Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to
solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing
effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional
game theoretic, analytic approaches and in searching through the large space of
possible auction mechanisms. This paper presents an approach to automated
mechanism design (AMD) in the domain of double auctions. We describe a novel
parametrized space of double auctions, and then introduce an evolutionary
search method that searches this space of parameters. The approach evaluates
auction mechanisms using the framework of the TAC Market Design Game and
relates the performance of the markets in that game to their constituent parts
using reinforcement learning. Experiments show that the strongest mechanisms we
found using this approach not only win the Market Design Game against known,
strong opponents, but also exhibit desirable economic properties when they run
in isolation.Comment: 18 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables, and 1 algorithm. Extended abstract to
appear in the proceedings of AAMAS'201