Control, Risk and Information Security Precautions

The introduction of the Internet to the business world has changed many ways of doing business. Unfortunately, the Internet has also become an arena where individuals are constantly at risk for computer viruses, spyware/adware infection, and malicious attacks designed to misuse or appropriate corporate assets. The wide-spread publicity of both cyber-attacks and ways to combat these problems, public and corporate education efforts, and prevention efforts (including corporate spending on new protections and enforcement of existing policies), suggest that it is logical for users to put precautionary practices in place. Unfortunately, they often don’t. Many individuals within organizations underestimate their vulnerability and do not follow prescribed security policies and procedures implemented within their organizations. Extant security literature heavily emphasizes automatic or programmed security measures, but does not focus strongly on the behaviors of individuals in the security setting. This paper examines two research questions: What are the effects of organizational policies and procedures on security precautions taken by individuals? What is the role that individual risk perceptions play in individual cyberprecautions choices? These questions will be addressed by theory taken from the formal control and fear of crime literatures. This theory posits that formal controls and individuals’ experiences have a strong effect on both individual perceptions of mandatory rules and individual risk perceptions. These perceptions, in turn, lead to precaution-taking behaviors. The resulting model will be tested with a field survey

Tort, Social Security, and No-Fault Schemes: Lessons from Real-World Experiments

Background Anthropometric measurements are useful in clinical practice since they are non-invasive and cheap. Previous studies suggest that sagittal abdominal diameter (SAD) may be a better measure of visceral fat depots. The aim of this study was to prospectively explore and compare how laboratory and anthropometric risk markers predicted subclinical organ damage in 255 patients, with type 2 diabetes, after four years. Methods Baseline investigations were performed in 2006 and were repeated at follow-up in 2010. Carotid intima-media thickness (IMT) was evaluated by ultrasonography and aortic pulse wave velocity (PWV) was measured with applanation tonometry over the carotid and femoral arteries at baseline and at follow-up in a cohort of subjects with type 2 diabetes aged 55–65 years old. Results There were significant correlations between apolipoprotein B (apoB) (r = 0.144, p = 0.03), C - reactive protein (CRP) (r = 0.172, p = 0.009) at baseline and IMT measured at follow-up. After adjustment for sex, age, treatment with statins and Hba1c, the associations remained statistically significant. HbA1c, total cholesterol or LDL-cholesterol did not correlate to IMT at follow-up. Baseline body mass index (BMI) (r = 0.130, p = 0.049), waist circumference (WC) (r = 0.147, p = 0.027) and sagittal Abdominal Diameter (SAD) (r = 0.184, p = 0.007) correlated to PWV at follow-up. Challenged with sex, SBP and HbA1c, the association between SAD, not WC nor BMI, and PWV remained statistically significant (p = 0.036). In a stepwise linear regression, entering both SAD and WC, the association between SAD and PWV was stronger than the association between WC and PWV. Conclusions We conclude that apoB and CRP, but not LDL-cholesterol predicted subclinical atherosclerosis. Furthermore, SAD was more independent in predicting arterial stiffness over time, compared with WC, in middle-aged men and women with type 2 diabetes.Funding Agencies|Medical Research Council of Southeast Sweden||Center for Medical Image Science and Visualization (CMIV)||Linkoping University||Futurum||King Gustaf V and Queen Victoria Freemason Foundation||GE Healthcare||Swedish Heart-Lung Foundation||Swedish Research Council Grant|12661|</p

Is the responsibilization of the cyber security risk reasonable and judicious?

Cyber criminals appear to be plying their trade without much hindrance. Home computer users are particularly vulnerable to attack by an increasingly sophisticated and globally dispersed hacker group. The smartphone era has exacerbated the situation, offering hackers even more attack surfaces to exploit. It might not be entirely coincidental that cyber crime has mushroomed in parallel with governments pursuing a neoliberalist agenda. This agenda has a strong drive towards individualizing risk i.e. advising citizens how to take care of themselves, and then leaving them to face the consequences if they choose not to follow the advice. In effect, citizens are “responsibilized .” Whereas responsibilization is effective for some risks, the responsibilization of cyber security is, we believe, contributing to the global success of cyber attacks. There is, consequently, a case to be made for governments taking a more active role than the mere provision of advice, which is the case in many countries. We conclude with a concrete proposal for a risk regulation regime that would more effectively mitigate and ameliorate cyber risk

"Out of the loop": autonomous weapon systems and the law of armed conflict

The introduction of autonomous weapon systems into the “battlespace” will profoundly influence the nature of future warfare. This reality has begun to draw the attention of the international legal community, with increasing calls for an outright ban on the use of autonomous weapons systems in armed conflict. This Article is intended to help infuse granularity and precision into the legal debates surrounding such weapon systems and their future uses. It suggests that whereas some conceivable autonomous weapon systems might be prohibited as a matter of law, the use of others will be unlawful only when employed in a manner that runs contrary to the law of armed conflict’s prescriptive norms governing the “conduct of hostilities.” This Article concludes that an outright ban of autonomous weapon systems is insupportable as a matter of law, policy, and operational good sense. Indeed, proponents of a ban underestimate the extent to which the law of armed conflict, including its customary law aspect, will control autonomous weapon system operations. Some autonomous weapon systems that might be developed would already be unlawful per se under existing customary law, irrespective of any treaty ban. The use of certain others would be severely limited by that law. Furthermore, an outright ban is premature since no such weapons have even left the drawing board. Critics typically either fail to take account of likely developments in autonomous weapon systems technology or base their analysis on unfounded assumptions about the nature of the systems. From a national security perspective, passing on the opportunity to develop these systems before they are fully understood would be irresponsible. Perhaps even more troubling is the prospect that banning autonomous weapon systems altogether based on speculation as to their future form could forfeit their potential use in a manner that would minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects when compared to non-autonomous weapon systems

The Impunity Project of the Inter American Press Association: Final Summary Report 2003-2006

Evaluates the impact of the initiative's rapid response unit, which investigates attacks and provides legal assistance; advertising campaign to make cases visible; and training program to prevent future attacks. Includes case summaries

Invisible injuries: concussive effects and international humanitarian law

The concussive effects of weapons used on the modern battlefield can cause Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). Indeed, TBI has been termed the "signature wound" of the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. To date, the injury has not been taken into account by armed forces in their application of international humanitarian law norms regarding attacks that affect civilians. Of particular note in this regard are the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in attack. This article opens the discussion about this recently discovered consequence of warfare for the civilian population. It examines the state of the science regarding TBI and queries whether the understanding of such injuries has reached the point at which commanders in the field are obligated to begin considering, as a matter of humanitarian law, the risk of causing TBI to civilians when they attack enemy forces. It concludes with a practical assessment of how they might do so

The law of cyber targeting

Cyber technology on the battlefield has outpaced the law, or at least full understanding of how extant law governs emerging capabilities—a strategically perilous state of affairs