Inconsistency Management from the Standpoint of Possibilistic Logic

International audienceUncertainty and inconsistency pervade human knowledge. Possibilistic logic, where propositional logic formulas are associated with lower bounds of a necessity measure, handles uncertainty in the setting of possibility theory. Moreover, central in standard possibilistic logic is the notion of inconsistency level of a possibilistic logic base, closely related to the notion of consistency degree of two fuzzy sets introduced by L. A. Zadeh. Formulas whose weight is strictly above this inconsistency level constitute a sub-base free of any inconsistency. However, several extensions, allowing for a paraconsistent form of reasoning, or associating possibilistic logic formulas with information sources or subsets of agents, or extensions involving other possibility theory measures, provide other forms of inconsistency, while enlarging the representation capabilities of possibilistic logic. The paper offers a structured overview of the various forms of inconsistency that can be accommodated in possibilistic logic. This overview echoes the rich representation power of the possibility theory framework

On the Existence of Characterization Logics and Fundamental Properties of Argumentation Semantics

Given the large variety of existing logical formalisms it is of utmost importance to select the most adequate one for a specific purpose, e.g. for representing the knowledge relevant for a particular application or for using the formalism as a modeling tool for problem solving. Awareness of the nature of a logical formalism, in other words, of its fundamental intrinsic properties, is indispensable and provides the basis of an informed choice. One such intrinsic property of logic-based knowledge representation languages is the context-dependency of pieces of knowledge. In classical propositional logic, for example, there is no such context-dependence: whenever two sets of formulas are equivalent in the sense of having the same models (ordinary equivalence), then they are mutually replaceable in arbitrary contexts (strong equivalence). However, a large number of commonly used formalisms are not like classical logic which leads to a series of interesting developments. It turned out that sometimes, to characterize strong equivalence in formalism L, we can use ordinary equivalence in formalism L0: for example, strong equivalence in normal logic programs under stable models can be characterized by the standard semantics of the logic of here-and-there. Such results about the existence of characterizing logics has rightly been recognized as important for the study of concrete knowledge representation formalisms and raise a fundamental question: Does every formalism have one? In this thesis, we answer this question with a qualified “yes”. More precisely, we show that the important case of considering only finite knowledge bases guarantees the existence of a canonical characterizing formalism. Furthermore, we argue that those characterizing formalisms can be seen as classical, monotonic logics which are uniquely determined (up to isomorphism) regarding their model theory. The other main part of this thesis is devoted to argumentation semantics which play the flagship role in Dung’s abstract argumentation theory. Almost all of them are motivated by an easily understandable intuition of what should be acceptable in the light of conflicts. However, although these intuitions equip us with short and comprehensible formal definitions it turned out that their intrinsic properties such as existence and uniqueness, expressibility, replaceability and verifiability are not that easily accessible. We review the mentioned properties for almost all semantics available in the literature. In doing so we include two main axes: namely first, the distinction between extension-based and labelling-based versions and secondly, the distinction of different kind of argumentation frameworks such as finite or unrestricted ones