly facilitates the Evolutionary Algorithm parameter tuning analysis. This study presents a comprehensive analysis of the commonly used non-parametric selection mechanisms. Comparison of the selection mechanisms is performed for the machine scheduling problem. The objective of the presented mathematical model is to determine the assignment of the arriving jobs among the available machines, and the processing order of jobs on each machine, aiming to minimize the total job processing cost. Different categories of Evolutionary Algorithms, which deploy various non-parametric selection mechanisms, are evaluated in terms of the objective function value at termination, computational time, and changes in the population diversity. Findings indicate that the Roulette Wheel Selection and Uniform Sampling selection mechanisms generally yield higher population diversity, while the Stochastic Universal Sampling selection mechanism outperforms the other non-parametric selection mechanisms in terms of the solution quality
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