10,926 research outputs found
Online learning in repeated auctions
Motivated by online advertising auctions, we consider repeated Vickrey
auctions where goods of unknown value are sold sequentially and bidders only
learn (potentially noisy) information about a good's value once it is
purchased. We adopt an online learning approach with bandit feedback to model
this problem and derive bidding strategies for two models: stochastic and
adversarial. In the stochastic model, the observed values of the goods are
random variables centered around the true value of the good. In this case,
logarithmic regret is achievable when competing against well behaved
adversaries. In the adversarial model, the goods need not be identical and we
simply compare our performance against that of the best fixed bid in hindsight.
We show that sublinear regret is also achievable in this case and prove
matching minimax lower bounds. To our knowledge, this is the first complete set
of strategies for bidders participating in auctions of this type
A Grey-Box Approach to Automated Mechanism Design
Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to
solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing
effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional
game theoretic, analytic approaches and in searching through the large space of
possible auction mechanisms. This paper presents an approach to automated
mechanism design (AMD) in the domain of double auctions. We describe a novel
parametrized space of double auctions, and then introduce an evolutionary
search method that searches this space of parameters. The approach evaluates
auction mechanisms using the framework of the TAC Market Design Game and
relates the performance of the markets in that game to their constituent parts
using reinforcement learning. Experiments show that the strongest mechanisms we
found using this approach not only win the Market Design Game against known,
strong opponents, but also exhibit desirable economic properties when they run
in isolation.Comment: 18 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables, and 1 algorithm. Extended abstract to
appear in the proceedings of AAMAS'201
An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information
available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take.
Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have
been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in
structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable
testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in
computer-based control systems.
Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order
to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods,
mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However,
due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically
simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results
derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result,
researchers are turning to empirical approaches.
This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to
designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on
empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field
Electronic Reverse Auctions: Spawning Procurement Innovation in the Context of Arab Culture
Government e-procurement initiatives have the potential to transform local institutions, but few studies have been published of strategies for implementing specific e-procurement tools, particularly involving procurement by a foreign government adapting to local culture in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA). This case describes procurement at a forward operating base (FOB) in Kuwait in support of operations in Iraq. The government procurers had to deal with a phenomenon unique to the MENA region: wasta. Wasta is a form of social capital that bestows power, influence, and connection to those who possess it, similar to guanxi in China. This study explores the value proposition and limitations of electronic reverse auctions (eRA) with the purpose of sharing best practices and lessons learned for government procurement in a MENA country. The public value framework provides valuable theoretical insights for the implementation of a new government e-procurement tool in a foreign country. In a culture dominated by wasta, the suppliers enjoyed the transparency and merit-based virtues of eRA’s that transferred successfully into the new cultural milieu: potential to increase transparency, competition, efficiency, and taxpayer savings. The practices provided herein are designed specifically to help buyers overcome structural barriers including training, organizational inertia, and a lack of eRA policy and guidance while implementing a new e-procurement tool in a foreign country
Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges
Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of
smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously
possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the
users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is
paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation.
In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for
participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing
incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently
discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally,
we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in
participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201
Private ex-ante transaction costs for repeated biodiversity conservation auctions: a case study
The European Union’s Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development has introduced promising changes in rewarding farmers by the implementation of conservation auctions and granting farmers’ transaction costs. The paper therefore deals with the evaluation of private transaction costs within a case study using repeated auctions to reward plant biodiversity. Based on a review of the current literature the paper develops a specific definition of transaction costs as well as a methodology to measure and calculate the farmers’ private transaction costs. The case study enfolds two field experiment auctions and two corresponding surveys. The transaction costs are measured by the use of written questionnaires and will be discussed both as a first reference value of farmers’ transaction costs as well as compared to the individual payments within the case study auctions in order to investigate the real-life performance of this specific application of repeated conservation auctions in biodiversity protection efforts.agri-environmental policy, biodiversity conservation auctions, transaction costs, ecological services, plant biodiversity, experimental economics, EAFRD-Regulation
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