Learning with bounded memory.

The paper studies infinite repetition of finite strategic form games. Players use a learning behavior and face bounds on their cognitive capacities. We show that for any given beliefprobability over the set of possible outcomes where players have no experience. games can be payoff classified and there always exists a stationary state in the space of action profiles. In particular, if the belief-probability assumes all possible outcomes without experience to be equally likely, in one class of Prisoners' Dilemmas where the average defecting payoff is higher than the cooperative payoff and the average cooperative payoff is lower than the defecting payoff, play converges in the long run to the static Nash equilibrium while in the other class of Prisoners' Dilemmas where the reserve holds, play converges to cooperation. Results are applied to a large class of 2 x 2 games.Cognitive complexity; Bounded logistic quantal response learning; Long run outcomes;

Game theory

game theory

Load Balancing for Dynamic Clients, Game Theory Approach

We address the problem of load balancing which is considered as a technique to spread work between two or more computers in order to get optimal response time and resource utilization between servers by using Nash equilibrium which is the central concern of game theory. We use a normal form table to express the payoff for every client, every client has estimate time for execution and every server has speed, from these facts, we innovate a dynamic payoff matrix to evaluate a Nash equilibrium point and then determine which server can serve an appropriate client to achieve best load balancing which is called "server matching" (Each client is matched to exactly one server, but a server can be matched to multiple clients or none.). We use Netlogo simulation to implement this matching, besides a useful game theory oolset called GAMBIT (Gambit toolset homepage, 2005) to solve the payoff matrix and compute Nash equilibrium point. This paper was done between the years 2007 – 2009, and to know what was done in this paper we can argue that we contribute in accomplishing the load balancing between servers, using new technique depends on game theory perspective, for that reason we can answer the question why this thesis was done, because it is very vital in achieving this goal. We use in our thesis a simulation methodology to prove the results that we have obtained from the simulation program which is a Netlogo V4.0.2, and we compare the results with traditionally techniques in load balancing. Finally, the results show that we improve the performance for the whole system by 4% in achieving load balancing and overweight the possibilities of using this technique in real system around the world

Learning with bounded memory

The paper studies infinite repetition of finite strategic form games. Players use a learning behavior and face bounds on their cognitive capacities. We show that for any given beliefprobability over the set of possible outcomes where players have no experience. games can be payoff classified and there always exists a stationary state in the space of action profiles. In particular, if the belief-probability assumes all possible outcomes without experience to be equally likely, in one class of Prisoners' Dilemmas where the average defecting payoff is higher than the cooperative payoff and the average cooperative payoff is lower than the defecting payoff, play converges in the long run to the static Nash equilibrium while in the other class of Prisoners' Dilemmas where the reserve holds, play converges to cooperation. Results are applied to a large class of 2 x 2 games

Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies in the EMU: Spillovers, Asymmetries, and Institutions

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the EMU context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When asymmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination doesn’t produce further gains in policymakers’ welfare.macroeconomic stabilization, EMU, coalition formation, linear quadratic differential games

Contributions to Game Theory and Management. Vol. III. Collected papers presented on the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management.

The collection contains papers accepted for the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 24-26, 2009, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The volume may be recommended for researches and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.