235 research outputs found

    Deep Learning -Powered Computational Intelligence for Cyber-Attacks Detection and Mitigation in 5G-Enabled Electric Vehicle Charging Station

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    An electric vehicle charging station (EVCS) infrastructure is the backbone of transportation electrification. However, the EVCS has various cyber-attack vulnerabilities in software, hardware, supply chain, and incumbent legacy technologies such as network, communication, and control. Therefore, proactively monitoring, detecting, and defending against these attacks is very important. The state-of-the-art approaches are not agile and intelligent enough to detect, mitigate, and defend against various cyber-physical attacks in the EVCS system. To overcome these limitations, this dissertation primarily designs, develops, implements, and tests the data-driven deep learning-powered computational intelligence to detect and mitigate cyber-physical attacks at the network and physical layers of 5G-enabled EVCS infrastructure. Also, the 5G slicing application to ensure the security and service level agreement (SLA) in the EVCS ecosystem has been studied. Various cyber-attacks such as distributed denial of services (DDoS), False data injection (FDI), advanced persistent threats (APT), and ransomware attacks on the network in a standalone 5G-enabled EVCS environment have been considered. Mathematical models for the mentioned cyber-attacks have been developed. The impact of cyber-attacks on the EVCS operation has been analyzed. Various deep learning-powered intrusion detection systems have been proposed to detect attacks using local electrical and network fingerprints. Furthermore, a novel detection framework has been designed and developed to deal with ransomware threats in high-speed, high-dimensional, multimodal data and assets from eccentric stakeholders of the connected automated vehicle (CAV) ecosystem. To mitigate the adverse effects of cyber-attacks on EVCS controllers, novel data-driven digital clones based on Twin Delayed Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (TD3) Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) has been developed. Also, various Bruteforce, Controller clones-based methods have been devised and tested to aid the defense and mitigation of the impact of the attacks of the EVCS operation. The performance of the proposed mitigation method has been compared with that of a benchmark Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG)-based digital clones approach. Simulation results obtained from the Python, Matlab/Simulink, and NetSim software demonstrate that the cyber-attacks are disruptive and detrimental to the operation of EVCS. The proposed detection and mitigation methods are effective and perform better than the conventional and benchmark techniques for the 5G-enabled EVCS

    Bibliographical review on cyber attacks from a control oriented perspective

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    This paper presents a bibliographical review of definitions, classifications and applications concerning cyber attacks in networked control systems (NCSs) and cyber-physical systems (CPSs). This review tackles the topic from a control-oriented perspective, which is complementary to information or communication ones. After motivating the importance of developing new methods for attack detection and secure control, this review presents security objectives, attack modeling, and a characterization of considered attacks and threats presenting the detection mechanisms and remedial actions. In order to show the properties of each attack, as well as to provide some deeper insight into possible defense mechanisms, examples available in the literature are discussed. Finally, open research issues and paths are presented.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

    IoT-HASS: A Framework For Protecting Smart Home Environment

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    While many solutions have been proposed for smart home security, the problem that no single solution fully protects the smart home environment still exists. In this research we propose a security framework to protect the smart home environment. The proposed framework includes three engines that complement each other to protect the smart home IoT devices. The first engine is an IDS/IPS module that monitors all traffic in the home network and then detects, alerts users, and/or blocks packets using anomaly-based detection. The second engine works as a device management module that scans and verifies IoT devices in the home network, allowing the user to flag any suspect device. The third engine works as a privacy monitoring module that monitors and detects information transmitted in plaintext and alerts the user if such information is detected. We call the proposed system IoT-Home Advanced Security System or IoT-HASS for short. IoT-HASS was developed using Python 3 and can be implemented in two modes of operation. The in-line mode allows the IoT-HASS to be installed in-line with the traffic inside a Raspberry Pi or a Router. In the in-line mode IoT-HASS acts as an IPS that can detect and block threats as well as alert the user. The second mode is the passive mode where IoT-HASS in not installed in-line with the traffic and can act as an IDS that passively monitors the traffic, detecting threats and alerting the user, but not blocking the attack. IoT-HASS was evaluated via four testing scenarios. It demonstrated superior performance in all testing scenarios in detecting attacks such as DDoS attacks, Brute Force Attacks, and Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks. In each of the four test scenarios, we also tested the device management functionality, which we found to successfully scan and display IoT devices for the homeowner. The extensive evaluating and testing of IoT-HASS showed that IoT-HASS can successfully run in a small device such as a Raspberry Pi, and thus, it will most likely run in an embedded device as an IoT device. Our future research will concentrate on strengthening the current features of IoT-HASS to include additional functionalities

    Machine Learning-Enabled IoT Security: Open Issues and Challenges Under Advanced Persistent Threats

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    Despite its technological benefits, Internet of Things (IoT) has cyber weaknesses due to the vulnerabilities in the wireless medium. Machine learning (ML)-based methods are widely used against cyber threats in IoT networks with promising performance. Advanced persistent threat (APT) is prominent for cybercriminals to compromise networks, and it is crucial to long-term and harmful characteristics. However, it is difficult to apply ML-based approaches to identify APT attacks to obtain a promising detection performance due to an extremely small percentage among normal traffic. There are limited surveys to fully investigate APT attacks in IoT networks due to the lack of public datasets with all types of APT attacks. It is worth to bridge the state-of-the-art in network attack detection with APT attack detection in a comprehensive review article. This survey article reviews the security challenges in IoT networks and presents the well-known attacks, APT attacks, and threat models in IoT systems. Meanwhile, signature-based, anomaly-based, and hybrid intrusion detection systems are summarized for IoT networks. The article highlights statistical insights regarding frequently applied ML-based methods against network intrusion alongside the number of attacks types detected. Finally, open issues and challenges for common network intrusion and APT attacks are presented for future research.Comment: ACM Computing Surveys, 2022, 35 pages, 10 Figures, 8 Table

    An Approach to Guide Users Towards Less Revealing Internet Browsers

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    When browsing the Internet, HTTP headers enable both clients and servers send extra data in their requests or responses such as the User-Agent string. This string contains information related to the sender’s device, browser, and operating system. Previous research has shown that there are numerous privacy and security risks result from exposing sensitive information in the User-Agent string. For example, it enables device and browser fingerprinting and user tracking and identification. Our large analysis of thousands of User-Agent strings shows that browsers differ tremendously in the amount of information they include in their User-Agent strings. As such, our work aims at guiding users towards using less exposing browsers. In doing so, we propose to assign an exposure score to browsers based on the information they expose and vulnerability records. Thus, our contribution in this work is as follows: first, provide a full implementation that is ready to be deployed and used by users. Second, conduct a user study to identify the effectiveness and limitations of our proposed approach. Our implementation is based on using more than 52 thousand unique browsers. Our performance and validation analysis show that our solution is accurate and efficient. The source code and data set are publicly available and the solution has been deployed

    Securing a UAV Using Features from an EEG Signal

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    This thesis focuses on an approach which entails the extraction of Beta component of the EEG (Electroencephalogram) signal of a user and uses his/her EEG beta data to generate a random AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) encryption key. This Key is used to encrypt the communication between the UAVs (Unmanned aerial vehicles) and the ground control station. UAVs have attracted both commercial and military organizations in recent years. The progress in this field has reached significant popularity, and the research has incorporated different areas from the scientific domain. UAV communication became a significant concern when an attack on a Predator UAV occurred in 2009, which allowed the hijackers to get the live video stream. Since a UAVs major function depend on its onboard auto pilot, it is important to harden the system against vulnerabilities. In this thesis, we propose a biometric system to encrypt the UAV communication by generating a key which is derived from Beta component of the EEG signal of a user. We have developed a safety mechanism that gets activated in case the communication of the UAV from the ground control station gets attacked. This system was validated on a commercial UAV under malicious attack conditions during which we implement a procedure where the UAV return safely to an initially deployed "home" position

    Techniques for utilizing classification towards securing automotive controller area network and machine learning towards the reverse engineering of CAN messages

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    The vehicle industry is quickly becoming more connected and growing. This growth is due to advancements in cyber physical systems (CPSs) that enhance the safety and automation in vehicle. The modern automobile consists of more than 70 electronic control units (ECUs) that communicate and interact with each other over automotive bus systems. Passenger comforts, infotainment features, and connectivity continue to progress through the growth and integration of Internet-of-Things (IoT) technologies. Common networks include the Controller Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnect Network (LIN), and FlexRay. However, the benefits of increased connectivity and features comes with the penalty of increased vulnerabilities. Security is lacking in preventing attacks on safety-critical control systems. I will explore the state of the art methods and approaches researchers have taken to identify threats and how to address them with intrusion detection. I discuss the development of a hybrid based intrusion detection approach that combines anomaly and signature based detection methods. Machine learning is a hot topic in security as it is a method of learning and classifying system behavior and can detect intrusions that alter normal behavior. In this paper, we discuss utilizing machine learning algorithms to assist in classifying CAN messages. I present work that focuses on the reverse engineering and classification of CAN messages. The problem is that even though CAN is standardized, the implementation may vary for different manufacturers and vehicle models. These implementations are kept secret, therefore CAN messages for every vehicle needs to be analyzed and reverse engineered in order to get information. Due to the lack of publicly available CAN specifications, attackers and researchers need to reverse engineer messages to pinpoint which messages will have the desired impact. The reverse engineering process is needed by researchers and hackers for all manufacturers and their respective vehicles to understand what the vehicle is doing and what each CAN message means. The knowledge of the specifications of CAN messages can improve the effectiveness of security mechanisms applied to CAN

    PLC Code Vulnerabilities and Attacks: Detection and Prevention

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    Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) play an important role in Industrial Control Systems (ICS), production lines, public infrastructure, and critical facilities. A compromised PLC would lead to devastating consequences that risk workplace safety, humans, environment, and associated systems. Because of their important role in ICS, more specifically PLC Based Systems (PLC-BS), PLCs have been targeted by various types of cyber-attacks. Many contributions have been dedicated to protecting ICS and exploring their vulnerabilities and threats, but little attention and progress have been made in enhancing the security of PLC code by utilizing internal PLC ladder logic code solutions. Mainly the contributions to protect and secure PLC-BS are related to external factors such as industrial networks, Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA), field devices, and servers. Focusing on those external factors would not be sufficient if adversaries gain access to a PLC since PLCs are insecure by design - do not have built-in self-defense features that could reduce or detect abnormalities or vulnerabilities within their running routines or codes. PLCs are defenseless against code exploitations and malicious code modifications. This research work focuses on exposing the vulnerabilities of PLC ladder logic code and provides countermeasure solutions to detect and prevent related code exploitation and vulnerabilities. Several test-bed experiments, using Rockwell PLCs, were conducted to deploy real-time attack models against PLC ladder logic code and provided countermeasure solutions to detect the associated threats and prevent them. The deployed attacks were successfully detected by the provided countermeasure solutions. These countermeasure techniques are novel, real-time PLC ladder logic code solutions that can be deployed to any PLC to enhance its code defense mechanism and enable it to detect and prevent code attacks and even bad code practices. The main novel contribution, among the provided countermeasure solutions, is the STC (Scan Time Code) technique. STC is a ladder logic code that was developed, deployed, and tested in several test-bed experiments to detect and prevent code abnormalities and threats. STC was able to detect and prevent a variety of real-time attack models against a PLC ladder logic code. STC was designed to capture and analyze the time a PLC spends in executing a specific routine or program per scan cycle to monitor any suspicious code modifications or behaviors. Any suspicious modifications or behaviors of PLC code within a particular routine would be detected by STC which in return would stop and prevent further code execution and warn operators. In addition to detecting code modifications, the STC technique was used to detect any modification of the CPU time slice scheduling. Another countermeasure technique was PLC code that was used to detect and prevent the manipulation or deterioration of particular field devices. Moreover, several countermeasure PLC code techniques were proposed to expose the vulnerabilities of PLC alarms code where adversaries could find ways to launch cyber-attacks that could suppress (disable) or silence the alarms and critical faults of associated ICS devices monitored by PLCs. Suppressed alarms would not be reported to operators or promptly detected, resulting in devastating damage. All provided countermeasure solutions in this work were successfully tested and capable of detecting, preventing, or eliminating real-time attack scenarios. The results were analyzed and proved the validity of the provided countermeasure solutions. This research work, also, provides policies, recommendations, and general countermeasures to enhance the validity and security of PLC code. All the techniques provided in this work are applicable to be implemented and deployed to any PLC at no extra cost, additional resources, or complex integration. The techniques enhance the security of PLCs by building more defensive layers within their respective routines which in return would reduce financial losses, improve workplace safety, and protect human lives and the environment

    Learning-guided network fuzzing for testing cyber-physical system defences

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    The threat of attack faced by cyber-physical systems (CPSs), especially when they play a critical role in automating public infrastructure, has motivated research into a wide variety of attack defence mechanisms. Assessing their effectiveness is challenging, however, as realistic sets of attacks to test them against are not always available. In this paper, we propose smart fuzzing, an automated, machine learning guided technique for systematically finding 'test suites' of CPS network attacks, without requiring any knowledge of the system's control programs or physical processes. Our approach uses predictive machine learning models and metaheuristic search algorithms to guide the fuzzing of actuators so as to drive the CPS into different unsafe physical states. We demonstrate the efficacy of smart fuzzing by implementing it for two real-world CPS testbeds---a water purification plant and a water distribution system---finding attacks that drive them into 27 different unsafe states involving water flow, pressure, and tank levels, including six that were not covered by an established attack benchmark. Finally, we use our approach to test the effectiveness of an invariant-based defence system for the water treatment plant, finding two attacks that were not detected by its physical invariant checks, highlighting a potential weakness that could be exploited in certain conditions.Comment: Accepted by ASE 201
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