Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains

Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains.Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain

Practices for strategic capacity management in Malaysian manufacturing firms

While the notion of manufacturing capabilities is a long-standing notion in research on operations management, its actual implementation and management has been hardly researched. Five case studies in Malaysia offered the opportunity to examine the practice of manufacturing managers with regard to strategic capability management. The data collection and analysis was structured by using the notion of Strategic Capacity Management. Whereas traditionally literature has demonstrated the beneficial impact of an appropriate manufacturing strategy on the business strategy and performance, the study highlights the difficulty of managers to set the strategy, let alone implementing it. This is partly caused by the immense pressure of customers in these dominantly Make-To-Order environments for SMEs. Current concepts for manufacturing capabilities have insufficiently accounted this phenomenon and an outline of a research agenda is presented

Supply chain management in industrial production. A retrospective view

The article presents a retrospective review on key-issues about how the management discipline evolved up to the current view about supply-chain management (SCM) in industrial production. Specifically, the article resumes: a) the reasons that led to the transition from the traditional procurement policies to the SCM approach, b) the variables involved in the process of defining SCM relations and c) the key managerial principles underlying SCM policies and strategies. In the manufacturing industry the problem of organizing and managing firm’s relationships with supplier has recently become of an unprecedented complexity. The evolution of production systems started around the ‘80s, with the shift from the “flexible” paradigm to the “lean” one, has increased dramatically the intricacy of product and process architecture.. At the same time, the opportunities brought by the technological hybridization of products (that is: opportunities deriving from incorporating complementary technologies within products so to enhance its features and performance) gained a critical role as a competitive advantage. In our view supply chain management, as well as others managerial areas, has undergone a profound change; indeed, in the last 30 years the evolution of the industrial competitive environment has deeply modified the reference framework of supply-chain relationships even in common procurement and/or routine contracts. In the attempt to give an adequate response to changes in the competitive environment, supply policies evolve to become articulate relational strategies based on the strategic assessments of the role and the relevance of the various suppliers. The traditional approach to procurement management is combined with a perspective of value creation, a perspective that goes beyond the traditional “make-or-buy” criteria, since it introduces principles for the assessment of the strategic capability of the suppliers to create value for customer rather than to be able to fulfill its task for the firm. In such a view, firms operating in the same value-chain coordinate their strategies with a view to increase the overall value rather than compete for the allocation of the existing one. Firms’ network of suppliers and the relational capabilities assume a critical role in order to coordinate the value creation processes within the chain.Supply chain management, industrial management

Managing Intellectual Property to Foster Agricultural Development

Over the past decades, consideration of IPRs has become increasingly important in many areas of agricultural development, including foreign direct investment, technology transfer, trade, investment in innovation, access to genetic resources, and the protection of traditional knowledge. The widening role of IPRs in governing the ownership of—and access to—innovation, information, and knowledge makes them particularly critical in ensuring that developing countries benefit from the introduction of new technologies that could radically alter the welfare of the poor. Failing to improve IPR policies and practices to support the needs of developing countries will eliminate significant development opportunities. The discussion in this note moves away from policy prescriptions to focus on investments to improve how IPRs are used in practice in agricultural development. These investments must be seen as complementary to other investments in agricultural development. IPRs are woven into the context of innovation and R&D. They can enable entrepreneurship and allow the leveraging of private resources for resolving the problems of poverty. Conversely, IPRs issues can delay important scientific advancements, deter investment in products for the poor, and impose crippling transaction costs on organizations if the wrong tools are used or tools are badly applied. The central benefit of pursuing the investments outlined in this note is to build into the system a more robust capacity for strategic and flexible use of IPRs tailored to development goals

CRIBs (Climate Relevant Innovation-system Builders): policy recommendations on fostering national systems of innovation under the UNFCCC

National systems of innovation (NSIs) provide the context within which all processes of technology development, transfer and uptake occur - they refer to the network of actors (e.g. firms, universities, research institutes, government departments, NGOs) within which innovation occurs, and the strength and nature of the relationships between them. Nurturing NSIs in relation to climate technologies provides a powerful new focus for international policy with potential to underpin more sustained and widespread development and transfer of climate technologies. This working paper builds on an invited presentation by one of the authors at a workshop on NSIs convened by the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It identifies policy recommendations for consideration of the TEC. The intention is both to inform possible recommendations by the TEC to the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) and to highlight potential areas for future work that the TEC could undertake on this issue

Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions In Retail Supply Chains With Customer Value

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value‐added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non‐cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers

Dynamic joint investments in supply chains under information asymmetry

Supply chain management involves the selection, coordination and motivation of independently operated suppliers. However the central planner's perspective in operations management translates poorly to vertically separated chains, where suppliers may have rational myopic reasons to object to full in- formation sharing and centralized decision rights. Particular problems occur when a downstream coordinator demands relation-specific investments (equipment, cost improvements in processes, adaptation of components to downstream processes, allocation of future capacity etc) from upstream suppliers without being able to commit to long-term contracts. In practice and theory, this leads of- ten to a phenomenon of either underinvestment in the chain or costly vertical integration to solve the commitment problem. A two-stage supply chain under stochastic demand and information asymmetry is modelled. A repeated investment-production game with coordinator commitment in supplier's investment addresses the information sharing and asset- specific investment problem. We provide a mitigation of the hold-up problem on the investment cost observed by the supplier and an instrument for truthful revelation of private information by using an investment sharing device. We show that there is an interior solution for the investment sharing parameter and discuss some extensions to the work.supply chain management, investment, information