Operational Decision Making under Uncertainty: Inferential, Sequential, and Adversarial Approaches

Modern security threats are characterized by a stochastic, dynamic, partially observable, and ambiguous operational environment. This dissertation addresses such complex security threats using operations research techniques for decision making under uncertainty in operations planning, analysis, and assessment. First, this research develops a new method for robust queue inference with partially observable, stochastic arrival and departure times, motivated by cybersecurity and terrorism applications. In the dynamic setting, this work develops a new variant of Markov decision processes and an algorithm for robust information collection in dynamic, partially observable and ambiguous environments, with an application to a cybersecurity detection problem. In the adversarial setting, this work presents a new application of counterfactual regret minimization and robust optimization to a multi-domain cyber and air defense problem in a partially observable environment

HARL: A Novel Hierachical Adversary Reinforcement Learning for Automoumous Intersection Management

As an emerging technology, Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) are believed to have the ability to move through intersections in a faster and safer manner, through effective Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication and global observation. Autonomous intersection management is a key path to efficient crossing at intersections, which reduces unnecessary slowdowns and stops through adaptive decision process of each CAV, enabling fuller utilization of the intersection space. Distributed reinforcement learning (DRL) offers a flexible, end-to-end model for AIM, adapting for many intersection scenarios. While DRL is prone to collisions as the actions of multiple sides in the complicated interactions are sampled from a generic policy, restricting the application of DRL in realistic scenario. To address this, we propose a hierarchical RL framework where models at different levels vary in receptive scope, action step length, and feedback period of reward. The upper layer model accelerate CAVs to prevent them from being clashed, while the lower layer model adjust the trends from upper layer model to avoid the change of mobile state causing new conflicts. And the real action of CAV at each step is co-determined by the trends from both levels, forming a real-time balance in the adversarial process. The proposed model is proven effective in the experiment undertaken in a complicated intersection with 4 branches and 4 lanes each branch, and show better performance compared with baselines

Game Theory Relaunched

The game is on. Do you know how to play? Game theory sets out to explore what can be said about making decisions which go beyond accepting the rules of a game. Since 1942, a well elaborated mathematical apparatus has been developed to do so; but there is more. During the last three decades game theoretic reasoning has popped up in many other fields as well - from engineering to biology and psychology. New simulation tools and network analysis have made game theory omnipresent these days. This book collects recent research papers in game theory, which come from diverse scientific communities all across the world; they combine many different fields like economics, politics, history, engineering, mathematics, physics, and psychology. All of them have as a common denominator some method of game theory. Enjoy

EVALUATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE METHODS FOR USE IN KILL CHAIN FUNCTIONS

Current naval operations require sailors to make time-critical and high-stakes decisions based on uncertain situational knowledge in dynamic operational environments. Recent tragic events have resulted in unnecessary casualties, and they represent the decision complexity involved in naval operations and specifically highlight challenges within the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Assess). Kill chain decisions involving the use of weapon systems are a particularly stressing category within the OODA loop—with unexpected threats that are difficult to identify with certainty, shortened decision reaction times, and lethal consequences. An effective kill chain requires the proper setup and employment of shipboard sensors; the identification and classification of unknown contacts; the analysis of contact intentions based on kinematics and intelligence; an awareness of the environment; and decision analysis and resource selection. This project explored the use of automation and artificial intelligence (AI) to improve naval kill chain decisions. The team studied naval kill chain functions and developed specific evaluation criteria for each function for determining the efficacy of specific AI methods. The team identified and studied AI methods and applied the evaluation criteria to map specific AI methods to specific kill chain functions.Civilian, Department of the NavyCivilian, Department of the NavyCivilian, Department of the NavyCaptain, United States Marine CorpsCivilian, Department of the NavyCivilian, Department of the NavyApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

A Comprehensive Survey of Data Mining-based Fraud Detection Research

This survey paper categorises, compares, and summarises from almost all published technical and review articles in automated fraud detection within the last 10 years. It defines the professional fraudster, formalises the main types and subtypes of known fraud, and presents the nature of data evidence collected within affected industries. Within the business context of mining the data to achieve higher cost savings, this research presents methods and techniques together with their problems. Compared to all related reviews on fraud detection, this survey covers much more technical articles and is the only one, to the best of our knowledge, which proposes alternative data and solutions from related domains.Comment: 14 page

A Temporal Framework for Hypergame Analysis of Cyber Physical Systems in Contested Environments

Game theory is used to model conflicts between one or more players over resources. It offers players a way to reason, allowing rationale for selecting strategies that avoid the worst outcome. Game theory lacks the ability to incorporate advantages one player may have over another player. A meta-game, known as a hypergame, occurs when one player does not know or fully understand all the strategies of a game. Hypergame theory builds upon the utility of game theory by allowing a player to outmaneuver an opponent, thus obtaining a more preferred outcome with higher utility. Recent work in hypergame theory has focused on normal form static games that lack the ability to encode several realistic strategies. One example of this is when a player’s available actions in the future is dependent on his selection in the past. This work presents a temporal framework for hypergame models. This framework is the first application of temporal logic to hypergames and provides a more flexible modeling for domain experts. With this new framework for hypergames, the concepts of trust, distrust, mistrust, and deception are formalized. While past literature references deception in hypergame research, this work is the first to formalize the definition for hypergames. As a demonstration of the new temporal framework for hypergames, it is applied to classical game theoretical examples, as well as a complex supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) network temporal hypergame. The SCADA network is an example includes actions that have a temporal dependency, where a choice in the first round affects what decisions can be made in the later round of the game. The demonstration results show that the framework is a realistic and flexible modeling method for a variety of applications