Judicial Review, Plural Weighted Voting, and Democracy

This paper examines an important argument that has received little attention despite its wide implications. This is the claim that judicial review can be equated with plural weighted voting (PwV) because both are justified as instruments to achieve better outcomes, and both violate political equality. We take this argument to be a reductio: given that plural voting is unacceptable, judicial review must be rejected. If correct, this claim threatens to undermine much recent liberal democratic theorising. We argue that none of the obvious routes to distinguish judicial review from PwV offer a convincing way to distinguish these two schemes. Furthermore, this has important implications for how we should understand judicial review. The result is thus significant not only for the particular issues mentioned, but also for our understanding of the role instrumental justifications play in democratic theory

Egalitarian vs. proportional voting in various contexts: An experimental study

The paper reports the results of series of experiments aimed at examining people’s readiness to use proportional voting as opposed to traditional, egalitarian ”one person-one vote“ principle. With proportional voting we understand voting procedures where the number of votes per person are determined based on how much the outcome of the vote influences each voter. In one experiment, the participants where asked to vote on a number of issues using various voting procedures. In addition to the traditional ”one issue—one vote“ procedure, the participants were also offered two voting schemes that let them freely divide a pre-assigned total number of votes between issues in various ways. The participants were also asked to evaluate the issues to measure their stakes. In another experiment, the participants were asked to evaluate various voting procedures that pre-assigned votes to different voter groups depending on the stakes of these groups. The voting issues were hypothetical scenarios regarding municipal-level decisions about construction work. Participants evaluated proportional voting procedures more favorably when more information was available about the stakes of those involved in the voting process. The overall results show that, at least in experimental conditions, people are ready to use proportional voting and are equally satisfied with proportional and egalitarian voting procedures. However, the question remains open whether proportional voting schemes can realistically be introduced into real-life democratic process

Democracy, Political Equality, and Majority Rule

Democracy is commonly associated with political equality and/or majority rule. This essay shows that these three ideas are conceptually separate, so the transition from any one to another stands in need of further substantive argument, which is not always adequately given. It does this by offering an alternative decision-making mechanism, called lottery voting, in which all individuals cast votes for their preferred options but, instead of these being counted, one is randomly selected and that vote determines the outcome. This procedure is democratic and egalitarian, since all have an equal chance to influence outcomes, but obviously not majoritarian

Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule

In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being. The main result of my study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule

Democratically Elected Aristocracies

The article suggests a formal model of a two-tier voting procedure, which unlike traditional voting systems does not presuppose that every vote counts the same. In deciding a particular issue voters are called in the first round to assign categories of their fellow-citizens with di#erential voting power (or weights) according to the special position or concern individuals are perceived as having with regard to that issue. In the second stage, voters vote on the issue itself according to their substantive view and their votes are counted in the light of the di#erential weights assigned in the first round. We analyze the formal and the philosophical reasons that support the model

Democratically Elected Aristocracies

The article suggests a formal model of a two-tier voting procedure, which unlike traditional voting systems does not presuppose that ev- ery vote counts the same. In deciding a particular issue voters are called in the first round to assign categories of their fellow-citizens with differential voting power (or weights) according to the special position or concern individuals are perceived as having with regard to that issue. In the second stage, voters vote on the issue itself accord- ing to their substantive view and their votes are counted in the light of the differential weights assigned in the first round. We analyze the formal and the philosophical reasons that support the model.