9,247 research outputs found
Counterfactual thinking in cooperation dynamics
Counterfactual Thinking is a human cognitive ability studied in a wide
variety of domains. It captures the process of reasoning about a past event
that did not occur, namely what would have happened had this event occurred,
or, otherwise, to reason about an event that did occur but what would ensue had
it not. Given the wide cognitive empowerment of counterfactual reasoning in the
human individual, the question arises of how the presence of individuals with
this capability may improve cooperation in populations of self-regarding
individuals. Here we propose a mathematical model, grounded on Evolutionary
Game Theory, to examine the population dynamics emerging from the interplay
between counterfactual thinking and social learning (i.e., individuals that
learn from the actions and success of others) whenever the individuals in the
population face a collective dilemma. Our results suggest that counterfactual
reasoning fosters coordination in collective action problems occurring in large
populations, and has a limited impact on cooperation dilemmas in which
coordination is not required. Moreover, we show that a small prevalence of
individuals resorting to counterfactual thinking is enough to nudge an entire
population towards highly cooperative standards.Comment: 18 page
Sequence Matters: an Experimental Study of the Effects of Experiencing Positive and Negative Reciprocity
This paper presents an experimental analysis of people’s behavior in situations involving both positive and negative reciprocity. The experiment implements sequences of two types of extensive form games called Punishment games and Trust games. The contemporaneous use of these two types of games allows us to define an ideal framework for understanding the basic elements of reciprocal behavior. Results show that the level of trust and punishment are consistent with the view that emotions are involvedReciprocity, trust, intentions, emotions, experiments J.E.L. Classification: D63, C78, C91
The false promise of the better argument
Effective argumentation in international politics is widely conceived as a matter
of persuasion. In particular, the ‘logic of arguing’ ascribes explanatory power
to the ‘better argument’ and promises to illuminate the conditions of legitimate
normative change. This article exposes the self-defeating implications of the
Habermasian symbiosis between the normative and the empirical force of
arguments. Since genuine persuasion is neither observable nor knowable, its
analysis critically depends on what scholars consider to be the better argument.
Seemingly, objective criteria such as universality only camouflage such moral
reification. The paradoxical consequence of an explanatory concept of arguing
is that moral discourse is no longer conceptualized as an open-ended process of
contestation and normative change, but has recently been recast as a governance
mechanism ensuring the compliance of international actors with pre-defined
norms. This dilemma can be avoided through a positivist reification of valid
norms, as in socialization research, or by adopting a critical and emancipatory
focus on the obstacles to true persuasion. Still, both solutions remain dependent
on the ‘persuasion vs. coercion’ problem that forestalls an insight into successful
justificatory practices other than rational communication. The conclusion
therefore pleas for a pragmatic abstention from better arguments and points to
the insights to be gained from pragmatist norms research in sociology
Employing AI to Better Understand Our Morals
We present a summary of research that we have conducted employing AI to better understand human morality. This summary adumbrates theoretical fundamentals and considers how to regulate development of powerful new AI technologies. The latter research aim is benevolent AI, with fair distribution of benefits associated with the development of these and related technologies, avoiding disparities of power and wealth due to unregulated competition. Our approach avoids statistical models employed in other approaches to solve moral dilemmas, because these are “blind” to natural constraints on moral agents, and risk perpetuating mistakes. Instead, our approach employs, for instance, psychologically realistic counterfactual reasoning in group dynamics. The present paper reviews studies involving factors fundamental to human moral motivation, including egoism vs. altruism, commitment vs. defaulting, guilt vs. non-guilt, apology plus forgiveness, counterfactual collaboration, among other factors fundamental in the motivation of moral action. These being basic elements in most moral systems, our studies deliver generalizable conclusions that inform efforts to achieve greater sustainability and global benefit, regardless of cultural specificities in constituents
The Explanatory Potential of Artificial Societies
It is often claimed that artificial society simulations contribute to the explanation of social phenomena. At the hand of a particular example, this paper argues that artificial societies often cannot provide full explanations, because their models are not or cannot be validated. Instead, artificial societies may sometimes provide potential explanations. It is shown that these potential explanations, if they contribute to our understanding, considerably differ from the standard kind of potential causal explanations. Instead of possible causal histories, simulations offer possible functional analyses of the explanandum. The paper discusses how these two kinds of potential explanations differ, and how possible functional analyses can be appraised
EMU and the euro - the first 10 years. Challenges to the sustainability and price stability of the euro area - what does history tell us?
EMU and the euro will face a number of challenges in the future. Two such challenges are examined here:first, the endurance prospects for the euro, and second, the inflation performance of the euro area during the coming ten years. How will it respond to them? This report provides a set of tentative answers based on the history of monetary unions and of stabilization policies. This body of evidence is exploited as the prime basis for conjectures and forecasts presented.Monetary unions, EMU, ECB, the euro, monetary and fiscal policies, Jonung
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