Routing Games over Time with FIFO policy

We study atomic routing games where every agent travels both along its decided edges and through time. The agents arriving on an edge are first lined up in a \emph{first-in-first-out} queue and may wait: an edge is associated with a capacity, which defines how many agents-per-time-step can pop from the queue's head and enter the edge, to transit for a fixed delay. We show that the best-response optimization problem is not approximable, and that deciding the existence of a Nash equilibrium is complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. Then, we drop the rationality assumption, introduce a behavioral concept based on GPS navigation, and study its worst-case efficiency ratio to coordination.Comment: Submission to WINE-2017 Deadline was August 2nd AoE, 201

Wardrop Equilibrium in Discrete-Time Selfish Routing with Time-Varying Bounded Delays

This paper presents a multi-commodity, discrete- time, distributed and non-cooperative routing algorithm, which is proved to converge to an equilibrium in the presence of heterogeneous, unknown, time-varying but bounded delays. Under mild assumptions on the latency functions which describe the cost associated to the network paths, two algorithms are proposed: the former assumes that each commodity relies only on measurements of the latencies associated to its own paths; the latter assumes that each commodity has (at least indirectly) access to the measures of the latencies of all the network paths. Both algorithms are proven to drive the system state to an invariant set which approximates and contains the Wardrop equilibrium, defined as a network state in which no traffic flow over the network paths can improve its routing unilaterally, with the latter achieving a better reconstruction of the Wardrop equilibrium. Numerical simulations show the effectiveness of the proposed approach

A Stackelberg Strategy for Routing Flow over Time

Routing games are used to to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficiency. Most prior work on routing games uses a simplified model of network flow where all flow exists simultaneously, and users care about either their maximum delay or their total delay. Both of these measures are surrogates for measuring how long it takes to get all of a user's traffic through the network. We attempt a more direct study of how competition affects network efficiency by examining routing games in a flow over time model. We give an efficiently computable Stackelberg strategy for this model and show that the competitive equilibrium under this strategy is no worse than a small constant times the optimal, for two natural measures of optimality

Efficient and adaptive congestion control for heterogeneous delay-tolerant networks

Detecting and dealing with congestion in delay-tolerant networks (DTNs) is an important and challenging problem. Current DTN forwarding algorithms typically direct traffic towards more central nodes in order to maximise delivery ratios and minimise delays, but as traffic demands increase these nodes may become saturated and unusable. We pro- pose CafRep, an adaptive congestion aware protocol that detects and reacts to congested nodes and congested parts of the network by using implicit hybrid contact and resources congestion heuristics. CafRep exploits localised relative utility based approach to offload the traffic from more to less congested parts of the network, and to replicate at adaptively lower rate in different parts of the network with non-uniform congestion levels. We extensively evaluate our work against benchmark and competitive protocols across a range of metrics over three real connectivity and GPS traces such as Sassy [44], San Francisco Cabs [45] and Infocom 2006 [33]. We show that CafRep performs well, independent of network connectivity and mobility patterns, and consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art DTN forwarding algorithms in the face of increasing rates of congestion. CafRep maintains higher availability and success ratios while keeping low delays, packet loss rates and delivery cost. We test CafRep in the presence of two application scenarios, with fixed rate traffic and with real world Facebook application traffic demands, showing that regardless of the type of traffic CafRep aims to deliver, it reduces congestion and improves forwarding performance

Atomic dynamic flow games : adaptive versus nonadaptive agents

We propose a game model for selfish routing of atomic agents, who compete for use of a network to travel from their origins to a common destination as fast as possible. We follow a frequently used rule that the latency an agent experiences on each edge is a constant transit time plus a variable waiting time in a queue. A key feature that differentiates our model from related ones is an edge-based tie-breaking rule for prioritizing agents in queueing when they reach an edge at the same time. We study both nonadaptive agents (each choosing a one-off origin-destination path simultaneously at the very beginning) and adaptive ones (each making an online decision at every nonterminal vertex they reach as to which next edge to take). On the one hand, we constructively prove that a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) always exists for nonadaptive agents, and show that every NE is weakly Pareto optimal and globally first-in-first-out. We present efficient algorithms for finding an NE and best responses of nonadaptive agents. On the other hand, we are among the first to consider adaptive atomic agents, for which we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) always exists, and that each NE outcome for nonadaptive agents is an SPE outcome for adaptive agents, but not vice versa

Fair Resource Allocation in Macroscopic Evacuation Planning Using Mathematical Programming: Modeling and Optimization

Evacuation is essential in the case of natural and manmade disasters such as hurricanes, nuclear disasters, fire accidents, and terrorism epidemics. Random evacuation plans can increase risks and incur more losses. Hence, numerous simulation and mathematical programming models have been developed over the past few decades to help transportation planners make decisions to reduce costs and protect lives. However, the dynamic transportation process is inherently complex. Thus, modeling this process can be challenging and computationally demanding. The objective of this dissertation is to build a balanced model that reflects the realism of the dynamic transportation process and still be computationally tractable to be implemented in reality by the decision-makers. On the other hand, the users of the transportation network require reasonable travel time within the network to reach their destinations. This dissertation introduces a novel framework in the fields of fairness in network optimization and evacuation to provide better insight into the evacuation process and assist with decision making. The user of the transportation network is a critical element in this research. Thus, fairness and efficiency are the two primary objectives addressed in the work by considering the limited capacity of roads of the transportation network. Specifically, an approximation approach to the max-min fairness (MMF) problem is presented that provides lower computational time and high-quality output compared to the original algorithm. In addition, a new algorithm is developed to find the MMF resource allocation output in nonconvex structure problems. MMF is the fairness policy used in this research since it considers fairness and efficiency and gives priority to fairness. In addition, a new dynamic evacuation modeling approach is introduced that is capable of reporting more information about the evacuees compared to the conventional evacuation models such as their travel time, evacuation time, and departure time. Thus, the contribution of this dissertation is in the two areas of fairness and evacuation. The first part of the contribution of this dissertation is in the field of fairness. The objective in MMF is to allocate resources fairly among multiple demands given limited resources while utilizing the resources for higher efficiency. Fairness and efficiency are contradicting objectives, so they are translated into a bi-objective mathematical programming model and solved using the ϵ-constraint method, introduced by Vira and Haimes (1983). Although the solution is an approximation to the MMF, the model produces quality solutions, when ϵ is properly selected, in less computational time compared to the progressive-filling algorithm (PFA). In addition, a new algorithm is developed in this research called the θ progressive-filling algorithm that finds the MMF in resource allocation for general problems and works on problems with the nonconvex structure problems. The second part of the contribution is in evacuation modeling. The common dynamic evacuation models lack a piece of essential information for achieving fairness, which is the time each evacuee or group of evacuees spend in the network. Most evacuation models compute the total time for all evacuees to move from the endangered zone to the safe destination. Lack of information about the users of the transportation network is the motivation to develop a new optimization model that reports more information about the users of the network. The model finds the travel time, evacuation time, departure time, and the route selected for each group of evacuees. Given that the travel time function is a non-linear convex function of the traffic volume, the function is linearized through a piecewise linear approximation. The developed model is a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model with high complexity. Hence, the model is not capable of solving large scale problems. The complexity of the model was reduced by introducing a linear programming (LP) version of the full model. The complexity is significantly reduced while maintaining the exact output. In addition, the new θ-progressive-filling algorithm was implemented on the evacuation model to find a fair and efficient evacuation plan. The algorithm is also used to identify the optimal routes in the transportation network. Moreover, the robustness of the evacuation model was tested against demand uncertainty to observe the model behavior when the demand is uncertain. Finally, the robustness of the model is tested when the traffic flow is uncontrolled. In this case, the model's only decision is to distribute the evacuees on routes and has no control over the departure time

Dynamic traffic equilibria with route and departure time choice

This thesis studies the dynamic equilibrium behavior in traffic networks and it is motivated by rush-hour congestion. It is well understood that one of the key causes of traffic congestion relies on the behavior of road users. These do not coordinate their actions in order to avoid the creation of traffic jams, but rather make choices that favor only themselves and not the community. An equilibrium occurs when everyone is satisfied with his own choices and would not benefit from changing them. We focus on dynamic mathematical models where the congestion delay of a road varies over time, depending on the amount of traffic that has crossed it up to that specific moment and independently on the pattern of traffic that will cross it at a later time. We mainly consider settings with arbitrary network topologies where users choose both the route and departure time and we tackle questions such as the followings: - Does an equilibrium always exist? - Can there be different equilibria? - How can an equilibrium behavior be computed? - How can one set tolls on roads so that, in an equilibrium, there is no congestion and social welfare is maximized

Dynamic selfish routing

This thesis deals with dynamic, load-adaptive rerouting policies in game theoretic settings. In the Wardrop model, which forms the basis of our dynamic population model, each of an infinite number of agents injects an infinitesimal amount of flow into a network, which in turn induces latency on the edges. Each agent may choose from a set of paths and strives to minimise its sustained latency selfishly. Population states which are stable in that no agent can improve its latency by switching to another path are referred to as Wardrop equilibria. A variety of results in this model have been obtained recently. Most of these revolve around the price of anarchy, which measures the degradation of performance due to the selfish behaviour of the agents as compared to a centrally optimised solution. Most of these analyses consider the notion of Wardrop equilibria as a solution concept of selfish routing games, but disregard the question of how such an equilibrium can be attained in the first place. In fact, common game theoretic assumptions needed for th