The Economics of Content Protection

In a model that allows smooth substitution between domestic and imported inputs, content protection distorts inout choice but does not force a divergence between price and unit production cost. Content protection biases gains intechnical efficiency away from those saving domestic input and toward those saving imported input. By increasing derived demand for the domestic input,a marginally effective content requirement benefits suppliers of this input. Increases in the content requirement above the marginally effective level increase such benefits to suppliers of the domestic input provided that the price elasticity of demand for the final product is less than a critical value. The consequences of content protection are not materially affected by monopoly in the domestic final product market or monopsony in the domestic input market unless such monopoly or monopsony are created by content protection. The situation of a monopolistic supplier of the domestic input is enhanced by content protection.

Content Protection and Oligopolistic Interactions

In oligopolistic situations content protection can have unexpected effects as it changes the nature of interactions between input suppliers. With a duoply, it does so in a manner that makes the foreign firm wish to match price increases and decreases of the domestic firm. Domestic input suppliers can therefore lose from such policies, even when set at free trade levels. The relation between input demands, the form of protection, and the degree of substitution between inputs is shown to define the effects of content protection and to provide the basis for understanding who might lobby for protection in different environments.

Local content protection reconsidered: the case of domestic monopsonist

In this paper we examine how local content protection (LCP) affects the use of the domestic intermediates, the use of total intermediates and the domestic welfare when domestic intermediate-goods market is under monopsony. In the domestic intermediate-goods market under monopsony, the marginal expenditure cost (MEC) of using domestic intermediates has a discontinuous segment because the average expenditure cost (AEC) is a kinked curve. It is shown that there exists a case where because of the discontinuity of the marginal expenditure cost, LCP has no effect on the use of domestic intermediates and has a negative impact on the domestic final-goods producer. This paper provides a summary of the general effects of LCP on the domestic intermediate-goods market under monopsony in terms of resource allocations and the domestic welfare. Moreover, the effects of LCP under monopsony are compared with the case under perfect competition and under free trade.

Economics of Domestic Cultural Content Protection in Broadcasting, The

We analyze the economics of domestic cultural content protection in terrestrial broadcasting, the most widespread policy instrument used in broadcasting. Using the love-of-variety approach, we model a representative consumer deriving utility from broadcasting services net of advertising,and allocating scarce time between consuming the various broadcasting services and leisure. Advertising is a nuisance; it costs time yet brings no utility. Broadcasting is a pure public good; broadcasters make profit in the monopolistic competition environment by bundling advertising with valuable cultural content. We impose a discrete domestic content requirement and then investigate the effects of its marginal changes on consumption of domestic broadcasting. Domestic content requirement may reduce (increase) consumption of domestic programs when consumer's demand is highly elastic (inelastic), the degree of preference for foreign content over domestic content is high (low) and opportunity cost of listening time is high (low). The reduction occurs because the consumer reshuffles her consumption bundle towards leisure away from high domestic-content stations thereby reducing the overall aggregate consumption of broadcasting, and subsequently, the overall aggregate consumption of domestic programs.boradcasting; domestic content; radio; cultural protection

Digital Watermarking as Content Protection Scheme

Nowadays, as the Internet grows rapidly, the copyright laws are not effective anymore, since a lot of copyrighted products (picture, audio, video, document, etc.) are available as digital data. Any unauthorized parties able to produce identical copies of digital data without degrading the original contents and to distribute the copies over the network. This condition has led to a strong demand for reliable and secure distribution of digital data over networks. Such a technique developed to overcome this problem is digital watermarking. Digital watermarking is a process in digital domain, which embeds a watermark into a copyrighted digital data, to protect its value, so that it cannot be used by unauthorized parties. This paper is intended to give an overview on digital watermarking. First, three application fields of watermarking are described and illustrated with some scenarios, namely watermarking for copyright protection, watermarking for copy protection, and watermarking for image authentication. Then watermarking techniques are discussed, starting from the basic watermarking procedure, followed by review of some watermarking techniques. And later, some attacks and obstacles to watermarking are highlighted. In conclusion, digital watermarking technology plays important role in content protection issues. Attacks and obstacles are also had to be faced by this technology. The main obstacle is that there is no standard available for watermarking techniques. Without any specific standard, it is difficult to determine how robust a watermarking technique should be

HARDWARE SECURITY-BASED DATA CONTENT PROTECTION

The method described here, uses a hardware‐based handshaking and hardware bound policies executed in computing devices, to geo‐fence contents being viewed in computers

Two content protection schemes for digital items

Modern techniques make digital articles easy to copy and manipulate. Content protection systems aim at protecting the rights of producers and distributors. These mostly rely on data encryption, digital watermarking, and special-purpose devices. In this paper, we describe two content protection schemes, both of which make use of tamper-resistant devices and devicer dependent decryption keys. One of the schemes uses a modified El Gamal system, in the other one we combine watermarking with encryption