Congestion pricing using a raffle-based scheme

We propose a raffle-based scheme for the decongestion of a shared resource. Our scheme builds on ideas from the economic literature on incentivizing contributions to a public good. We formulate a game-theoretic model for the decongestion problem in a setup with a finite number of users, as well as in a setup with an infinite number of non-atomic users. We analyze both setups, and show that the former converges toward the latter when the number of users becomes large. We compare our results to existing results for the public good provision problem. Overall, our results establish that raffle-based schemes are useful in addressing congestion problems.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS-0910711)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CCF-0424422)United States. Air Force Office of Scientific Research (FA9550-06-1-0244

Incentive schemes for Internet congestion management: Raffles versus time-of-day pricing

The Internet is plagued with congestion problems of growing severity which are worst at peak periods. In this paper, we compare two schemes that incentivize users to shift part of their usage from the peak-time to the off-peak time. The traditional time-of-day pricing scheme gives a fixed reward per unit of shifted usage. Conversely, the raffle-based scheme provides a random reward distributed in proportion of each user's fraction of the total shifted usage. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that both schemes can achieve an optimal level of decongestion at a unique Nash equilibrium. We provide a comparison of the schemes' sensitivity to uncertainty of the users' utilities.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS-0910711

Incentive Mechanisms for Internet Congestion Management: Fixed-Budget Rebate versus Time-of-Day Pricing

Mobile data traffic has been steadily rising in the past years. This has generated a significant interest in the deployment of incentive mechanisms to reduce peak-time congestion. Typically, the design of these mechanisms requires information about user demand and sensitivity to prices. Such information is naturally imperfect. In this paper, we propose a \emph{fixed-budget rebate mechanism} that gives each user a reward proportional to his percentage contribution to the aggregate reduction in peak time demand. For comparison, we also study a time-of-day pricing mechanism that gives each user a fixed reward per unit reduction of his peak-time demand. To evaluate the two mechanisms, we introduce a game-theoretic model that captures the \emph{public good} nature of decongestion. For each mechanism, we demonstrate that the socially optimal level of decongestion is achievable for a specific choice of the mechanism's parameter. We then investigate how imperfect information about user demand affects the mechanisms' effectiveness. From our results, the fixed-budget rebate pricing is more robust when the users' sensitivity to congestion is "sufficiently" convex. This feature of the fixed-budget rebate mechanism is attractive for many situations of interest and is driven by its closed-loop property, i.e., the unit reward decreases as the peak-time demand decreases.Comment: To appear in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networkin

Gamification in transport interventions: Another way to improve travel behavioural change

Gamification is dramatically transforming how behaviour change interventions are delivered. The design of gaming products in the field of transport, a field which is perceived as having derived demand, is largely underdeveloped. This paper explores gamification in the context of transport, proposes a conceptual theoretical framework that explains why and how gamification may be designed and evaluated, and synthesises current practice regarding the range of interventions offered thus far. The conclusions identify strategies and implications for the improvement to existing schemes as well as guidance for future research into gamification

Linear Regression from Strategic Data Sources

Linear regression is a fundamental building block of statistical data analysis. It amounts to estimating the parameters of a linear model that maps input features to corresponding outputs. In the classical setting where the precision of each data point is fixed, the famous Aitken/Gauss-Markov theorem in statistics states that generalized least squares (GLS) is a so-called "Best Linear Unbiased Estimator" (BLUE). In modern data science, however, one often faces strategic data sources, namely, individuals who incur a cost for providing high-precision data. In this paper, we study a setting in which features are public but individuals choose the precision of the outputs they reveal to an analyst. We assume that the analyst performs linear regression on this dataset, and individuals benefit from the outcome of this estimation. We model this scenario as a game where individuals minimize a cost comprising two components: (a) an (agent-specific) disclosure cost for providing high-precision data; and (b) a (global) estimation cost representing the inaccuracy in the linear model estimate. In this game, the linear model estimate is a public good that benefits all individuals. We establish that this game has a unique non-trivial Nash equilibrium. We study the efficiency of this equilibrium and we prove tight bounds on the price of stability for a large class of disclosure and estimation costs. Finally, we study the estimator accuracy achieved at equilibrium. We show that, in general, Aitken's theorem does not hold under strategic data sources, though it does hold if individuals have identical disclosure costs (up to a multiplicative factor). When individuals have non-identical costs, we derive a bound on the improvement of the equilibrium estimation cost that can be achieved by deviating from GLS, under mild assumptions on the disclosure cost functions.Comment: This version (v3) extends the results on the sub-optimality of GLS (Section 6) and improves writing in multiple places compared to v2. Compared to the initial version v1, it also fixes an error in Theorem 6 (now Theorem 5), and extended many of the result

Time dependent pricing in wireless data networks: Flat-rate vs. usage-based schemes

With the advances of bandwidth-intensive mobile devices, we see severe congestion problems in wireless data networks. Recently, research emerges to solve this problem from a pricing point of view. Time dependent pricing has been introduced, and initial investigations have shown its advantages over the conventional time independent pricing. Nevertheless, much is unknown in how a practical and effective time dependent pricing scheme can be designed. In this paper, we explore the design space of time dependent pricing. In particular, we focus on a number of schemes, e.g., the usage-based scheme, the flat-rate scheme, and a mixture of them which we called a cap scheme. Our findings include: 1) the ISP obtains a higher profit with usage-based (or flat-rate) scheme if the capacity is insufficient (or sufficient); 2) the usage-based scheme usually achieves a higher consumer surplus and more efficient traffic utilization than the flat-rate scheme; and 3) the cap scheme is strongly preferred by the ISP to further increase its revenue. We believe our findings provide important insights for ISPs to design effective pricing schemes.Department of ComputingRefereed conference pape

HOT Lanes with a Refund Option and Potential Application of Connected Vehicles

abstract: Priced Managed Lanes (MLs) have been increasingly advocated as one of the effective ways to mitigating congestion in recent years. This study explores a new and innovative pricing strategy for MLs called Travel Time Refund (TTR). The proposed TTR provides an additional option to paying drivers that insures their travel time by issuing a refund to the toll cost if they do not reach their destination within specified travel times due to accidents or other unforeseen circumstances. Perceived benefits of TTR include raised public acceptance towards priced MLs, utilization increase of HOV/HOT lanes, overall congestion mitigation, and additional funding for relevant transportation agencies. To gauge travelers’ interests of TTR and to analyse its possible impacts, a stated preference (SP) survey was performed. An exploratory and statistical analysis of the survey responses revealed negative interest towards HOT and TTR option in accordance with common wisdom and previous studies. However, it is found that travelers are less negative about TTR than HOT alone; supporting the idea, that TTR could make HOT facilities more appealing. The impact of travel time reliability and latent variables representing psychological constructs on travelers’ choices in response to this new pricing strategy was also analysed. The results indicate that along with travel time and reliability, the decision maker’s attitudes and the level of comprehension of the concept of HOT and TTR play a significant role in their choice making. While the refund option may be theoretically and analytically feasible, the practical implementation issues cannot be ignored. This study also provides a discussion of the potential implementation considerations that include information provision to connected and non-connected vehicles, distinction between toll-only and refund customers, measurement of actual travel time, refund calculation and processing and safety and human factors issues. As the market availability of Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) is prognosticated by 2020, the potential impact of such technologies on effective demand management, especially on MLs is worth investigating. Simulation analysis was performed to evaluate the system performance of a hypothetical road network at varying market penetration of CAVs. The results indicate that Connected Vehicles (CVs) could potentially encourage and enhance the use of MLs.Dissertation/ThesisDoctoral Dissertation Civil, Environmental and Sustainable Engineering 201

Is Energy Storage an Economic Opportunity for the Eco-Neighborhood?

International audienceIn this article, we consider houses belonging to an eco-neighborhood in which inhabitants have the capacity to optimize dynamically the energy demand and the energy storage level so as to maximize their utility. The inhabitants' preferences are characterized by their sensitivity toward comfort versus price, the optimal expected temperature in the house, thermal loss and heating efficiency of their house. At his level, the eco-neighborhood manager shares the resource produced by the eco-neighborhood according to two schemes: an equal allocation between the houses and a priority based one. The problem is modeled as a stochastic game and solved using stochastic dynamic programming. We simulate the energy consumption of the eco-neighborhood under various pricing mechanisms: flat rate, peak and off-peak hour, blue/white/red day, peak day clearing and a dynamic update of the price based on the consumption of the eco-neighborhood. We observe that economic incentives for houses to store energy depend deeply on the implemented pricing mechanism and on the homogeneity in the houses' characteristics. Furthermore, when prices are based on the consumption of the eco-neighborhood, storage appears as a compensation for the errors made by the service provider in the prediction of the consumption of the eco-neighborhood