1,113 research outputs found
Integrated Safety and Security Risk Assessment Methods: A Survey of Key Characteristics and Applications
Over the last years, we have seen several security incidents that compromised
system safety, of which some caused physical harm to people. Meanwhile, various
risk assessment methods have been developed that integrate safety and security,
and these could help to address the corresponding threats by implementing
suitable risk treatment plans. However, an overarching overview of these
methods, systematizing the characteristics of such methods, is missing. In this
paper, we conduct a systematic literature review, and identify 7 integrated
safety and security risk assessment methods. We analyze these methods based on
5 different criteria, and identify key characteristics and applications. A key
outcome is the distinction between sequential and non-sequential integration of
safety and security, related to the order in which safety and security risks
are assessed. This study provides a basis for developing more effective
integrated safety and security risk assessment methods in the future
DAG-Based Attack and Defense Modeling: Don't Miss the Forest for the Attack Trees
This paper presents the current state of the art on attack and defense
modeling approaches that are based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). DAGs
allow for a hierarchical decomposition of complex scenarios into simple, easily
understandable and quantifiable actions. Methods based on threat trees and
Bayesian networks are two well-known approaches to security modeling. However
there exist more than 30 DAG-based methodologies, each having different
features and goals. The objective of this survey is to present a complete
overview of graphical attack and defense modeling techniques based on DAGs.
This consists of summarizing the existing methodologies, comparing their
features and proposing a taxonomy of the described formalisms. This article
also supports the selection of an adequate modeling technique depending on user
requirements
Improving Attack Trees Analysis using Petri Net modeling of Cyber-Attacks
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 IEEE.Cyber security is one general concern to all network-based organizations. In recent years, by significant increasing cyber-attacks in critical infrastructures (CIs) the need of smart prediction, awareness and protection systems is not deniable. The first step for security assessment is on recognizing and analyzing attacks. In this paper, one of the graphical security assessments named Attack Tree (AT) is used to illustrate one kind of cyber-attacks scenario in Industry 4.0 and the system's behavior is analyzed by Petri Nets.authorsversionpublishe
Toward optimal multi-objective models of network security: Survey
Information security is an important aspect of a successful business today. However, financial difficulties and budget cuts create a problem of selecting appropriate security measures and keeping networked systems up and running. Economic models proposed in the literature do not address the challenging problem of security countermeasure selection. We have made a classification of security models, which can be used to harden a system in a cost effective manner based on the methodologies used. In addition, we have specified the challenges of the simplified risk assessment approaches used in the economic models and have made recommendations how the challenges can be addressed in order to support decision makers
Towards optimal multi-objective models of network security: survey
Information security is an important aspect of a successful business today. However, financial difficulties and budget cuts create a problem of selecting appropriate security measures and keeping networked systems up and running. Economic models proposed in the literature do not address the challenging problem of security countermeasure selection. We have made a classification of security models, which can be used to harden a system in a cost effective manner based on the methodologies used. In addition, we have specified the challenges of the simplified risk assessment approaches used in the economic models and have made recommendations how the challenges can be addressed in order to support decision makers
Integrated Attack Tree in Residual Risk Management Framework
Safety-critical cyber-physical systems (CPSs), such as high-tech cars having cyber capabilities, are highly interconnected. Automotive manufacturers are concerned about cyber attacks on vehicles that can lead to catastrophic consequences. There is a need for a new risk management approach to address and investigate cybersecurity risks. Risk management in the automotive domain is challenging due to technological improvements and advances every year. The current standard for automotive security is ISO/SAE 21434, which discusses a framework that includes threats, associated risks, and risk treatment options such as risk reduction by applying appropriate defences. This paper presents a residual cybersecurity risk management framework aligned with the framework presented in ISO/SAE 21434. A methodology is proposed to develop an integrated attack tree that considers multiple sub-systems within the CPS. Integrating attack trees in this way will help the analyst to take a broad perspective of system security. Our previous approach utilises a flow graph to calculate the residual risk to a system before and after applying defences. This paper is an extension of our initial work. It defines the steps for applying the proposed framework and using adaptive cruise control (ACC) and adaptive light control (ALC) to illustrate the applicability of our work. This work is evaluated by comparing it with the requirements of the risk management framework discussed in the literature. Currently, our methodology satisfies more than 75% of their requirements
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