Dynamic matching and bargaining games: A general approach

This paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies. This result is informed by the analysis of non-cooperative dynamic search and bargaining games. Such games provide models of decentralized markets with trading frictions. A central objective of this literature is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of the frictions. In particular, does the trading outcome become Walrasian when frictions become small? Existing specifications of such games provide divergent answers. The characterization result is used to investigate what causes these differences and to generalize insights from the analysis of specific search and bargaining games.Dynamic Matching and Bargaining, Decentralized Markets, Non-cooperative Foundations of Competitive Equilibrium, Search Theory

Mean Field Equilibrium in Dynamic Games with Complementarities

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical distribution of the states of other players. Such games can be used to model a diverse set of applications, including network security models, recommender systems, and dynamic search in markets. Stochastic games are generally difficult to analyze, and these difficulties are only exacerbated when the number of players is large (as might be the case in the preceding examples). We consider an approximation methodology called mean field equilibrium to study these games. In such an equilibrium, each player reacts to only the long run average state of other players. We find necessary conditions for the existence of a mean field equilibrium in such games. Furthermore, as a simple consequence of this existence theorem, we obtain several natural monotonicity properties. We show that there exist a "largest" and a "smallest" equilibrium among all those where the equilibrium strategy used by a player is nondecreasing, and we also show that players converge to each of these equilibria via natural myopic learning dynamics; as we argue, these dynamics are more reasonable than the standard best response dynamics. We also provide sensitivity results, where we quantify how the equilibria of such games move in response to changes in parameters of the game (e.g., the introduction of incentives to players).Comment: 56 pages, 5 figure

Penerapan Algoritma Dynamic Programing pada Pergerakan Lawan dalam Permainan Police and Thief

Games have the basic meaning of games, games in this case refer to the notion of intellectual agility. In its application, a Game certainly requires an AI (Artificial Intelligence), and the AI used in the construction of this police and thief game is the dynamic programming algorithm. This algorithm is a search algorithm to find the shortest route with the minimum cost, algorithm dynamic programming searches for the shortest route by adding the actual distance to the approximate distance so that it makes it optimum and complete. Police and thief is a game about a character who will try to run from police. The genre of this game is arcade, built with microsoft visual studio 2008, the AI used is the Dynamic Programming algorithm which is used to search the path to attack players. The results of this test are police in this game managed to find the closest path determined by the Dynamic Programming algorithm to attack player

Random Matching Models and Money:The Global Structure and Approximation of Stationary Equilibria

Random matching models with different states are an important class of dynamic games; for example, money search models, job search models, and some games in biology are special cases.In this paper, we investigate the basic structure of the models: the existence of equilibria, the global structure of the set of equilibria, and the approximation and computation of equilibria.Under conditions which are typically satisfied in monetary models, the equilibrium condition can be considered as a nonlinear complementarity problem with some new feature.

A Parallel Computer-Go Player, using HDP Method

The game of Go has simple rules to learn but requires complex strategies to play well, and, the conventional tree search algorithm for computer games is not suited for Go program. Thus, the game of Go is an ideal problem domain for machine learning algorithms. This paper examines the performance of a 19x19 computer Go player, using heuristic dynamic programming (HDP) and parallel alpha-beta search. The neural network based Go player learns good Go evaluation functions and wins about 30% of the games in a test series on 19x19 boar

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.Uncoupled, Nash equilibrium, stochastic dynamics, bounded recall

Assessing the Potential of Classical Q-learning in General Game Playing

After the recent groundbreaking results of AlphaGo and AlphaZero, we have seen strong interests in deep reinforcement learning and artificial general intelligence (AGI) in game playing. However, deep learning is resource-intensive and the theory is not yet well developed. For small games, simple classical table-based Q-learning might still be the algorithm of choice. General Game Playing (GGP) provides a good testbed for reinforcement learning to research AGI. Q-learning is one of the canonical reinforcement learning methods, and has been used by (Banerjee $\&$ Stone, IJCAI 2007) in GGP. In this paper we implement Q-learning in GGP for three small-board games (Tic-Tac-Toe, Connect Four, Hex)\footnote{source code: https://github.com/wh1992v/ggp-rl}, to allow comparison to Banerjee et al.. We find that Q-learning converges to a high win rate in GGP. For the $\epsilon$-greedy strategy, we propose a first enhancement, the dynamic $\epsilon$ algorithm. In addition, inspired by (Gelly $\&$ Silver, ICML 2007) we combine online search (Monte Carlo Search) to enhance offline learning, and propose QM-learning for GGP. Both enhancements improve the performance of classical Q-learning. In this work, GGP allows us to show, if augmented by appropriate enhancements, that classical table-based Q-learning can perform well in small games.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1802.0594

Dynamic real-time hierarchical heuristic search for pathfinding.

Movement of Units in Real-Time Strategy (RTS) Games is a non-trivial and challenging task mainly due to three factors which are constraints on CPU and memory usage, dynamicity of the game world, and concurrency. In this paper, we are focusing on finding a novel solution for solving the pathfinding problem in RTS Games for the units which are controlled by the computer. The novel solution combines two AI Planning approaches: Hierarchical Task Network (HTN) and Real-Time Heuristic Search (RHS). In the proposed solution, HTNs are used as a dynamic abstraction of the game map while RHS works as planning engine with interleaving of plan making and action executions. The article provides algorithmic details of the model while the empirical details of the model are obtained by using a real-time strategy game engine called ORTS (Open Real-time Strategy). The implementation of the model and its evaluation methods are in progress however the results of the automatic HTN creation are obtained for a small scale game map