2,708 research outputs found

    Coalition Formation and Combinatorial Auctions; Applications to Self-organization and Self-management in Utility Computing

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    In this paper we propose a two-stage protocol for resource management in a hierarchically organized cloud. The first stage exploits spatial locality for the formation of coalitions of supply agents; the second stage, a combinatorial auction, is based on a modified proxy-based clock algorithm and has two phases, a clock phase and a proxy phase. The clock phase supports price discovery; in the second phase a proxy conducts multiple rounds of a combinatorial auction for the package of services requested by each client. The protocol strikes a balance between low-cost services for cloud clients and a decent profit for the service providers. We also report the results of an empirical investigation of the combinatorial auction stage of the protocol.Comment: 14 page

    Coordination of Purchasing and Bidding Activities Across Markets

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    In both consumer purchasing and industrial procurement, combinatorial interdependencies among the items to be purchased are commonplace. E-commerce compounds the problem by providing more opportunities for switching suppliers at low costs, but also potentially eases the problem by enabling automated market decision-making systems, commonly referred to as trading agents, to make purchasing decisions in an integrated manner across markets. Most of the existing research related to trading agents assumes that there exists a combinatorial market mechanism in which buyers (or sellers) can bid (or sell) service or merchant bundles. Todayâ??s prevailing e-commerce practice, however, does not support this assumption in general and thus limits the practical applicability of these approaches. We are investigating a new approach to deal with the combinatorial interdependency challenges for online markets. This approach relies on existing commercial online market institutions such as posted-price markets and various online auctions that sell single items. It uses trading agents to coordinate a buyerâ??s purchasing and bidding activities across multiple online markets simultaneously to achieve the best overall procurement effectiveness. This paper presents two sets of models related to this approach. The first set of models formalizes optimal purchasing decisions across posted-price markets with fixed transaction costs. Flat shipping costs, a common e-tailing practice, are captured in these models. We observe that making optimal purchasing decisions in this context is NP-hard in the strong sense and suggest several efficient computational methods based on discrete location theory. The second set of models is concerned with the coordination of bidding activities across multiple online auctions. We study the underlying coordination problem for a collection of first or second-price sealed-bid auctions and derive the optimal coordination and bidding policies.

    Born to trade: a genetically evolved keyword bidder for sponsored search

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    In sponsored search auctions, advertisers choose a set of keywords based on products they wish to market. They bid for advertising slots that will be displayed on the search results page when a user submits a query containing the keywords that the advertiser selected. Deciding how much to bid is a real challenge: if the bid is too low with respect to the bids of other advertisers, the ad might not get displayed in a favorable position; a bid that is too high on the other hand might not be profitable either, since the attracted number of conversions might not be enough to compensate for the high cost per click. In this paper we propose a genetically evolved keyword bidding strategy that decides how much to bid for each query based on historical data such as the position obtained on the previous day. In light of the fact that our approach does not implement any particular expert knowledge on keyword auctions, it did remarkably well in the Trading Agent Competition at IJCAI2009

    An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design

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    Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in computer-based control systems. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field

    User evaluation of a market-based recommender system

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    Recommender systems have been developed for a wide variety of applications (ranging from books, to holidays, to web pages). These systems have used a number of different approaches, since no one technique is best for all users in all situations. Given this, we believe that to be effective, systems should incorporate a wide variety of such techniques and then some form of overarching framework should be put in place to coordinate them so that only the best recommendations (from whatever source) are presented to the user. To this end, in our previous work, we detailed a market-based approach in which various recommender agents competed with one another to present their recommendations to the user. We showed through theoretical analysis and empirical evaluation with simulated users that an appropriately designed marketplace should be able to provide effective coordination. Building on this, we now report on the development of this multi-agent system and its evaluation with real users. Specifically, we show that our system is capable of consistently giving high quality recommendations, that the best recommendations that could be put forward are actually put forward, and that the combination of recommenders performs better than any constituent recommende

    Learning users' interests by quality classification in market-based recommender systems

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    Recommender systems are widely used to cope with the problem of information overload and, to date, many recommendation methods have been developed. However, no one technique is best for all users in all situations. To combat this, we have previously developed a market-based recommender system that allows multiple agents (each representing a different recommendation method or system) to compete with one another to present their best recommendations to the user. In our system, the marketplace encourages good recommendations by rewarding the corresponding agents who supplied them according to the users’ ratings of their suggestions. Moreover, we have theoretically shown how our system incentivises the agents to bid in a manner that ensures only the best recommendations are presented. To do this effectively in practice, however, each agent needs to be able to classify its recommendations into different internal quality levels, learn the users’ interests for these different levels, and then adapt its bidding behaviour for the various levels accordingly. To this end, in this paper we develop a reinforcement learning and Boltzmann exploration strategy that the recommending agents can exploit for these tasks. We then demonstrate that this strategy does indeed help the agents to effectively obtain information about the users’ interests which, in turn, speeds up the market convergence and enables the system to rapidly highlight the best recommendations
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