12,218 research outputs found
Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
Territoriality of Law and the International Trade Game: Towards a New Institutional Economics of International Transactions
The conventional theory of international trade is dominated by a model presupposing a legal order that is perfect in its specifications and controllability, binding for all economic agents, no matter their nationality. World order appears to be cosmopolitan in the sense of Kant. An international private law community such as this, however, does not exist. In fact, there is a multitude of legal orders and a territoriality of law, leading to problems largely neglected in the traditional theory of international trade. They are at the heart of what we would like to call the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT) – a research program which started from a monograph published in 1990 (see Schmidt-Trenz 1990). This paper addresses two questions: Which specific problems emerge in contracts and the contracting process because of factors such as the multitude of legal orders and the territoriality of law? What solutions are there to these problems a) on the level of the law, and b) in the shadow of the law or completely independent of it (?private ordering?)? How do they work from an efficiency point of view? We restrict attention to the international exchange of goods. However, the insights gained can be transferred to other types of transactions, such as international finance transactions, direct investment, and investment agreements. --conflict of law,international private law,transaction costs,enforcement of judgements,private ordering
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Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders Reappraised
Economists draw important lessons for modern development from the medieval Maghribi traders who, according to Greif, enforced contracts multilaterally through a closed, private-order ‘coalition’. We show that this view is untenable. The Maghribis used formal legal mechanisms and entered business associations with non-Maghribis. Not a single empirical example adduced by Greif shows that any ‘coalition’ actually existed. The Maghribis cannot be used to argue that the social capital of exclusive networks will facilitate exchange in developing economies. Nor do they provide any support for the cultural theories of economic development and institutional change for which they have been mobilised
Contract Farming in Developing Countries: An overview
This paper presents a review of the literature on contract farming (CF), focusing on recent empirical research on the economic impact of CF. The paper starts with an explanation of the phenomenon of CF, providing definitions, typologies, models and objectives. Using a Transaction Costs Economics framework, the paper explains for which products and market CF seems most suitable. The empirical literature on CF is assessed by answering three questions: Why do smallholders engage in CF? Are smallholders included in or excluded from CF arrangements? What impact does CF have on smallholder income and rural development? Finally, the paper identifies the conditions under which smallholders are most likely to benefit from CF schemes
Quality of Information in Mobile Crowdsensing: Survey and Research Challenges
Smartphones have become the most pervasive devices in people's lives, and are
clearly transforming the way we live and perceive technology. Today's
smartphones benefit from almost ubiquitous Internet connectivity and come
equipped with a plethora of inexpensive yet powerful embedded sensors, such as
accelerometer, gyroscope, microphone, and camera. This unique combination has
enabled revolutionary applications based on the mobile crowdsensing paradigm,
such as real-time road traffic monitoring, air and noise pollution, crime
control, and wildlife monitoring, just to name a few. Differently from prior
sensing paradigms, humans are now the primary actors of the sensing process,
since they become fundamental in retrieving reliable and up-to-date information
about the event being monitored. As humans may behave unreliably or
maliciously, assessing and guaranteeing Quality of Information (QoI) becomes
more important than ever. In this paper, we provide a new framework for
defining and enforcing the QoI in mobile crowdsensing, and analyze in depth the
current state-of-the-art on the topic. We also outline novel research
challenges, along with possible directions of future work.Comment: To appear in ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN
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Information exchange in laboratory markets: competition, transfer costs, and the emergence of reputation
Public reputation mechanisms are an effective means to limit opportunistic behavior in markets suffering from moral hazard problems. While previous research was mostly concerned with the influence of exogenous feedback mechanisms, this study considers the endogenous emergence of reputation through deliberate information sharing among actors and the role of barriers in hindering information exchange. Using a repeated investment game, we analyze the effects of competition and transfer costs on players’ willingness to share information with each other. While transfer costs are a direct cost of the information exchange, competition costs represent an indirect cost that arises when the transfer of valuable information to competitors comes at the loss of a competitive advantage. We show that barriers to information exchange not only affect the behavior of the senders of information, but also affect the ones about whom the information is shared. While the possibility of sharing information about others significantly improves trust and market efficiency, both competition and direct transfer costs diminish the positive effect by substantially reducing the level of information exchange. Players about whom the information is shared anticipate and react to the changes in the costs by behaving more or less cooperatively. For reputation building, an environment is needed that fosters the sharing of information. Reciprocity is key to understanding information exchange. Even when it is costly, information sharing is used as a way to sanction others. © 2020, The Author(s)
Coopetition and innovation. Lessons from worker cooperatives in the Spanish machine tool industry
This is an electronic version of the accepted paper in Journal of Business & Industrial
Marketing[EN] Purpose –
This paper aims to investigate how the implementation of the inter-cooperation principle
among Spanish machine-tool cooperatives helps them to coopete–collaborate with
competitors, in their innovation and internationalization processes and achieve collaborative
advantages.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses a multi-case approach based on interviews
with 15 CEOs and research and development (R&D) managers, representing 14 Spanish
machine tool firms and institutions. Eight of these organizations are worker-cooperatives..
Findings – Worker -cooperatives achieve advantages on innovation and internationalization
via inter-cooperation (shared R&D units, joint sales offices, joint after-sale services,
knowledge exchange and relocation of key R&D technicians and managers). Several mutual
bonds and ties among cooperatives help to overcome the risk of opportunistic behaviour and
knowledge leakage associated to coopetition. The obtained results give some clues explaining
to what extent and under which conditions coopetitive strategies of cooperatives are
transferable to other types of ownership arrangements across sectors.
Practical implications – Firms seeking cooperation with competitors in their R&D and
internationalization processes can learn from the coopetitive arrangements analyzed in the
paper.
Social implications – Findings can be valuable for sectoral associations and public bodies
trying to promote coopetition and alliances between competitors as a means to benefit from
collaborative advantages.
Originality/value – Focusing on an “ideal type” of co-operation -cooperative organisationsand
having access to primary sources, the paper shows to what extent (and how) strong
coopetitive structures and processes foster innovation and internationalization
The Impact of the Judiciary on Economic Activity
This paper examines the consequences of slow judiciaries on firms' contracting behaviour in India. After deriving testable implications from a game theoretical model, I examine how case pendency rates in India's state courts affect the contracting behaviour of 170,000 small non-agricultural informal firms from the 2000 National Sample Survey's 55th round. I find that a slow judiciary implies more breaches of contract, discourages firms from undertaking relationship-specific investments, impedes firms' access to formal financial institutions, and favours inefficient dynasties. Moving a firm from the highest to the lowest pendency state would result in a 10% improvement in firm performance.Law and economics, Institutions, Courts, Contracts, Industrial Organisation, Economic Growth, Industrial Performance
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