On kernels, defaults and even graphs

Extensions in prerequisite-free, disjunction-free default theories have been shown to be in direct correspondence with kernels of directed graphs; hence default theories without odd cycles always have a ``standard'' kind of an extension. We show that, although all ``standard'' extensions can be enumerated explicitly, several other problems remain intractable for such theories: Telling whether a non-standard extension exists, enumerating all extensions, and finding the minimal standard extension. We also present a new graph-theoretic algorithm, based on vertex feedback sets, for enumerating all extensions of a general prerequisite-free, disjunction-free default theory (possibly with odd cycles). The algorithm empirically performs well for quite large theories

A logic of defeasible argumentation: Constructing arguments in justification logic

In the 1980s, Pollock’s work on default reasons started the quest in the AI community for a formal system of defeasible argumentation. The main goal of this paper is to provide a logic of structured defeasible arguments using the language of justification logic. In this logic, we introduce defeasible justification assertions of the type t:F that read as “t is a defeasible reason that justifies F”. Such formulas are then interpreted as arguments and their acceptance semantics is given in analogy to Dung’s abstract argumentation framework semantics. We show that a large subclass of Dung’s frameworks that we call “warranted” frameworks is a special case of our logic in the sense that (1) Dung’s frameworks can be obtained from justification logic-based theories by focusing on a single aspect of attacks among justification logic arguments and (2) Dung’s warranted frameworks always have multiple justification logic instantiations called “realizations”. We first define a new justification logic that relies on operational semantics for default logic. One of the key features that is absent in standard justification logics is the possibility to weigh different epistemic reasons or pieces of evidence that might conflict with one another. To amend this, we develop a semantics for “defeaters”: conflicting reasons forming a basis to doubt the original conclusion or to believe an opposite statement. This enables us to formalize non-monotonic justifications that prompt extension revision already for normal default theories. Then we present our logic as a system for abstract argumentation with structured arguments. The format of conflicting reasons overlaps with the idea of attacks between arguments to the extent that it is possible to define all the standard notions of argumentation framework extensions. Using the definitions of extensions, we establish formal correspondence between Dung’s original argumentation semantics and our operational semantics for default theories. One of the results shows that the notorious attack cycles from abstract argumentation cannot always be realized as justification logic default theories

Where Fail-Safe Default Logics Fail

Reiter's original definition of default logic allows for the application of a default that contradicts a previously applied one. We call failure this condition. The possibility of generating failures has been in the past considered as a semantical problem, and variants have been proposed to solve it. We show that it is instead a computational feature that is needed to encode some domains into default logic

Redundancy in Logic III: Non-Mononotonic Reasoning

Results about the redundancy of circumscriptive and default theories are presented. In particular, the complexity of establishing whether a given theory is redundant is establihsed.Comment: minor correction

Complexity of Prioritized Default Logics

In default reasoning, usually not all possible ways of resolving conflicts between default rules are acceptable. Criteria expressing acceptable ways of resolving the conflicts may be hardwired in the inference mechanism, for example specificity in inheritance reasoning can be handled this way, or they may be given abstractly as an ordering on the default rules. In this article we investigate formalizations of the latter approach in Reiter's default logic. Our goal is to analyze and compare the computational properties of three such formalizations in terms of their computational complexity: the prioritized default logics of Baader and Hollunder, and Brewka, and a prioritized default logic that is based on lexicographic comparison. The analysis locates the propositional variants of these logics on the second and third levels of the polynomial hierarchy, and identifies the boundary between tractable and intractable inference for restricted classes of prioritized default theories

Propositional semantics for default logic

We present new semantics for propositional default logic based on the notion of meta-interpretations - truth functions that assign truth values to clauses rather than letters. This leads to a propositional characterization of default theories: for each such finite theory, we show a classical propositional theory such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between models for the latter and extensions of the former. This means that computing an extension and answering questions about coherence, set-membership, and set-entailment are reducible to propositional satisfiability. The general transformation is exponential but tractable for a subset which we call 2-DT which is a superset of network default theories and disjunction-free default theories. This leads to the observation that coherence and membership for the class 2-DT is NP-complete and entailment is co-NP-complete.Since propositional satisfiability can be regarded as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP), this work also paves the way for applying CSP techniques to default reasoning. In particular, we use the taxonomy of tractable CSP to identify new tractable subsets for Reiter's default logic. Our procedures allow also for computing stable models of extended logic programs