Designing Allocation Mechanisms for Carrier Alliances

The goal of the first part of this thesis is to obtain a high-level theoretical understanding of how an alliance can be managed such that its resources are used in an optimal manner. We propose a pricing mechanism to manage the interactions of carriers, through the allocation of alliance resources and profits, in a manner that encourages individual carriers to make decisions that are optimal for the alliance. Our methodology is based on modeling carrier behavior as linear programs, which are incorporated into a mechanism that manages carrier interactions by appropriately setting resource prices. After introducing two distinct behavioral models, the performance of the mechanism using each model is analyzed for its ability to ensure alliance optimal behavior is attained. We find that the behavioral model selected can significantly impact the characteristics of allocations obtained using the mechanism. In the second part of the thesis, we seek to establish practical insights regarding how the characteristics of potential partners impact the benefit that can be gained by collaborating with these partners. Computational experiments are conducted to evaluate the impact of network size, fleet capacity, demand distribution, and network compatibility on the benefit associated with collaborating. A comprehensive study for simulated two and three-carrier alliances establishes general insights regarding the compatibility of carriers with varying network sizes and fleet capacities. The impact of increasing hub-to-hub connectivity between partnering carriers is then investigated, followed by a study of the effect of market overlap on alliance success. Finally, a real-world cargo alliance is analyzed. In the third and final part of this thesis, we develop new approaches for determining and inducing fair profit allocations in alliances, providing alternatives to traditional approaches which equate minimum acceptance requirements and satisfaction. The mechanism established in the first part of the thesis is adapted to more precisely control the profit allocations obtained, in particular so that an allocation as close to some predetermined fair" allocation is obtained. Several measures of fairness are proposed and implemented, and their performance analyzed for each of the behavioral models discussed in the first part of the thesis.Ph.D.Committee Co-Chair: Ergun, Özlem; Committee Co-Chair: Sokol, Joel; Committee Member: Erera, Alan; Committee Member: Johnson, Ellis; Committee Member: Toktay, Beri

Inter-firm collaboration in transportation

Dans la littérature académique et professionnelle relative au transport de marchandise, il y a longtemps que les méthodes de planification avancées ont été identifiées comme un moyen de dégager des économies grâce à une efficacité accrue des opérations de transport. Plus récemment, la collaboration interentreprises dans la planification du transport a été étudiée comme une source de gain supplémentaire en efficacité et, par conséquent, une opportunité pour dégager de nouvelles économies pour les collaborateurs. Cependant, la mise en œuvre d'une collaboration interentreprises en transports soulève un certain nombre d’enjeux. Cette thèse aborde trois thèmes centraux de la collaboration interentreprises et démontre les contributions via des études de cas dans l’industrie forestière et du meuble. Premièrement, les moyens technologiques pour soutenir une collaboration en planification du transport sont étudiés. Un système d’aide à la décision supportant la collaboration en transport forestier est présenté. Deuxièmement, le partage entre les collaborateurs du coût commun en transport est étudié. Une méthode de répartition du coût de transport tenant compte de l'impact - l’augmentation du coût de transport - des exigences inégales entre des collaborateurs est proposée. Troisièmement, la création de groupes collaboratifs - des coalitions - dans un ensemble de collaborateurs potentiel est étudiée. Un modèle réseau pour la formation d’une coalition selon les intérêts d’un sous-ensemble de collaborateurs adoptant ou pas un comportement opportuniste est détaillé. De plus, pour soutenir l'étude des thèmes précédents, la thèse comprend deux revues de la littérature. Premièrement, une revue sur les méthodes de planification et les systèmes d’aide à la décision en transport forestier est présenté. Deuxièmement, à travers la proposition d'un cadre pour créer et gérer une collaboration en transport et, plus généralement en logistique, une revue de travaux sur le transport et la logistique collaborative est offerte.In the academic and professional literature on freight transportation, computer-based planning methods have a long time ago been identified as a means to achieve cost reduction through enhanced transportation operations efficiency. More recently, inter-firm collaboration in transportation planning has been investigated as a means to provide further gains in efficiency and, in turn, to achieve additional cost reduction for the collaborators. However, implementation of inter-firm collaboration in transportation raises a number of issues. This thesis addresses three central themes in inter-firm collaboration and exemplifies the contributions in case studies involving collaboration in furniture and forest transportation. First, technological means to enable collaboration in transportation planning are studied. Embedding a computer-based planning method for truck routing, a decision support system enabling collaborative transportation is presented. Second, sharing the common transportation cost among collaborators is studied. A cost allocation method taking into account the impact – an increase of the transportation cost – of uneven requirements among collaborators is proposed. Third, building collaborating groups (i.e. coalitions) among a set of potential collaborators is studied. A network model for coalition formation by a subset of self-interested collaborators adopting or not an opportunistic behaviour is detailed. Moreover, to support the study of the aforementioned themes, the thesis includes two literature reviews. First, a survey on planning methods and decision support systems for vehicle routing problem in forest transportation is presented. Second, through the proposition of a framework for building and managing collaboration in transportation and, more generally in logistics, a survey of works on collaborative transportation and logistics is given

Evolutionary Mechanism Design

The advent of large-scale distributed systems poses unique engineering challenges. In open systems such as the internet it is not possible to prescribe the behaviour of all of the components of the system in advance. Rather, we attempt to design infrastructure, such as network protocols, in such a way that the overall system is robust despite the fact that numerous arbitrary, non-certified, third-party components can connect to our system. Economists have long understood this issue, since it is analogous to the design of the rules governing auctions and other marketplaces, in which we attempt to achieve sociallydesirable outcomes despite the impossibility of prescribing the exact behaviour of the market participants, who may attempt to subvert the market for their own personal gain. This field is known as 'mechanism design': the science of designing rules of a game to achieve a specific outcome, even though each participant may be self-interested. Although it originated in economics, mechanism design has become an important foundation of multi-agent systems (MAS) research. In many scenarios mechanism design and auction theory yield clear-cut results; however, there are many situations in which the underlying assumptions of the theory are violated due to the messiness of the real-world. In this thesis I introduce an evolutionary methodology for mechanism design, which is able to incorporate arbitrary design objectives and domain assumptions, and I validate the methodology using empirical techniques

Combinatorial exchange models for a user-driven air traffic flow management in Europe

2008/2009Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) is the service responsible to guarantee that the available capacity of the air transportation system is efficiently used and never exceeded. It guarantees safety of air transportation by adopting a series of measures which range from strategic long-term ones to the imposition of ground delays to flights at a tactical level. These ATFM delays are imposed to individual flights at the departure airport prior to their take-off, since it is safer and less costly to anticipate on the ground any delay predicted somewhere in the system. They are assigned by a central authority according to a First-Planned-First-Served principle, without taking into account individual Airlines' preferences. This criteria of assignment can cause an aggregated cost of delay experienced by users, higher than the minimal one, due to the fact that the cost of delay is a non-linear function of the duration and it depends on many variables such as the type of aircraft, the specific origin-destination pair, ecc. This thesis tackles the issue of formalizing and analyzing alternative models for the assignment of ATFM resources which take into account individual airlines preferences. In particular mathematical programming models are analyzed, that extend the concept of ATFM slot currently adopted to the one of Target Window, as proposed in the CATS European project. Such a concept is in line with the SESAR program, recently adopted in Europe to develop the new generation system of Air Traffic Management, which imposes a direct involvement of Airspace users whenever external constraints need to be enforced that modify their original requests. The first Chapter provides a general introduction to the context of Air Traffic Management and Air Traffic Control. In the second Chapter the principles, methods and performances of the ATFM system are described according to the current situation as well as to the SESAR target concept. The problem of optimally assign ATFM resources is then described mathematically and then analyzed to uncover two fundamental structures that determine its tractability: one corresponds to the case in which there is a unique capacity constrained resource while in the second there is an unrestricted number of constrained resources. In Chapter three a number of properties are proved that give insight into the applicability of different mechanisms for a central calculation of the optimal solution by the ATFM authority. Since such mechanisms involve cost minimization for several agents they are formulated as exchanges, i.e. particular types of auctions in which each participant may buy and/or sell several indivisible goods. The last part of the thesis included in Chapter four deals with the design of iterative exchange mechanisms, whose application in real world presents several advantages with respect to centralized models, from the distribution of computational complexity among participants to the preservation of disclosure of private information by Aircraft Operators. In this case an optimal model based on the Lagrangian relaxation of the separable central problem is first formulated and analyzed. To overcome practical issues possibly deriving from its application in real operations, an heuristic iterative Market-based mechanism is finally formalized. This algorithm exploits some of the underlying characteristics specific to the problem to derive near-optimal solutions in an acceptable time. Computational results are obtained by simulating its implementation on real traffic data and they show that considerable cost savings are possible with respect to a First-Planned-First-Served central allocation. The contribute of this thesis is twofold. The first is to provide a mathematical description, modeling and analysis of the ATFM resource exchange problem faced by Airspace users when network capacity needs to be rationed among them. The second consists in the methodological innovation represented by the formulation of the Market Mechanism which is compliant with several requirements represented by legislative and practical constraints and whose simulation provided encouraging results.XXII Cicl

Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology

kwartalni

Operational Research: Methods and Applications

Throughout its history, Operational Research has evolved to include a variety of methods, models and algorithms that have been applied to a diverse and wide range of contexts. This encyclopedic article consists of two main sections: methods and applications. The first aims to summarise the up-to-date knowledge and provide an overview of the state-of-the-art methods and key developments in the various subdomains of the field. The second offers a wide-ranging list of areas where Operational Research has been applied. The article is meant to be read in a nonlinear fashion. It should be used as a point of reference or first-port-of-call for a diverse pool of readers: academics, researchers, students, and practitioners. The entries within the methods and applications sections are presented in alphabetical order. The authors dedicate this paper to the 2023 Turkey/Syria earthquake victims. We sincerely hope that advances in OR will play a role towards minimising the pain and suffering caused by this and future catastrophes

Strategic algorithms

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2009.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 193-201).Classical algorithms from theoretical computer science arise time and again in practice. However,a practical situations typically do not fit precisely into the traditional theoretical models. Additional necessary components are, for example, uncertainty and economic incentives. Therefore, modem algorithm design is calling for more interdisciplinary approaches, as well as for deeper theoretical understanding, so that the algorithms can apply to more realistic settings and complex systems. Consider, for instance, the classical shortest path algorithm, which, given a graph with specified edge weights, seeks the path minimizing the total weight from a source to a destination. In practice, the edge weights are often uncertain and it is not even clear what we mean by shortest path anymore: is it the path that minimizes the expected weight? Or its variance, or some another metric? With a risk-averse objective function that takes into account both mean and standard deviation, we run into nonconvex optimization challenges that require new theory beyond classical shortest path algorithm design. Yet another shortest path application, routing of packets in the Internet, needs to further incorporate economic incentives to reflect the various business relationships among the Internet Service Providers that affect the choice of packet routes. Strategic Algorithms are algorithms that integrate optimization, uncertainty and economic modeling into algorithm design, with the goal of bringing about new theoretical developments and solving practical applications arising in complex computational-economic systems.(cont.) In short, this thesis contributes new algorithms and their underlying theory at the interface of optimization, uncertainty and economics. Although the interplay of these disciplines is present in various forms in our work, for the sake of presentation we have divided the material into three categories: 1. In Part I we investigate algorithms at the intersection of Optimization and Uncertainty. The key conceptual contribution in this part is discovering a novel connection between stochastic and nonconvex optimization. Traditional algorithm design has not taken into account the risk inherent in stochastic optimization problems. We consider natural objectives that incorporate risk, which tum out equivalent to certain nonconvex problems from the realm of continuous optimization. As a result, our work advances the state of art in both stochastic and in nonconvex optimization, presenting new complexity results and proposing general purpose efficient approximation algorithms, some of which have shown promising practical performance and have been implemented in a real traffic prediction and navigation system. 2. Part II proposes new algorithm and mechanism design at the intersection of Uncertainty and Economics. In Part I we postulate that the random variables in our models come from given distributions. However, determining those distributions or their parameters is a challenging and fundamental problem in itself. A tool from Economics that has recently gained momentum for measuring the probability distribution of a random variable is an information or prediction market. Such markets, most popularly known for predicting the outcomes of political elections or other events of interest, have shown remarkable accuracy in practice, though at the same time have left open the theoretical and strategic analysis of current implementations, as well as the need for new and improved designs which handle more complex outcome spaces (probability distribution functions) as opposed to binary or n-ary valued distributions. The contributions of this part include a unified strategic analysis of different prediction market designs that have been implemented in practice.(cont.) We also offer new market designs for handling exponentially large outcome spaces stemming from ranking or permutation-type outcomes, together with algorithmic and complexity analysis. 3. In Part III we consider the interplay of optimization and economics in the context of network routing. This part is motivated by the network of autonomous systems in the Internet where each portion of the network is controlled by an Internet service provider, namely by a self-interested economic agent. The business incentives do not exist merely in addition to the computer protocols governing the network. Although they are not currently integrated in those protocols and are decided largely via private contracting and negotiations, these economic considerations are a principal factor that determines how packets are routed. And vice versa, the demand and flow of network traffic fundamentally affect provider contracts and prices. The contributions of this part are the design and analysis of economic mechanisms for network routing. The mechanisms are based on first- and second-price auctions (the so-called Vickrey-Clarke-Groves, or VCG mechanisms). We first analyze the equilibria and prices resulting from these mechanisms. We then investigate the compatibility of the better understood VCG-mechanisms with the current inter-domain routing protocols, and we demonstrate the critical importance of correct modeling and how it affects the complexity and algorithms necessary to implement the economic mechanisms.by Evdokia Velinova Nikolova.Ph.D

Operational Research: Methods and Applications

Throughout its history, Operational Research has evolved to include a variety of methods, models and algorithms that have been applied to a diverse and wide range of contexts. This encyclopedic article consists of two main sections: methods and applications. The first aims to summarise the up-to-date knowledge and provide an overview of the state-of-the-art methods and key developments in the various subdomains of the field. The second offers a wide-ranging list of areas where Operational Research has been applied. The article is meant to be read in a nonlinear fashion. It should be used as a point of reference or first-port-of-call for a diverse pool of readers: academics, researchers, students, and practitioners. The entries within the methods and applications sections are presented in alphabetical order