Future Implications of Emerging Disruptive Technologies on Weapons of Mass Destruction

This report asks the questions: What are the future implications of Emerging Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) on the future of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) warfare? How might EDTs increase the lethality and effectiveness of WMDs in kinetic warfare in 2040? How can civic leaders and public servants prepare for and mitigate projected threats? Problem  In the coming decade, state and non-state adversaries will use EDTs to attack systems and populations that may initiate and accelerate existing geopolitical conflict escalation. EDTs are expected to be used both in the initial attack or escalation as well as a part of the detection and decision-making process. Due to the speed of EDTs, expected confusion, and common lack of human oversight, attacks will also be incorrectly attributed, which has the capacity to escalate rapid geopolitical conflict to global military conflict, and ultimately, to the use of nuclear WMDs. The use of EDTs in the shadow of nuclear WMDs is also expected to create an existential threat to possible adversaries, pushing them to “lower the bar” of acceptability for using nuclear WMDs. EDTs will enable and embolden insider threats, both willing and unknowing, to effect geopolitical conflict on a global scale. In addition, the combination of multiple EDTs when used together for attacks will create WMD effects on populations and governments. Furthermore, EDTs will be used by adversaries to target and destabilize critical infrastructure systems, such as food, energy, and transportation, etc. that will have a broader effect on populations and governments. EDTs will enable adversaries to perpetrate a long-game attack, where the effect and attribution of the attack may not be detected for an extended period -- if ever. Solution  To combat these future threats, organizations will need to conduct research and intelligence gathering paired with exploratory research and development to better understand the state of EDTs and their potential impacts. With this information, organizations will need to conduct collaborative “wargaming” and planning to explore a range of possible and potential threats of EDTs. The knowledge gained from all of these activities will inform future training and best practices to prepare for and address these threats. Organizations will also need to increase their investments in EDT related domains, necessitating countries to not only change how they fight, but also evolve their thinking about deterrence. Expanded regulation, policy making, and political solidarity among members will take on an increasingly more significant and expanded role. Broader government, military, and civilian cooperation will be needed to disrupt and mitigate some of these future threats in conjunction with broader public awareness. All of these actions will place a higher value on cooperation and shared resiliency among NATO members

Cyber Law and Espionage Law as Communicating Vessels

Professor Lubin\u27s contribution is Cyber Law and Espionage Law as Communicating Vessels, pp. 203-225. Existing legal literature would have us assume that espionage operations and “below-the-threshold” cyber operations are doctrinally distinct. Whereas one is subject to the scant, amorphous, and under-developed legal framework of espionage law, the other is subject to an emerging, ever-evolving body of legal rules, known cumulatively as cyber law. This dichotomy, however, is erroneous and misleading. In practice, espionage and cyber law function as communicating vessels, and so are better conceived as two elements of a complex system, Information Warfare (IW). This paper therefore first draws attention to the similarities between the practices – the fact that the actors, technologies, and targets are interchangeable, as are the knee-jerk legal reactions of the international community. In light of the convergence between peacetime Low-Intensity Cyber Operations (LICOs) and peacetime Espionage Operations (EOs) the two should be subjected to a single regulatory framework, one which recognizes the role intelligence plays in our public world order and which adopts a contextual and consequential method of inquiry. The paper proceeds in the following order: Part 2 provides a descriptive account of the unique symbiotic relationship between espionage and cyber law, and further explains the reasons for this dynamic. Part 3 places the discussion surrounding this relationship within the broader discourse on IW, making the claim that the convergence between EOs and LICOs, as described in Part 2, could further be explained by an even larger convergence across all the various elements of the informational environment. Parts 2 and 3 then serve as the backdrop for Part 4, which details the attempt of the drafters of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 to compartmentalize espionage law and cyber law, and the deficits of their approach. The paper concludes by proposing an alternative holistic understanding of espionage law, grounded in general principles of law, which is more practically transferable to the cyber realmhttps://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks/1220/thumbnail.jp

Index

Janus.Net vol.14, nº

THE SPACE BETWEEN: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CYBERSPACE AS A DOMAIN

The objective of this thesis is to identify the extent to which defining cyberspace as domain will affect the formulation of Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) policy related to cyberspace in the future. However, as cyberspace lacks a consistent definition, a prerequisite for this discussion is establishing exactly what cyberspace is. Having provided framework for understanding cyberspace, the policy approaches of the last five presidential administrations were examined to determine whether they treat cyberspace as a domain and what this suggests about future policy development. In the end, there appears to be a tendency for each presidential administration to treat cyberspace as an instrument rather than a domain, which is an approach that will likely require adjustment as threats within cyberspace evolve so as to adequately address them.Outstanding ThesisCivilian, City of Portland, Portland Police BureauApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

Constrained Cognition: Information Management and the Practical Limits of Nuclear Escalation Control

Nuclear escalation control theory rests on the idea that decision makers, in a limited nuclear war scenario, will choose their actions based on a rational assessment of the available information. That information essentially consists of intelligence reports about one\u27s adversary and information reporting the status of one\u27s own forces\u27 ability to execute offensive actions and the damage level of vital national targets. Yet the practical limits of managing the flow and quality of this information, coupled with the fog and friction inherent in human analyses, significantly affect the decision-making process vis-à-vis nuclear escalation. Hence, these limitations cast a pall over any military doctrine that relies heavily on the assumption that nuclear escalation can be controlled with precision. Examining information management during the Cuban Missile Crisis shows the practical limits of managing this information flow, which in turn limits the ability of national leaders to make such decisions properly

Security and defence research in the European Union: a landscape review

This landscape report describes the state of play of the European Union’s policies and activities in security and defence and the EU-funded research aimed at supporting them, with an exclusive focus on intentional harm. It is organised around several thematic building blocks under the umbrella of the three core priorities defined in the European agenda on security. The report reviews the current main risks and threats but also those that may emerge within the next 5 years, the policy and operational means developed to combat them, the main active stakeholders and the EU legislation in force. In this context, a short history of EU research on security and defence is presented, followed by an inventory of relevant research and development projects funded under the Horizon 2020 framework programme during the period 2014-2018. The specific contributions of the Joint Research Centre to security research are also highlighted. Finally, future avenues for security and defence research and development are discussed. Please note that the executive summary of this landscape report has been published simultaneously as a companion document.JRC.E.7-Knowledge for Security and Migratio

Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations

As the quarter-century mark in the 21st Century nears, new aviation-related equipment has come to the forefront, both to help us and to haunt us. (Coutu, 2020) This is particularly the case with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These vehicles have grown in popularity and accessible to everyone. Of different shapes and sizes, they are widely available for purchase at relatively low prices. They have moved from the backyard recreation status to important tools for the military, intelligence agencies, and corporate organizations. New practical applications such as military equipment and weaponry are announced on a regular basis – globally. (Coutu, 2020) Every country seems to be announcing steps forward in this bludgeoning field. In our successful 2nd edition of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets (Nichols, et al., 2019), the authors addressed three factors influencing UAS phenomena. First, unmanned aircraft technology has seen an economic explosion in production, sales, testing, specialized designs, and friendly / hostile usages of deployed UAS / UAVs / Drones. There is a huge global growing market and entrepreneurs know it. Second, hostile use of UAS is on the forefront of DoD defense and offensive planners. They are especially concerned with SWARM behavior. Movies like “Angel has Fallen,” where drones in a SWARM use facial recognition technology to kill USSS agents protecting POTUS, have built the lore of UAS and brought the problem forefront to DHS. Third, UAS technology was exploding. UAS and Counter- UAS developments in navigation, weapons, surveillance, data transfer, fuel cells, stealth, weight distribution, tactics, GPS / GNSS elements, SCADA protections, privacy invasions, terrorist uses, specialized software, and security protocols has exploded. (Nichols, et al., 2019) Our team has followed / tracked joint ventures between military and corporate entities and specialized labs to build UAS countermeasures. As authors, we felt compelled to address at least the edge of some of the new C-UAS developments. It was clear that we would be lucky if we could cover a few of – the more interesting and priority technology updates – all in the UNCLASSIFIED and OPEN sphere. Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Technologies and Operations is the companion textbook to our 2nd edition. The civilian market is interesting and entrepreneurial, but the military and intelligence markets are of concern because the US does NOT lead the pack in C-UAS technologies. China does. China continues to execute its UAS proliferation along the New Silk Road Sea / Land routes (NSRL). It has maintained a 7% growth in military spending each year to support its buildup. (Nichols, et al., 2019) [Chapter 21]. They continue to innovate and have recently improved a solution for UAS flight endurance issues with the development of advanced hydrogen fuel cell. (Nichols, et al., 2019) Reed and Trubetskoy presented a terrifying map of countries in the Middle East with armed drones and their manufacturing origin. Guess who? China. (A.B. Tabriski & Justin, 2018, December) Our C-UAS textbook has as its primary mission to educate and train resources who will enter the UAS / C-UAS field and trust it will act as a call to arms for military and DHS planners.https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/1031/thumbnail.jp