The Drama of Fishing Commons: Cournot-Nash Model and Cooperation

Cournot-Nash model; drama of the commons; cooperation; game theory; fishing effort.

Job Scheduling, Cooperation and Control

This paper considers one machine job scheduling situations or sequencing problems, where clients can have more than a single job to be processed in order to get a final output.Moreover, a job can be of interest for different players. This means that one of the main assumptions in classic sequencing problems is dropped: the one to one correspondence between clients and jobs.It is shown that the corresponding cooperative games are balanced for specific types of cost criteria.scheduling;cooperation;game theory;cooperative games

On the Prevalence of Framing Effects Across Subject-Pools in a Two- Person Cooperation Game

In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person cooperation game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player, and in the negative frame, a negative one. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki and Jerusalem, no framing effect is observed. These findings are also reflected in associated first-order beliefs. We argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within (cross-cultural) research on subject-pool differences.framing of decision problems, methodology, subject-pool differences

Coalitional Games for Transmitter Cooperation in MIMO Multiple Access Channels

Cooperation between nodes sharing a wireless channel is becoming increasingly necessary to achieve performance goals in a wireless network. The problem of determining the feasibility and stability of cooperation between rational nodes in a wireless network is of great importance in understanding cooperative behavior. This paper addresses the stability of the grand coalition of transmitters signaling over a multiple access channel using the framework of cooperative game theory. The external interference experienced by each TX is represented accurately by modeling the cooperation game between the TXs in \emph{partition form}. Single user decoding and successive interference cancelling strategies are examined at the receiver. In the absence of coordination costs, the grand coalition is shown to be \emph{sum-rate optimal} for both strategies. Transmitter cooperation is \emph{stable}, if and only if the core of the game (the set of all divisions of grand coalition utility such that no coalition deviates) is nonempty. Determining the stability of cooperation is a co-NP-complete problem in general. For a single user decoding receiver, transmitter cooperation is shown to be \emph{stable} at both high and low SNRs, while for an interference cancelling receiver with a fixed decoding order, cooperation is stable only at low SNRs and unstable at high SNR. When time sharing is allowed between decoding orders, it is shown using an approximate lower bound to the utility function that TX cooperation is also stable at high SNRs. Thus, this paper demonstrates that ideal zero cost TX cooperation over a MAC is stable and improves achievable rates for each individual user.Comment: in review for publication in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processin

Essential Feature - Cooperative Gameplay

Although single player and multiplayer is very important in today game, cooperative mode is an essential part of a great game. There are a lot of benefits of playing co-op mode in a game such as education and joy. Communicating, solving problems, handling stress, managing time, making decision, following instructions, acting fast as well as working in a team are skills that students can learn and practice while they are playing cooperative games. These skills are valuable for students to use in education and even in careers

Gender-specific inclinations in a Cooperation Game - Implications for Negotiations

This study explores possible gender-specific inclinations, specifically inclinations for cooperation, fairness, discrimination, risk taking and sex stereotyping, all potentially fundamental to negotiation outcomes. The aim is that the findings may provide insight in observed gender inequality in organizational life. Participants in the study were engaged in matrix games with a Prisoners’ Dilemma-like payoff structure, but with variable degrees of possible cooperation. The games were played with the strategy method and all participants played against both women and men. The results showed no significant differences in level of cooperation between the sexes. Neither were there any significant differences in fairness or discrimination of or by either sex in the games. However, men were found to be more prone to taking risks compared to women, and both female- and male participants believed that men would take higher risks in the games. Differences in risk propensity may help explain why men do better in negotiations in organizational life, as men would be more inclined than women to enter risky negotiations and taking risks in negotiations. Thus policies aimed at lowering the risk of becoming unemployed, paired with policies to lower the risk of initiating salary negotiations, could potentially contribute to increased gender equality in organizational life

A Distributed Merge and Split Algorithm for Fair Cooperation in Wireless Networks

This paper introduces a novel concept from coalitional game theory which allows the dynamic formation of coalitions among wireless nodes. A simple and distributed merge and split algorithm for coalition formation is constructed. This algorithm is applied to study the gains resulting from the cooperation among single antenna transmitters for virtual MIMO formation. The aim is to find an ultimate transmitters coalition structure that allows cooperating users to maximize their utilities while accounting for the cost of coalition formation. Through this novel game theoretical framework, the wireless network transmitters are able to self-organize and form a structured network composed of disjoint stable coalitions. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm can improve the average individual user utility by 26.4% as well as cope with the mobility of the distributed users.Comment: This paper is accepted for publication at the IEEE ICC Workshop on Cooperative Communications and Networkin