Logic, self-awareness and self-improvement: The metacognitive loop and the problem of brittleness

This essay describes a general approach to building perturbation-tolerant autonomous systems, based on the conviction that artificial agents should be able notice when something is amiss, assess the anomaly, and guide a solution into place. We call this basic strategy of self-guided learning the metacognitive loop; it involves the system monitoring, reasoning about, and, when necessary, altering its own decision-making components. In this essay, we (a) argue that equipping agents with a metacognitive loop can help to overcome the brittleness problem, (b) detail the metacognitive loop and its relation to our ongoing work on time-sensitive commonsense reasoning, (c) describe specific, implemented systems whose perturbation tolerance was improved by adding a metacognitive loop, and (d) outline both short-term and long-term research agendas

Controlled Natural Languages for Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

Controlled natural languages (CNLs) are effective languages for knowledge representation and reasoning. They are designed based on certain natural languages with restricted lexicon and grammar. CNLs are unambiguous and simple as opposed to their base languages. They preserve the expressiveness and coherence of natural languages. In this paper, it mainly focuses on a class of CNLs, called machine-oriented CNLs, which have well-defined semantics that can be deterministically translated into formal languages to do logical reasoning. Although a number of machine-oriented CNLs emerged and have been used in many application domains for problem solving and question answering, there are still many limitations: First, CNLs cannot handle inconsistencies in the knowledge base. Second, CNLs are not powerful enough to identify different variations of a sentence and therefore might not return the expected inference results. Third, CNLs do not have a good mechanism for defeasible reasoning. This paper addresses these three problems and proposes a research plan for solving these problems. It also shows the current state of research: a paraconsistent logical framework from which six principles that guide the user to encode CNL sentences were created. Experiment results show this paraconsistent logical framework and these six principles can consistently and effectively solve word puzzles with injections of inconsistencies

Proceedings of the IJCAI-09 Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Action and Change

Copyright in each article is held by the authors. Please contact the authors directly for permission to reprint or use this material in any form for any purpose.The biennial workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Action and Change (NRAC) has an active and loyal community. Since its inception in 1995, the workshop has been held seven times in conjunction with IJCAI, and has experienced growing success. We hope to build on this success again this eighth year with an interesting and fruitful day of discussion. The areas of reasoning about action, non-monotonic reasoning and belief revision are among the most active research areas in Knowledge Representation, with rich inter-connections and practical applications including robotics, agentsystems, commonsense reasoning and the semantic web. This workshop provides a unique opportunity for researchers from all three fields to be brought together at a single forum with the prime objectives of communicating important recent advances in each field and the exchange of ideas. As these fundamental areas mature it is vital that researchers maintain a dialog through which they can cooperatively explore common links. The goal of this workshop is to work against the natural tendency of such rapidly advancing fields to drift apart into isolated islands of specialization. This year, we have accepted ten papers authored by a diverse international community. Each paper has been subject to careful peer review on the basis of innovation, significance and relevance to NRAC. The high quality selection of work could not have been achieved without the invaluable help of the international Program Committee. A highlight of the workshop will be our invited speaker Professor Hector Geffner from ICREA and UPF in Barcelona, Spain, discussing representation and inference in modern planning. Hector Geffner is a world leader in planning, reasoning, and knowledge representation; in addition to his many important publications, he is a Fellow of the AAAI, an associate editor of the Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research and won an ACM Distinguished Dissertation Award in 1990

Logical disagreement : an epistemological study

While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the Ad Hoc Reading according to which logical disagreements occur when two subjects take incompatible doxastic attitudes toward a specific proposition in or about logic. Chapter 2 presents a new counterexample to the widely discussed Uniqueness Thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Theory Choice Reading of ‘logical disagreement’. According to this interpretation, logical disagreements occur at the level of entire logical theories rather than individual entailment-claims. Chapter 4 concerns a key question from the philosophy of logic, viz., how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical consequence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we turn to the Akrasia Reading. On this reading, logical disagreements occur when there is a mismatch between the deductive strength of one’s background logic and the logical theory one prefers (officially). Chapter 6 introduces logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia and presents a novel dilemma. Chapter 7 revisits the epistemology of peer disagreement and argues that the epistemic significance of central principles from the literature are at best deflated in the context of logical disagreement. The chapter also develops a simple formal model of deep disagreement in Default Logic, relating this to our general discussion of logical disagreement. The monograph ends in an epilogue with some reflections on the potential epistemic significance of convergence in logical theorizing

Logical Disagreement

While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the Ad Hoc Reading according to which logical disagreements occur when two subjects take incompatible doxastic attitudes toward a specific proposition in or about logic. Chapter 2 presents a new counterexample to the widely discussed Uniqueness Thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Theory Choice Reading of ‘logical disagreement’. According to this interpretation, logical disagreements occur at the level of entire logical theories rather than individual entailment-claims. Chapter 4 concerns a key question from the philosophy of logic, viz., how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical consequence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we turn to the Akrasia Reading. On this reading, logical disagreements occur when there is a mismatch between the deductive strength of one’s background logic and the logical theory one prefers (officially). Chapter 6 introduces logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia and presents a novel dilemma. Chapter 7 revisits the epistemology of peer disagreement and argues that the epistemic significance of central principles from the literature are at best deflated in the context of logical disagreement. The chapter also develops a simple formal model of deep disagreement in Default Logic, relating this to our general discussion of logical disagreement. The monograph ends in an epilogue with some reflections on the potential epistemic significance of convergence in logical theorizing

Using GRASP and GA to design resilient and cost-effective IP/MPLS networks

The main objective of this thesis is to find good quality solutions for representative instances of the problem of designing a resilient and low cost IP/MPLS network, to be deployed over an existing optical transport network. This research is motivated by two complementary real-world application cases, which comprise the most important commercial and academic networks of Uruguay. To achieve this goal, we performed an exhaustive analysis of existing models and technologies. From all of them we took elements that were contrasted with the particular requirements of our counterparts. We highlight among these requirements, the need of getting solutions transparently implementable over a heterogeneous network environment, which limit us to use widely standardized features of related technologies. We decided to create new models more suitable to fit these needs. These models are intrinsically hard to solve (NP-Hard). Thus we developed metaheuristic based algorithms to find solutions to these real-world instances. Evolutionary Algorithms and Greedy Randomized Adaptive Search Procedures obtained the best results. As it usually happens, real-world planning problems are surrounded by uncertainty. Therefore, we have worked closely with our counterparts to reduce the fuzziness upon data to a set of representative cases. They were combined with different strategies of design to get to scenarios, which were translated into instances of these problems. Finally, the algorithms were fed with this information, and from their outcome we derived our results and conclusions

Seeing the Good: Rehumanizing Moral Conflict in a Dehumanizing Age

This dissertation integrates insights from metaethical constructivism and enactive cognitive science to rehumanize both “religiously” and “secularly” grounded moral conflict and its dehumanizing side effects. Specifically, my motivating problem centers around the way in which moral conflict can be used to “justify” dehumanization in the form of what I term moral exclusion-qua-subject; exclusion from collective moral deliberation for one reason or another. Moral exclusion-qua-subject can in turn enable a slide into what we more typically think of as the dangers of dehumanization, and what I circumscribe as moral exclusion-qua-object: traditional human rights violations up to and including violence and death. At stake in this project is thus both the relative health and cohesion of our moral communities as well as the possibility of avoiding the darker threats of violence on an individual or mass scale. My critical diagnosis is that by overcoming what I refer to as the metaethical divide (dealt with in Chapters 2 and 3)—and even more importantly, by reconceptualizing our understandings of perception, rationality, objectivity, and identity (Chapters 4 and 5)—we can disrupt the pathway from existence-of-moral-conflict → the dehumanizing belief that the person with whom we disagree “must” be either unable or unwilling to engage in proper moral deliberation (and thus is unworthy of inclusion in collective moral deliberation). My constructive proposal makes both an explanatory (metaethical and moral epistemic) contribution (Chapter 6) in the form of what I term enactive constructivism, as well as a practical, action-guiding one (Chapter 7) by advocating for the cultivation of specific rehumanizing epistemic virtues

The Paradox of Nature: Merleau-Ponty\u27s Semi-Naturalistic Critique of Husserlian Phenomenology

This dissertation deals with Merleau-Ponty\u27s critical transformation of Husserl\u27s phenomenology through a rethinking of the concept of nature, which Husserl, Merleau-Ponty argues, fails to integrate or explain successfully in his philosophical system. The first chapter reconstructs Husserl\u27s transcendental-phenomenological project in Ideas I, while the second widens the investigation to cover the ontologically-centered Ideas II and III. In my third chapter, I chart what I call Merleau-Ponty\u27s organic appropriation of Husserl and the unique hermeneutical challenges it poses. Here the ambiguity of Ideas II, which both grounds subjectivity in the lived body and separates nature from spirit (Geist), plays a crucial role. The fourth chapter concentrates on the Merleau-Ponty\u27s later meditations on the ontology of nature and subjectivity, particularly in his recently translated Nature lectures of 1959-61. Finally, the fifth chapter compares and contrasts Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, in terms of both substance and method, through a detailed examination of their different notions of (and ways to address) paradox. I show how Merleau-Ponty\u27s paradoxical thinking stems not from chance or mere temperament but a fundamental, systematic commitment to the self-contradictory (or dialectical, but in a modified sense) nature of being and truth themselves