56,932 research outputs found

    On kernels, defaults and even graphs

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    Extensions in prerequisite-free, disjunction-free default theories have been shown to be in direct correspondence with kernels of directed graphs; hence default theories without odd cycles always have a ``standard'' kind of an extension. We show that, although all ``standard'' extensions can be enumerated explicitly, several other problems remain intractable for such theories: Telling whether a non-standard extension exists, enumerating all extensions, and finding the minimal standard extension. We also present a new graph-theoretic algorithm, based on vertex feedback sets, for enumerating all extensions of a general prerequisite-free, disjunction-free default theory (possibly with odd cycles). The algorithm empirically performs well for quite large theories

    A logic of defeasible argumentation: Constructing arguments in justification logic

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    In the 1980s, Pollock’s work on default reasons started the quest in the AI community for a formal system of defeasible argumentation. The main goal of this paper is to provide a logic of structured defeasible arguments using the language of justification logic. In this logic, we introduce defeasible justification assertions of the type t:F that read as “t is a defeasible reason that justifies F”. Such formulas are then interpreted as arguments and their acceptance semantics is given in analogy to Dung’s abstract argumentation framework semantics. We show that a large subclass of Dung’s frameworks that we call “warranted” frameworks is a special case of our logic in the sense that (1) Dung’s frameworks can be obtained from justification logic-based theories by focusing on a single aspect of attacks among justification logic arguments and (2) Dung’s warranted frameworks always have multiple justification logic instantiations called “realizations”. We first define a new justification logic that relies on operational semantics for default logic. One of the key features that is absent in standard justification logics is the possibility to weigh different epistemic reasons or pieces of evidence that might conflict with one another. To amend this, we develop a semantics for “defeaters”: conflicting reasons forming a basis to doubt the original conclusion or to believe an opposite statement. This enables us to formalize non-monotonic justifications that prompt extension revision already for normal default theories. Then we present our logic as a system for abstract argumentation with structured arguments. The format of conflicting reasons overlaps with the idea of attacks between arguments to the extent that it is possible to define all the standard notions of argumentation framework extensions. Using the definitions of extensions, we establish formal correspondence between Dung’s original argumentation semantics and our operational semantics for default theories. One of the results shows that the notorious attack cycles from abstract argumentation cannot always be realized as justification logic default theories

    Where Fail-Safe Default Logics Fail

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    Reiter's original definition of default logic allows for the application of a default that contradicts a previously applied one. We call failure this condition. The possibility of generating failures has been in the past considered as a semantical problem, and variants have been proposed to solve it. We show that it is instead a computational feature that is needed to encode some domains into default logic

    Complexity of Prioritized Default Logics

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    In default reasoning, usually not all possible ways of resolving conflicts between default rules are acceptable. Criteria expressing acceptable ways of resolving the conflicts may be hardwired in the inference mechanism, for example specificity in inheritance reasoning can be handled this way, or they may be given abstractly as an ordering on the default rules. In this article we investigate formalizations of the latter approach in Reiter's default logic. Our goal is to analyze and compare the computational properties of three such formalizations in terms of their computational complexity: the prioritized default logics of Baader and Hollunder, and Brewka, and a prioritized default logic that is based on lexicographic comparison. The analysis locates the propositional variants of these logics on the second and third levels of the polynomial hierarchy, and identifies the boundary between tractable and intractable inference for restricted classes of prioritized default theories
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