Review Essay: Andy Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence.

Review Essay: Andy Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence

Extended emotion

Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external worl

“I Is Someone Else”: Constituting the Extended Mind’s Fourth Wave, with Hegel

We seek to constitute the extended mind’s fourth wave, socially distributed group cognition, and we do so by thinking with Hegel. The extended mind theory’s first wave invokes the parity principle, which maintains that processes that occur external to the organism’s skin should be considered mental if they are regarded as mental when they occur inside the organism. The second wave appeals to the complementarity principle, which claims that what is crucial is that these processes together constitute a cognitive system. The first two waves assume that cognitive systems have well-defined territories or boundaries, and that internal and external processes do not switch location. The third wave rejects these assumptions, holding instead that internal processes are not privileged, and internal and external processes can switch, and that processes can be distributed among individuals. The fourth wave would advocate socially distributed group cognition. Groups are deterritorialized collective agents; they are ineliminatively and irreducibly real, they have mental states. Individuals constitute groups, but groups also constitute individuals. What counts as an individual and a group is a function of the level of analysis. And they are conflicted

Extending the Extended Mind : From Cognition to Consciousness

Where does conscious experience stop and the rest of the world begin? Is the material basis of consciousness confined to the brain, or can it be extended to include other parts of the body and environmental elements? This study proposes an extended account: when all the requirements are fulfilled, an external tool may become part of the realising basis for certain experiential processes. Andy Clark and David Chalmers argued famously that the material basis of cognitive states sometimes extends out of the barriers of skin and skull to external objects such as notebooks and other everyday tools. However, they draw the line there: only cognition, but not consciousness can have an extended base. The central argument of this study is that their constraint is not legitimate. If one is accepted, the other one follows. The first chapter lays an overview of the theoretical background of externalism and the 4E-theories in present-day philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. It also examines the central concepts, accounts and methodological questions that will be used and further developed in later chapters. The second chapter presents three arguments for the position defended in this thesis, namely the hypothesis of extended conscious mind. The third chapter analyses the ongoing debate in the interface of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science about the causal–constitution distinction, and argues that rather than in mechanist terms, the causal–constitution distinction should be interpreted in diachronic terms when dealing with mental phenomena. When depicted that way, the extension relation in the hypothesis of extended conscious mind counts as constitutive. The fourth chapter distinguishes between several different levels of extension, from mere short-term extension to more robust functional incorporation, where the external tool has become part of the transparent bodily point of view of the subject. Based on the notion of functional incorporation, a set of demarcation criteria for the hypothesis of extended conscious mind will be developed. The chapter closes by discussing sensory substitution as a concrete example of functional incorporation. Finally, the fifth chapter introduces the most influential counter-arguments that have been set forth against the hypothesis of extended conscious mind. The critiques will be examined and answered.Väitöstutkimus esittää, että mielen ja tietoisen kokemuksen rajat laajentuvat pään ja ruumiin ulkopuolelle, esimerkiksi teknologisiin apuvälineisiin. Tutkimus kyseenalaistaa mielenfilosofiassa perinteisesti vallassa olleen näkemyksen, jonka mukaan mielen toiminnot voitaisiin selittää pelkän aivotoiminnan pohjalta – sen sijaan mielen toiminnot syntyvät aivojen, ruumiin ja ympäristön vuorovaikutuksessa. Andy Clark ja David Chalmers esittivät kuuluisassa artikkelissaan, että jokapäiväiset apuvälineet voivat olla kognitiivisten prosessien muodostamisessa mukana biologisen ruumiin ohella. Clark ja Chalmers kuitenkin rajoittivat laajentumisen tähän: heidän mukaansa pelkästään kognitiivisilla prosesseilla voi olla laajentunut perusta, mutta tietoinen kokemus rajoittuu pään sisään. Tämän tutkimuksen uusi avaus ja ydinargumentti on, että tällaista rajanvetoa ei ole mahdollista tehdä johdonmukaisesti. Jos hyväksymme kognitiivisten tilojen laajentumisen, tietoinen kokemus seuraa mukana. Biologisten toimintojen ohella esimerkiksi muistikirja tai älypuhelin voi toimia muistoja ja uskomuksia osaltaan toteuttavana välineenä, ja sokeankeppi tai tekoraaja osana tuntoaistimuksen toteuttavaa materiaalista pohjaa. Jotta laajentuminen voi tapahtua, ulkoisen välineen tulee täyttää tietyt ehdot, sen täytyy muun muassa tulla osaksi funktionaalista ruumiillista identiteettiä. Ulkoisiin apuvälineisiin laajentuminen on mahdollista aivojen ja ruumiin rakenteellisen muovautuvuuden ansiosta: ruumiillistetun osan ei tarvitse olla biologinen, mutta sen täytyy tulla ”läpinäkyväksi” osaksi subjektin näkökulmaa. Käsitteellisen analyysin lisäksi työssä käsitellään useita empiirisiä tutkimustapauksia (kuten aistikorvaavuuslaite-teknologia ja empiirinen unitutkimus). Mielen ja tietoisen kokemuksen laajentumisella on kauaskantoinen vaikutus, joka näkyy filosofian ohella useilla muillakin aloilla. Tutkimus auttaa vastaamaan erittäin ajankohtaisiin kysymyksiin, kuten millainen status käyttämillemme jokapäiväisille teknologisille laitteille tulisi antaa: tulisiko niitä pitää vain fyysisinä esineinä vai kognitiivisten prosessien jatkeena? Yksi esiin nouseva käytännönläheinen kysymys jatkotutkimukselle on kuinka ympäristön muokkaaminen (esim. hoitolaitoksissa tehtävät ratkaisut) vaikuttaa mieleen – ja tästä seuraa myös monenlaisia eettisiä kysymyksiä

Epistemic presentism

Commonsense functionalism is taken to entail a version of the extended mind thesis, according to which one’s dispositional beliefs may be partly constituted by artifacts. As several opponents of the extended mind thesis have objected, claiming so can generate a cognitive/knowledge bloat, according to which we may count as knowing the contents of trusted websites, even before looking them up (!). One way to retain commonsense functionalism, but avoid the ensuing “cognitive/knowledge bloat” worry is to introduce epistemic presentism—the view that there are no dispositional beliefs and that we can only believe, and thereby know, things in the present. Independently of the above problem, epistemic presentism can be further motivated by shedding light on two central epistemological questions: (1) how to understand the distinction between doxastic and propositional justification and (2) how to interpret the closure principle. The view also aligns with strong intuitions about what we may take ourselves to know, what the relation between action and belief is, and what may count as part of our minds

The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering

This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as “a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism. Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the “scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary” metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin. We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended, embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact with independently motivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.40 page(s

Philosophy and Philosophy: The Subject Matter and the Discipline

The last two decades have seen the proliferation of the empirical study of philosophy. This dissertation defends the practice and argues that to understand the way contingent features of the practice of philosophy affect the epistemic standing of philosophers, we need to draw upon a wider and more varied set of empirical data than is sometimes supposed. To explore this, the dissertation focuses on two places where the practices of the discipline of philosophy have an effect on the epistemology of philosophy. First, the dissertation discusses the interaction between notable works of philosophy and their readers. In particular, it critiques the method of defending the epistemic standing of philosophers through careful examination of notable works of philosophy to discern the methods in the text. Ultimately this method is epistemically unmotivated. It is instead far more important to study how people have interacted and reacted to works of philosophy. Second, the dissertation defends the use of lexicography in philosophy. Using "intuition" as a case study, the dissertation argues metasemantically and lexicographically that philosophers often use common words with meanings unique to philosophy. Through both discussions it is argued that experimental philosophers and epistemologists of philosophy need to drastically expand the sorts of data they collect and consider in their theorizing.

Getting their acts together: A coordinated systems approach to extended cognition

A cognitive system is a set of processes responsible for intelligent behaviour. This thesis is an attempt to answer the question: how can cognitive systems be demarcated; that is, what criterion can be used to decide where to draw the boundary of the system? This question is important because it is one way of couching the hypothesis of extended cognition – is it possible for cognitive systems to transcend the boundary of the brain or body of an organism? Such a criterion can be supplied by what is called in the literature a ‘mark of the cognitive’. The main task of this thesis is to develop a general mark of the cognitive. The starting point is that a system responsible for intelligent behaviour is a coordinated coalition of processes. This account proposes a set of functional conditions for coordination. These conditions can then be used as a sufficient condition for membership of a cognitive system. In certain circumstances, they assert that a given process plays a coordination role in the system and is therefore part of the system. The controversy in the extended cognition debate surrounds positive claims of systemhood concerning ‘external’ processes so a sufficient condition will help settle some of these debates. I argue that a Coordinated Systems Approach like this will help to move the extended cognition debate forward from its current impasse. Moreover, the application of the approach to social systems and stygmergic systems - systems where current processes are coordinated partly by the trace of previous action – promises new directions for research